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la thm follovflng pages an attoiqpt has baen niadG to 
anolyao ttm various fsotors and forces contributing ttie 
gsmeral* as \mll as tt^ specific bacxgrouncl of the I'IJOQIO-
Freooh Israeli aggression against Egypt* It; is also high-
lighted that the crisis vhich erupted in October 19^6 has 
no fundamental connection either with Suez or ^inai as 
claliRsd by the aggres^^rs* The nationali»at;ion of thtD 
Sues Canal had provided a kind of oppojrtuniLty which the 
western powers required at most* They usod it as a pretext 
to Justify their hostile action against l<»asser who had become 
a danger to the iiqperialist interests in the Middle ^astern 
region* liasser's action not only jeopardiifted tliuir ecot>oiiiic 
intarests but it endeu the Anglo-French in^ e^rial legacy witii 
£gypt« For Zsraelt whic^ had adopted a policy of expansionism 
since its creation^ an attack on ^ gypt was mure appealing 
vtmn she was assured tx<at Anglo-Frexuh Oov<.^ rnia3nts woulu 
cooperate in her deed* 
Apart fr«HB the countries directly involved in thu 
1956 crisis^ the role of the two super yoMorsg the UH, tt^ 
Arab %forld and the Afro-Asian countries hajs also buen exa-
oiined* 
il 
This work aims at hlstoriea analytical study ^f the 
onrants laadlng to tho Anglompranch isr^all attack on figypt. 
Tho introductocy ehaptor brings Into focus the concnsrclal ;, 
Strategical and political slgnifiean o£ tlM Suez Ccmal 
due to which it had become an object of Great Power rivalry 
in iigypt* The seooiMi chapter aeaka to examine the war time 
diploMcy of Great Britain which ultimately resulted into 
the creation of Israel - a cancer in the heart of the Arab 
world* It is also high lighted that the involv<ament of iigypt 
in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war and its subseciuont defeat pro-* 
vod tu be a last nail in the coffin of Mohmxiiad /ai dynasty* 
The tiiird ch«^ pter deals with tho causes anci consequences of 
the Sgyptiiui revolittion. The fourth chapter presents the 
emergence of iJas^ er as a syndool of Arab nationalism in 
the Middle £ast« who not only challengeu tlie western policies 
in trie rogion# but established a close liaJLson with the con>» 
munist countries^ particularly with aussisw it is also argued 
that his act of nationaliaation of the Sue:s Canal was not thi 
^ole reason of the Anglo«>Fr«ndh hostility against £igypt# al-
though it provided a provocation and preterit to their action. 
The fifth eh4^ ?tor deals with the causes of iaral*s antagonism 
towards Sgypt and the Zionists design to «*]ctract every possi-
ble benifit from the Anglo»french ooc^ ;>eration in her military 
action* The effectiveness of the pressure oxertod by the vari-
ous countries^ particularly the United iitates and the i>oviet 
Russia t:irough the United i^ ations resolutions (in cose o£ 
i U 
iyaBTica ttiTough hexr oeononlo &*mGtXotm dgalnat the aggresaors) 
£or a e«tiuie£lr« ondi uneoncULtiooal witticUcr«w«a from the Egyptian 
torritoritts oco^pi«d Joy aritadn* FraiKie ftnci Xarael in tho wai 
h«0 a lso biaon flOKaffllned, A conclusion i s «ttu»inpt@a after ex<au» 
raining the factors mv3i forces rosponsibiti i:or tho creation 
of tho ciijaato of hotrod and d i s t rys t vhich ultiaiatoly rosval-
tod in the t r i p a r t i t e attack on £gypt« Zt ^liso prusonts tho 
long term consoqusnoos of tho war in tho Middle i^astem p o l i -
t i c s in gonoral* and in £gypt# in particuljir. 
Finally* Z ostj^ross toy doop sense of gratitude to 
professor ^ .A^H, ailgrami* Chairman* Oepartiosnt of P o l i t i c a l 
^ i ence* A»M*y,* for his kind oncouragesaont and cjuiaance i n -
proparing t h i s dissertat ion* 
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Chiq;>tttr -> I 
OaO^POLITICAL IMPORTAi^ Ci:: OF QMEZ Ci^HMs 
l^ie 3\iGZ c r i s i s of 1956« l i k e a l i major int&ri.atioxidl 
di6put€»s« has i t s own unique h i s t o r i c a l l>m:kgr<uWia, The h i s -
tory o£ i»%i»z CoDAl i s mariuid Isy var ious coi .trovex.sies a^d 
c o n f l i c t s , a r i s i n g out of attenq^ts t o cozatrol t h i s s t r a t e g i c 
water*way# which enhaiiCOd the g e o - p o l i t i c a l iinportai.co of 
Egypt i n the worla , Among f a c t o r s accountit^g fur tra^^eaies 
and triwnphs of i^gypt# the geographical lo<;ation of ^uez 
Canal has always been given prime in^Kjrtar.ce, 
The ouez Ca!:al« a f t e r i t s c o n s t r u c t i o n , had oec^^ie a 
part of the wor ld ' s phys i ca l and p o l i t i c a l geoyra^yhy. I t 
Joined the t'lediterraiiean ai.d Hed ooa# aiid Sioparated two 
2 
coi^tir^ents namely Asia and A f r i c a , The gctograj,>nicul 
l o c a t i o n of thvj ^us2 Cai^al has made I t s s t r a t e g i c value 
i n internativ^ijai a l f a i r s greater than that wf any othur 
marititioe Caxial i n the world, other routes <At& rouch lui.ger 
iii coqporis ion t o the ^uez i^assage and coxisuinoci niore t i n^ i 
ar.d mone/. <i:>uez Carial cut short the hundreds wf thou^^ands 
of mi les tho dista^iCe between i^i^ortant pairts o£ tho world. 
! • Hugh J , Schonf ie id , The ;*uog Canal in Peace a .^d v.art 
1869-1969, (X,oi.don, 'WSTTTpTW. ' " 
2 , The i i iddle £ a s t arid :.wrth <^ricai 19Q2-fc3> (Lo.-don, 
1983) , p . 1 4 5 . 
3 
has revoXutionlsed i n t e m a t i o n d l niarltitte jBhippin^i, Xiie 
rnain trade routes of the westerr) world t c tl}Q .'.i<i<lle arid 
Far East pa. &ed through the Suss Canal, "^le i;»uez Carjal"* 
s a i d the u . £ , fiecrotary of s t a t e * John Foster JL>U11«2S« " i s 
a water way of innportdnce t o a l l the nat ions* FL>C many o£ 
the:n in Europe and i n Asia i t Xa, i n almost l i t e r a l umiao, 
the l i f e l i n e i t has been c a l l e d " . Laying] a t the cros s road 
between the East and west* and between mari^ecs of ir;dustria-> 
l i z e d Europe and the raw mater ia l s of under developeu / ts ia , 
the ^uez Canal has a t t r a c t e d the bulK u£ C(.>tnmercial t r a f f i c 
5 
wf the world. Hure over* the economic oxpar s i o n of tlia ^.urupua. 
arid <\sian c o u n t r i e s it icreased the in|porta.ice wl the carnal. .»itn 
the discu^very o£ the Middle Eastern o i l * tite Canal ha i^ a l s o 
become an irnportant iuaritiroe route f o r petroleai t products 
of thu Uaitud iiitates* 
The advancement in s c i e n c e and technology i s anc-tir^r 
f a c t o r which has croatod a v a s t demand for raw mat.:ri.als of 
var ious s o r t s i n developed countr ies* which obviously goes 
through the 5uez Canal, Divers ion of trade t o a l t e r n a t i v e 
3 , Hm Fatha l la i^l^atib and omar Z, Ghobashy* rhe >-'Uea Canal t 
aafe and Free passage , Inforruation papers* i.;o,9. (i.ew Y.>rA« 
I960)* p , 6 . 
*• U»>>> 4>epartment of i»tate iiiuletii>. Vol , 3S,* 4,«-.,c>96, , i, i  
(/^ugust 27* 1956}* p . 3 3 5 , 
5 , Joseph A, ubieta* Jhe In ternat iona l o ta tus wf tho 
auea Caoal, I lnd e d , {thm Hague* 1970}* p , l . 
6 , iiennow^vram* The Evolution of aueg Coiiai >^tatug from 
la69 uato 1956t <^  Hisit^rical J u r i d i c a l ;^tudy» Clar is , 
routes i £ the passage of sh ip through the CUiital w&rc stoppod 
- o r 1£ western countr i e s at ten^ted t o reduce trieir ctepei <lo..ce 
upon t h i s v i t a l s ea liriK. would irivolved lortger ai&tai.c&0 ntore 
7 
sai l i i^y tlnie and higher e9q>ense8« The saviny it. sriippiny 
time e f f e c t e d kt^ the Canal i s roughly hai£ en the journey 
from aombay t o l^ver Pi>oi v ia»the Cape# isaetween oi.e quarter 
a..d a t h i r a t o china, with ntach smal ler d i l toro i i ce It. the 
trade with Austral ia^ Perhaps a day or two. As a r e s u l t 
tiite buropeat. countr ios navo become laoro aud noro depe:.<deut 
on the ^uez Caiial for obtaini i ig raw mater ia l s e s s o . i t i a i t o 
t h e i r expanding i n d u s t r i e s . Amongst the cofflrnooitio.^ goi^.^i 
south wards through the passage of tho Canal t<»> the ^uat 
were railway equipn>e:.t« inetals machiriery U; mout tho 
9 
resiuirements of und^r dovelopiag cou.'^tries,, In return, 
these countr i e s export r^w loateriaxs ir.ciuding Coal« Iron* 
Timber^ i'iber* Hubber« ores ar.d metals t o the " indus tr ia l 
Cure of tho world ocunomy*. i\mong the goods aau raw 
mator ia l s going north wards through the Caiial t o thc^ jest 
'vas the P e t r o l e vim products uf the Middle £atit* i>il ha^ b e e . 
ex' .ractea in P e r s i a but tho tremendous resources of o i l i;: 
Arabian Per.inasula vrere d iscovered in 1933.' I t furt^ter 
77* The ecoaomist* Vol,« 130« ^^o. S64i9. {Uraaon, Augu£>t 4, 
1956} , p . 4 2 0 . 
Q« Richard C« vmit ing, *The ouea Canal and iiriti^^h ^cciioroy; 
191d«1960« i n Keith M. w i l s o a , (£d.}« ilrooorialistn ai.a 
iiiIo«»i;.yyptiati 
i i e e a l B o 
9 . I b i d , , p ,77 
10 . I b i d . 
1 1 . The Economist* (August 4 , 1956) , p»420» 
eiihariC@cl the g<3o«»strategic sigi.iJElcaiio& at the i^u&'z Canal. 
European aatiorts* for str^^tegic as well as econoiidc r&aso:>3 
became luvolved in uiX ea^Xoration ii. the i^iddle ^ . a s t .The 
^ue2 Cai^ai played & v i t a l r o l e in t he vBfOVQs^»iX& u£ coinudi* 
t i e s aiid in the l a u l t i l a t ^ r a i payraerjt& systvira tw which tnese 
. 12 
hiovenseiits gave rise"* 
The main producer* east of 3ues using tne Coi^ al v;ero 
Iudia« Uurma and Ceylon. These countries scat jute« cotton 
textiles* Tea* Vegi^table* animals £ats« Oil ana Variety wf 
13 
ntetals and minerals t o the viest* But th6> cnajur eleiiiei^t 
wf which Br i t a in and other £ropean count r ios depor.aeu upi>n 
14 the ^ues Canal was o i l from the middle i^ast. Duri'.y tlie 
world war IZ# the o i l played the ro l e of v i t a l war iua tor ia l . 
This was shown in the cho^-igii.vj ^topottiou of Canal Cargo t -
world trade* when ID 1948 o i l Ixsconwi raoro JUnportai^t than 
15 
^thor north bound cargoes . i%t the time •.*£. ^aez cri^itii 
of 19S6* Europe obtained aoixm 80 p^x c^nt o£ i t s o i l require* 
niants from the Middle iuost* most of t h i s oeii^y tr^na^otted 
through the oues Canal, although shor t liv\jd* tho c losure 
of oues Coiial in 19&6 ceased Cwii&idoroble hard-snip aiau 
affec ted the ecoao(% of various na t io s« Zn 1870* tho t i x s t 
year a f t e r the Canal wo© opesied t o navigat iou, tiio i.uji^ber - i 
12. Whiting* Op, c i t . * p . 7 7 . 
13* JCbia. 
!*• The Economists (August 4* 19S6}* p.420> 
15. whiting* Op. Cit .« pp.77-76. 
v««s«l« pammXng through it was 466 with an aggregate net 
tonnaga of about 436«000 tons* ay 19S5« the y&cix bofore 
the nationalisation of Suas Canal by Egyptian GuvarnoMntt 
thoae figuraa had riaan to 14^666 ships with mi dggrag<atti 
nat tonnage of ovar 115 million tons and it continued to 
17 increase there after. 
The geo*political and strategic io^portimce o£ the ouez 
Canal had beecxaa even greater than ever as a result u£ the 
two world wars* the had been the main pasii^ gc way thruugh 
which heavy eqtiipment and sea borne war materials were sup-
plied* The Canal had proved as a vital linii betwuen a::urope 
and Aaia and an essential strategic base in peace aa well 
as in war* ^ Since its construction* the Sues Canal hod been 
locked upon as a prise or pown by the Great Powers, The 
strategic position of the li^xies Canal had also played on 
in^ portant role in the diplcmatic history of i;igypt« Dritoir. 
and FrarMse Gso«political in^portance oC Sueis Caiml was soon 
realised by dritoin who initially oppposed its creation and 
19 
considered it "unfeasible and politically inauvisaole'*. 
16* Cited in Joseph A. ubieta« op* Cit*« |q;>*l*2. 
17* Cited in Joseph A* obieta« op. dt.* p.2, 
16* Jon Kioiche* The iiecond Arab-Avfakening* (London* 1970}« 
p*a4, 
19. ahai^ Abdul wayyunt* Jigypt Reboraa A ;itudy of i.gypt*s 
Freedom Moyyoentt 1?45»1K* iii&v 
>^ e^e also Obieta* Qp. Cit^* p*3. and also Bennw-Avram, 
OP* Cit^* p*23* 
1^ 110 re«J.l24ation had toecon* • ma^ox cause* which brought 
20 Sgypt uactair ttm occupatioo of Britiah Govemnent in 1882 
•nd ttm pmrpmtMAtlon o£ tkim British control until 1956. ^  
WortmrlY Britain opposod tho Canal *« jupojoct due to fe«ur 
of France* whose predominoiKai in Sflypt wouldi upset the 
strategic balance of the Hediterranean and endanger the 
British positicMi in XiMU.a. Soon after tim Canal vas Gcmsh" 
leted and formarliy oppoed in 1869 for navigation* the 
British Government realized that now it was not possible to 
leeep ttm world powers away especially Franoct from the arad« 
whisAi was economically* coaraarcially and strategically iiqpos-
tant to her. The creation of Suez Canal naturally redu^»d tho 
conniercial value of the c^pe route* which w«i8 dominated by the 
British alone* As a result* a new geo«politiccil concept was 
22 developed in European diplomacy. 
Za order to neutralize French influences in Egypt ^ ind 
strengthen her position in Asia and Africa^ it had become 
a part of the British strategy to acquire mc»re and more 
control ovcMT the Suez Canal* This was i^ romoted by Disraeli's 
purchase of almost half of the shares of th€t Suex Canal 
eonpany in 187S* and the maint^nenoe of Bjritish 
201 P*a. Vatikiotis* The History of gqypt i From M 
Ali to Sadat* ZZs^ ed** (London* 1980)* p.l69* 
uhamtnad 
21* D*A, Famie* Sast and west of Suez i Th«> sy^S Canal 
in History i 1854-1956* (London* 1969)^ p.737. 
22* H*L* Hosian* *The Suez Canal in the Timii of war** 
Foreign Affairs* («ew Yorlc* 1935)* Vol* 15.* p .94 . 
23 
forces in i^ g^ypt from 1862 to 1956. Di£>rac^ .i's purcoa&Q 
of the Can«l shares was undoubtedly royardud both t^ hcrne 
and abroad* "to be a prelude to some form ot Briti^ n^ coritr<vl 
24 
ever Egypt"* 
FreiiCh private interest recnaind* but icrom n^ v; oi., trie 
British Government becaoie a paranu^unt pcweir wn th^ cc^ i^ an^  * s 
board. Aa for i^ gypt it was rightly said that she "wa& no lin-
ger master in her own hwu:^ e« but hclple&slj^ subjected tw 
foroiyn interference both in its internal tmd it. its external, 
offairs".^^ 
The ^uez Canal "had joti^coinc the vital artery icr tho fluw 
of exports* iiqports and shipping of many nations;"* out Bri-
tain was certainly the biggest user of the caiial in b.th di<-> 
27 
rections from the very beginning* y^xiut 21 ^ iiilion metric 
tons out of the 67 million tons of oil movtdu noxt^ i ward thr-
ough the Canal in 1955 came tu this country, aritaii.'s is^ urt;. 
of rubber from Malaya* wheat Meat and .vot^l fruro Hustrftlia* 
Chromes frcMR East Africa* cotton* tea* oil t^iu iDanyanusu trum 
India* Jute from Pa^^stan* cea anui v^ ii frv, a Ceylon all traiiS* 
ported via Sues. In return Britain sent thtacis cwm.tri<s6 
23. Robert R« Bowie* buez 1956 i Internatio^.al crisis m^j. 
the Role of Law. "(London* 1974}* p.7. see also ubieta« 
Qp> Cit.* pp.8*9. 
24. Lord Kinross* Between Two w-east The Creation of the 
;£»ueg Cana4< (London* 1968)* p.276. £ee ai.8s> ubieta* 
UP. Cit.. p.c). anu axso i»cht*wfit3ld* Up. cit.# pp.48-49. 
25. Obieta* up. Cit.* p.9, 
26. aowie* uPj, Cit,* p.2. 
27. The £conomist. (August 4* 1956)* p.420. 
8 
naehinttry« Y«hiGXea« and eonsuMr goods* c<!»rt;aln ehemi<-
emXM «nd a«Miit« imieh «l8o p«ssed through tha Caxua. 
Soon aftMr i t « qp«ning unt i l 1956 the B\3»z Canal wos 
rttg4ucd«d 4MI a k»y f«aturtt of tha Bri t i sh sconoini^. Ths Sco» 
noadst* • fuaous Journal publi«h«d txom Loncton« oomtmnt^ 
that " i t had htimn eut by Franeh anargy and Egyptian money 
29 for Br i t i sh advantage*** Britain «merged as tim chief bene< 
f i e iary of tha Suwi canal %A»ii;di she had coophatically and 
inplmsably op];»MHikl. 
Oonoassion* Controversy %aa. Construction 
7lMi history of aneient Bgypt shovs that tha dream of 
building a water vm^ to connect the iMNiiterranean and the 
11 Aed Sea was aliire for centur ies ,* i t i s ^aso evident that 
i n the ancient moA medieval period the nttmi for a canal t o 
ae<»wK>date the water boriw t r a f f i c between the two seas was 
strongly f e l t * 
The modern j^iase of the Canal history laegins with the 
115 
landii^ of Hapolean in £gypt on July 1798* i^ epolean t<x»k 
a keen interest in the Canal project and revived the old 
28* Ibid, 
29, Quoted in whiting* gPjiSi&x* P^'^^ 
30* Kinross* qp* cit** p*66* 
31 . The WAR Year Book# I960* p*68* For fun:lier d e t a i l see 
(a>ieta« OP* c i t * / p*4* 
32 . obieta* qg. cit«# p.4* Bee a l so Tim Hicldle aast*l950, (l«ondon* 1950)* p*79* 
9 
l(toa of. d i g g i n g a c a n a l t o connec t t h e Hedlterrai^ear. a.iiu t na 
Red ^ea« i l l s corK^ueiit no t only i n t e i i s e f i e d th«t i u e a i^i wiygjLi.vj 
a canna l b u t i t a l s o d i v e r t e d t h e a t t e n t i o n wf tha wes t e rn 
33 
wor ld t o thii s t r a t e g i c in^>orta;ice of £gypt<i 
The d i s cove ry of Cape r o u t e i n 1498 j rad ica l l^ choiujua 
t h e ]9alai^4ce u£ wor ld t r d o e , Fr«iiice« aiid o t h e r M i d i t e r r a u e a i . 
34 
comnerc ia l powers were badly h i t by t h i s chu..«jc, ;»i:ice t n o 
cape r o u t e was doioinated by B r i t a i n , Frances iisver l o e t he r 
i n t e r e s t i n iigypt us t ^ l l as i n t h e Suez diu^i p s o j e c t * rWtivKg 
t h e £uropea:i s t a t e s Frai^ce enjoyed a l e a d i n g p u s i t i ^ n ii. t he 
e a s t e r n MCKliterranean, a*nd - o r y e o - g r a p h i c c a rua&on^ h e r i n -
t e r e s t i n t h e a n c i e n t Cc:^.iercial r o u t e thruugn &gypt vvos mure 
35 
greater than any other country, 
7he idoa o£ constructing a canal across tho l^ tnnti^  u£ 
u.iez was revived in modern tiioe largely due to tho t.ece~.sity 
felt in SuropOf and particularly in France, to <^t£. set ttie 
coflunercial advantages enjoyed by Britain ii. hex: traffic witin 
India viA the Cape by an alternative provisdon to fi^ .u out a 
36 
route niore accessible to iieditterra.nean pcvrers**. i^s the 
interest of France and Britain clashed over the caiial i^sue. 
33* Hobert ^tepheno* i^ assert political Leaders of the Iwentietn 
Cexitury, (Aylesbury', 1971), p*12. 
34, Kinross, op. Cit.# pp«6-7, 
35, Schonfield, op, Cit,# p,6, 
36, Zbid,, p.20. 
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it h^d becoma «i "diplcMnatic axiom** th«tt i:iie uae couz;try 
wQA to scixre the construction of the i^xusz Ctu-iAl ana the wtnor 
to prevent it. 
liepolean who had a desire to expai;d the hegeraon^ wf 
3d France ever Sgypt "to obtain mastery over the aediterraneaii" 
saw the Isthiaus o£ ^uez ix; a giobdi perspective a^ a i@diis 
of establishing the military and political power of France 
3y to counter the growiny doiainance of the Great iiritair.. tie 
tooK a practical step in this regard and so to say tiie age 
old canal project was to pass "from the real:as of thcvr^ 
40 into those of factual enquiry**,, Kapoleaj! appoi-tcu a 
teara of technicians AT.J. engineers to unaer tdi o the wor^ 
of canal. Among them was the £ amour enyinour J*;'i. ijepero whw 
conducted the survey of the Zsthmus of :uuez onU ropurteu 
against the cutting of a direct canal due to tho ditterouce 
in the level of the two iie<AB0 According to this report R/Qd 
Sea was more thari thirty feet higher than the level cf the 
41 
Mediterranean. Lepere* opposed the construction ui a 
42 
sea to a sea Canals This misconception prevalloo u;,til 
1647.*^ 
37. |b^d, 
38. jayyum. Op. Cit.. p.2. 
39. Kinross, up. Cit.. p.6. 
40. Ibid., p.l4. 
41. :ichonfield, op. cit., p. 11. 
42. H.i^ , Hooivin, Sritieh Routes tu India, {i^ oiiaoi., 196G), 
pp. 220-230. 
43. Fathalla SI Katib a^ ju ^ mar 2. Ohobashy, up. cit., p.7, 
11 
44 NOjpolean** rule in Egypt ended after a mere two ye^ urs. 
ThG end o£ French rule left « political vacwim in tiie country 
in which a struggle for power aoiong con^peting ground was 
45 
developed* This struggle gave rise of rioharnmau /ill« an 
Altmnian officer in the Ottoman An9(y« who by li.|Uidatlag 
the M«unluK8« establishod a dynasty of herecdtary pasha's 
iii £gypt» In 160S he was recognized Ijy the ;jultan as Gover-
ner of Sgypt* In 1607 he defeated a British fcrctj which iimi 
occupied Alexandria* Finally a Firmai; of June 1841 grar.ted 
him the hereditary viceroy of £gypt under suzerainty of the 
47 Turkish £iqpire« 
iXiring Hohamnau Ali*s reign« £gypt r^ igaiiit^ d pr«^ atiye 
and made progress in various fields* But tJh& scheras for a 
maritime canal across the isUunus of 3uez was still iii cha<^ s. 
Various attempts had boon made by France to achieve this enJ 
but no perndseiun was granted until lt>54 due tc- the stroxig 
British opposition. MohativtMEtd Ali realised the in^urtai.ce 
of such a canal if it was ever coistructed^ he refused to 
grant the necessary concossion on a political ground. He 
thought that the canal might lead the intezventiun o£ 
48 
foreign powers in £gypt« 
44* Kinross, Op. Cit.* p.17, 
45, Vatikiotis, Op* Cit.^ p*50. 
46. The Middle £ast and i^ orth Africa» 19b0«»81^  (jjonuon, 
1980}« p*30a. 
47* Obieta« op* Cit.* p*S*# ^ee also Kinrosis, op* Cit.# p.47, 
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The British GoveamoMiiit resisted Frencih efforts at evorv 
step* AS to ouunter the plan of e odRdi ititrootuced by France* 
pelmerston* the h^eri foreign secretary^ prc«K>tod a railway 
project* aioiing the creation of a rail roacl from Aloxonoria 
49 to Cairo and suea. At firat« this schenict was co iSiaorad 
in 1834« and soon after the settlement of 1&41 it was again 
revived by Britain by offering finaricial aJ.d for this purpose 
SO 
to Egypt* AS a result« railway versus canal had ixicoim a 
controvercial issue between the twu governments* The railway 
project was attaci>ed by France and Austria* while ^ t>ji«ir^ u 
considered canal ic^ractisable* 
MohaiBRMd All doiibted the success c£ Clianal project uue 
to the growing Anglo French rivalry on thifi issue* Once All 
had expressed it in the following wordst 
Austria and France toay desire tl'te Ca^ a^l 
but England* but Russia* juet the Great 
Powers come to an understariding and de-
nand it of ne ai:id X opn prepare to execute 
it* Egypt does not lack oien* Z can en^loy 
ny whole arnqf*^ * 
MohM»nad All died in ld49 without grunting permission 
52 to either scheme* He was succeeded by hJ.s cjrand son Hbbas 
S3 Pasha who being an "Anglophil" granted a cor.cession in 
IbSl fur the oonstructiun of a rail road from ^iluxandriu 
to Carlo, l^ he railway project was cookie ted in 1854 uncior 
49* J*C* Hurewits* Diplomacy in the i^ ear aiKi twiddle i::astt 
A Documentary Recordi 15^5«1914« (Iiondt?n* 1956)* Vol, 
X*« p*146* 
50* Kinross* OP. Cit.* pp.47«4ii. 
51. Ibia.*p.49. 
52. ochonfield* Op. Cit.* p.19. 
53. Ibid. Seo also Vatikiotis, v.p. Cit.* p*71. 
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tho superv i s ion o£ Hotdert ^topheuaon,'^ Aa a r e s u l t uf 
Qr i t iah oppos i t ion ne i ther Mohanmad A l i nur hi£> succwai^cvr 
Alaldas had 9rartte<i conoeaoion t o the Catia^ p r o j e c t , rriis 
s i t u a t i o n p r e v a i l e d u n t i l Ferdinand de i«eseepa« a Fre:iC^i 
erigineer» with «^oa the £MW v iceroy uf ^gypt« Mch«iiKnoui s a i u 
haa been connected i n h i s youth* secured the f i r s t Q-yiXOaBfiiuu 
t o bu i ld the Sues CSiial in lb54 . 
i \£ter xiv& death wf sa id Pasha De«-i«esscps expiesaea 
h i s gr io f i n the foliowin'^ words, which rcvealud th& i<.jteg<-
r i t y u£ t h e i r fr iendships 
"I am gr ived tu the heart* not on account 
of m^ enterpr i se* i n which X have the inost 
serene confidence* d i s p i t e a l l the d i f f i c u l -
t i e s which ma^ ' ar i se* but becausts o£ c r u e l 
separat ion from a f a i t h f u l friefsd who £or 
more then a quarter of century has yivon ^.• 
me so n^aiiy proofs of a f f e c t i o n and corifidOi.ce'* 
I t has been s i l id that* "Lesaeps* t r iu t^h clorivuu as 
much from p e r s i s t e n c e as from personal fri«:n<iship wit.^ •.^aia'*. 
The coficession v^ilch was yrantud on i.ovoiTtbcr 3o* liiS^, 
replaced with s e v e r a l a l terr iat iv^s ar.d modi f i ca t ions a^j the 
57 /iCt of Concession of 1856. Zt had becuiiMi th*. basia u^ x^ n 
which the cunpany's r i g h t t o e x p l o i t XXm Canal re^^tuU iuiti.1 
i t was n a t i o n a l i z e d by the Government of ^.q^jpt on July 26* 
^ 4 . I b i d . 
55 . juoted i n 4^ciK>n£ield* Oi>. Cit .< p»39, 
56 . Hurewitz* o o . Cit«« p,146« 
57 . I b i d . 
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SB 1956, The conpany %ihich Lossaps was authorizQd tw fuxtn 
for the purpose of building of «i earmi throuyh the Istrvousj 
o£ ;»uez to comiect the t^ ttditerraneaii ari4 Red ae<ft&« was n^ tneu 
as the COd^ jigine UniverseXie due Canal Haritime de HKXQZ, Tiui 
duration oi the concession was 99 yeara fruit the date of the 
opening of the canals after which it should revert# tc th«!! 
Egyptian Guvemment* £h® capital of the Con^any was to i:}e 
offered fur subscriptiwn to all tho nation of the v/crla. 
The president was to be appointed by the Goverumerit of 
£gypt« from amongst the shore holders• Ten per cent uf 
the net profits were to go to the founders* 15 per cent 
to the Egyptian Government and 75 per cent to the share 
59 holders. From the finai^ oial point of vUsvt the act of 
concession was roost disadvaiitageous to Egypt, i^ ldwaxu uice^> 
a British author* has com-nentod that* "never has there boe::> 
a Concession so profitable to the granted aiiu so coati^ ^ to 
the granter as that given by said to the ;>ue2 Cat^ al Cotr^an^". 
The concessions granted to De l^ essepti was bound to 
liultan's ratification before the worK on tlie G*it.&l ue 
started* The canal project was officially iianctioiiod i>at 
this legal flaw provided a golden opportunity to the British 
58* Obieta* QP« Cit .> p .5* 
59 . H. Fa tha l la £ 1 , Khatib ai^ d omar z . Gobt&shy* <^i>, wit .< 
p«7.* s e e Qbieta* Og. Cit»# pp.S>6** see Kinros:>* ^ j ^ 
Ci t . f pp . 62*64•* and a l s o ochonfield* op . Cit.> pp. 
16*24. 
6 0 . A-dward i^icey* The >>torY of Kheoivate* p«40* wuotwu Ir* 
« • Fatha l la i^l Khatib and c»iiar Z. Ohob<ishy* »^p, C i t . * ^ . 7 . 
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Oovdrnnsnt b««d»d 1^ PaliiMurston to nako evcury posslbXo wovm 
to pravent tfaMi digging of « oanal* As a reeuXt o£ British 
opposition Siiltsn's ratification was dslayed for raora than 
Ai 
a dacada,^ Haan i^ iila said pasha diad and was succaadad iyy 
Isoaii* With this ehaiMTa Las&aps was not discouraged axKi hav-
ing ovar CK»Mi nost of tbm difficulties^ ha saourod a naw con-
cession with ZMMil on January 30« 1866* Finally* this con-
vantion was ratified hy the sultan« in March 19« 1866. 
S^mntually* Sues Canal was CMMBpleted and formally 
Opened in 1869 for navigation •^ '' The opening of the SXMZ 
Canal brought about an abrupt change in ttm British policy 
towards the Canal and it also stiioalated hetr interest in 
Bgypt* wutt Asia in general and Egypt in particiaar had 
beoooa a IMY area of European dJ^Jlenacy* frioreover* the 
formation of Israel had turned i^st Asia into a battle 
field* and even to day has not ceased to shake the region. 
Just after its opening* Sues Canal established as one 
of the aost ii^ortant lines of CKxnnunioation and transpor-
tation in the %forld* Britain's predoninanoe in the trade with 
India and Far £ast made her dependent lyqpon the SVMZ canal "which 
had largely reduced the time «ad expense of shipping to anu 
61* Oeofga i;<encsowski« The Middle gast in %iorld Affairs# 
Ilird ed. (London* 1963}« p.6Xi« 
62* Ibid,* p*612, 
63. Obieta* OP* cit** p*2 
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from India* then Britain •• aL«t inportant colonial out post 
«8 ooai;>ar<»d to ttM lotsgwe and mxptu»»L^m route via tha CI^MS.^^ 
British govarnaent soon r^aliaad har vrong policy to oppose 
siaeh a grand proJoet« which was prov^ so aclvantagaous to 
har ooramoreially as wall as stratagioally.^^ Failing to 
invest in tha Canal coopany* howaver Britain did not hava 
any voica in tha coi^ c>any*s policy*^' palinarston was of tan 
eritioi8fi»d for his lack of far sightadnass regarding the 
Sues Canal,'^ The Canal was c^jviously under the donination 
of a single great power the France, the very thing of which 
Palnerston had fom»rly been afraid. Her Majesty's Oovern-
msnt had to manoauvre hard to win the battle, which which 
she had already lost. When Disraelli held the office of tha 
prima Minister in 1874, he isaiadiataly began to e:q>lore the 
pros«pects of squiring control over the Sues Can«l.^^ He was 
lucky enough to get this oj^^rtunity in 1875 when debt rluden 
Ismail pasha decided to sell his stock in the coo^any. Dis. 
raeli seised tha occasion pros^tly and purchased Egyptian 
shares of the Canal coopany riq;>resenting 44% of the coi^pai^*s 
64, gayyuBw OD^ cit«^ p*4, 
65« see The goonondst. (August 4, 1956), pp.4i9^2o. 
66. Sfpid^B p.420* 
67. Hurewits« yp> cit.» p,177«# ^see also obieta, O P . cit.. 
p«7« 
68. Kinross, OP. cit.* p.233. 
69. Hurewits, O P . cit.* p.177, 
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70 
capital fur four million pounds, Znxa w«»£i cc'iii^ iacred v.ne 
of tho boldast financial anc political coi.triuutic>n in u % 
world of history. In all uvar Britoia "thexxi yauB ci j^^fui 
recoynition that tho biqpire had gained jruutly iiX'th ii. 
71 
prestige and practical advaritages"* it wa& proved 
correct in the near futuru. rhe purchase of the shureu iou tt. 
the reinposition of tor^ign control ovur Lgjpt, who uos no 
longer freo in hur home ua itfoil as foreig.i atfoiru, iQ:nuxx 
pasha Vi/os deposed by the Sultan under the pre^ iuure w£ the 
British Governtnent aitd his son 7ewfik pashu was appoiitou 
as the new viceroy of £yypt« /it this Juncture tho nnglc-
French rivalry was minimized £>ecause both had two intorctiits 
in comoon • "the freedom of the oues coital ai^a the proper 
72 
administration of Egyptian afi:airs'*. 
Arabi'B Lationaliat revolt atid jdri-
tain's occuijation of i^ gypt 
The growing foreign ii.turleroncc urwui^ eu "liative 
73 
sentiments and IslafTiic religious zeal" in -igyptia*. ;>eoplo. 
Dissatisfaction prevailed in ttio i^ gyptian .\tux^0 whicn led 
to an anti alien movo'mu;it» whicn rapidly e;i^ (^io to a neao u;iUor 
74 the leadership of colowol ^bTobi, This towi. a fcna ^f revolt 
70. ooieta, (^ y Cit«< plb,, see also 4jei.ZwW3..i, wPip Cit,< 
p.(>12,« and also ochonlieia, v.p, CJLt»» pp.47-46, 
71. ;jChonfield, Op, Cit«# p#48, 
72. Ibid. 
73. Ioid.# p.49. 
74. Ibid. 
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•gainst the authority of tha Khedive «ma fwrcig;^ intorvon-
sion in £g/pt* /urabi*6 revolt was crushea o^ ariti^h forces 
and tho final show down was cootpXet&id on septtuober 13# ldB2« 
75 
whan Goneral wosley dafeated Araoi at Tel-«l«>Keiuir. /irabi*s 
revolt provideiu an excuse tc the British Ooveri-nient tu Justi-
fy her occupation over Egypt* /although the mair> purpose ibe-
hind this fliove was tu control the Sues Canal. From lSb2 
to 1956 British forces remained in Egypt to protect the 
Canal« thus maintaining virtual control over this strategic 
77 
water way* After Arabi*s revolt Great Britain ijec«i;])c a 
defacto authority of £gypt# although de«^jure she still was 
vmder the Suzerainty of ottcmtar] JSn^ire* This situation 
prevailed tmtil 1914 when the British Goverurtict.t unil*^terally 
declared Egypt a protectorate* free frcmi ttito Juzeraii ;.y wf 
Turkish .;^ ultan* Britain was conscious enough t«^  realize 
that the other European powers did not taivo her m^ve in 
a goou tasto* "France by her w'Wn action hacl lot>t for t^ ver 
79 her status in Egyptian affairs"* Z:^  these circuin:9ta:.ces 
it had bec^ M^ ae inevitaole for Great iiritain tw reacn an agree-
ment with other powers to pjreserve the freedom of Canal for 
the passage of all ships in any circvimutar^ces* i^ventuaily. 
75* ubieta* Qp* Cit,y< p*10*« sec alsu juanosuws/vi, up^ y^ *^ ,^^,»» 
pp* 22«23. 
76* LnesowsKif Us^ * Git** p*612* 
77. iJowie, K.Om Cit.* p.4. 
7a, «>.bieta, op. Cit.* p. 10* 
79* ^chonfielUf up* Cit*« p.SI* 
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A GotBpXfMd.&lRg foxmiXa waa adopted by M:c&pitlii<j Frunch ^ro-> 
pcsaX'"^ and en ootuber 29# Xkim niu& tnajor pc^wers • UJ[C« Fxuuoh, 
Gerfnany« AU6trl«i«>Hung«iry# i^pair;# Russi«i« I t a l y , Tur>.ey duid the 
I^ehterXanwis signed <i coi^vtscition in Constantinople aufliijluy th@ 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l s t a t u s of the £>u&z Caiidl* rh«» . a r t i c l e 2 of thl£> 
convention roadi 
"The ;>U08 Maritime Canal s h a l l always be 
fre«^ anu open* in t i n e o£ v^ar a& i n tlnte 
of peace« t o every ves&el of ccKivoerce or 
of war« without dla t l i^ct lon of ill&g, Cuu» 
SQ<;i^ntly« the High osntraot lug P a r t i e s 
agree not In aay way t o I n t e r f e r e wit)'. 
the f ree use o£ the canal* in tline o£ v/ar 
as In time of peace . The Canal aover ahi^l 
b« subjected to the exercise of the r l j h t 
of blockade"•&! 
The Constantinople convention was tnoaiit t o r e s t i v e 
the i»ue2 Canal coatroversy* In I'act* t h i s t?as far Uro^ n ijQi.n>.^ 
the r e a l i t y * History of the liuez Canal revea ls t h a t "the 
conventions and t r e a t i e s reyardiruj the dMitij. hod d o u r l y 
l o s t even t ^ l r l imi ted worth" during the uurs* 
30. Ubieta* op» Cit»< PP. lO-ll. 
81* Hurewltz, op. Cit.# pp. 202*20S. 
82 . Kiniche, O P . Cit.< p*4it.« For fu r the r diiita^^lij soe 
iJowle, OP. ^ Cit.< p.5.# see LenczowsKl, Op. Clt.< 
pp* 613«614.« and a l so aiQ Middle £as t aiid i^crth 
Africai 196»»70. (London* 1970)• p .789 . 
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Egypt Unday B r i t i s h P ro t ec to r a to 
Upto the time o£ the opening of tho ;^ iuez Caii<il ir^ 
ld69# th4a chief aim o£ tha B r i t i s h GQVornnKiist, ci£ regard s 
- £gypt wa« t o prevent France from ol>taini.rg a dumir^ant 
p o s i t i o n in £gypt* In the l a t t e r half of the nintoenth 
century p ro t ec t ion of t h i s "ia^Mirial l i f e line** had beconie 
the prifiCipal ob jec t ive v>f B r i t i s h furtsign pol icy iu the 
Miudle i::a8t« P r i o r t o world war I« Bri tair i usuai iy iocKeo 
u^ >or; Ottoman XurKey «u* a guarantor t o protc^ct her i i t o r t iS t s 
ama coitKnunicatiuns i n the i-iiddle iilast. Frua 1663 to 1907 tl>e 
Bgyptiati Govornment had boon dominated *by ov.a '^t t;>e oiliest 
etopire bu i lde r s of raooern history"# i*U: i^volyi: iiari:.;j« 
86 
whw in 1891 bec«UT)e Lord Cromer • Uuri<ig h i s p«sir^ <^ u ^udox. 
was reconv|ured by a j o i n t /inglu^Sgyptiar. f.^rce a t thu b a t t l e 
of Oindurmaii on September 2« lti9d* The est<ibliwh-:iei.t u£ t^ «& 
Anglo-Egyptian Cofidomltiiuffl enhanced t l ^ B r i t i s h positioz:^ it; 
^Sypt f i i r ther , At the turn of the century# "Kgypt ha^ for 
a l l purpose becanio p a r t and pa rce l of the i i r i t i s h et;t^>irc".^ 
B i . Johii Marlow« AnQlo<»gayptian«aeldtiona i lUQO^l^bS^ 
(»c^>don« 19S3T7 pTSSS, 
84 . Ralph H« Magnus# (od,)« tjocunients on the Middle £Ast# 
(Washington, O.C, 20036« July» 1969), p«^ 
8 5 . Lenozowsi'vif pp^ C^t,< p«47b« 
86 . Tte Middle East and :.orth Africa i 1969*70^ (i«ondo.%« 
i^vo); pM^. -^ 
87 . ob ie t a . Op. Cit.> p . 1 3 . 
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His sucoossorst Sir £ldon Gorst (1907«»1911} «»<! iiord latchQner 
(191i*i9i4)# continued to exercise unristricteci power in i^gypt. 
Bri t i sh Goverr^aent repeate<il](' claima<i that her occupation wf 
Egypt wes tt tein^rory a£fair but virtuelXy *8he was bocomiug 
B9 laore and more a fixture" with the TurKey*s entri uia the 
s ide o£ the centriil Powers in Morld wer l« "aritaii. f^urtd 
90 her tradit ional strategy In the tiiddle £ast in ruiu". 
This i^uught about a radical change in Brit ish p o l i t i c a l 
strategy* She began to encourage ttm growling uc&tiot.al arid 
anti Turkish fee l ings o£ the Arab subjects of uttomar i^apirc 
The u^esB Canal had become so v i t a l to the Brit ish Gwvorxanont 
that nothing short of actual Bri t i sh contr^^l over .^yypt 
91 
"world assuage the anxiety f e l t for i t s security". To 
achieve th i s end martial law v/as i£ns.x>sed in £.gypt and tajJLny 
advaritage of the crucial situation* which was created after 
Tur/vey*s siding with Germany* liiritain ur4.IateraXly a^.i.ounced 
the end of Turkish suzerainty and proclaimed a protectorate 
92 
over i:igypt on December 19* 1914 • 
93 
On Decwober 20# 1914 Abbas Hilmi pasha was cicposea 
fror.' Khedjviate ai^ d the British (Sovernment offerou the title 
of Saltan to Hussein Kamil Pasha* the brother of Tawfik. 
80* X«encsowsi(i* C>D^ Cit«# p*476« 
&9* schonfield* pp. Cit«^ p.S3« 
90. Magnus* up, Cit.* p.5 
91. Obieta* op. Cit.* p.12. 
92. Lencsowski* op^ Cit«< p.476. 
93. The i^ d^dle aaat and i-torth Africa i 1969'»70< p. 709. 
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"Egypt bec<un9 «i B r i t i s h protectorQto i n nuaio a& v/uil uu 
t a c t " , ^ * 
Although £gypt hdd i>een occupied by i iritair: fru'in 1602, 
th& s&tablis^wlQRt o£ pr&toctorata wau hwni lat ing t.^ ii.gyptiuxiC 
arid wounded t h e i r i .at ional p r i d e . Mert io l law* &^^n&<,xaaX.p9 f o r -
c i b l e recruitment o£ l«bour« r i s i n g pr ices* prustii^cc^ o£ foreign. 
95 96 
o f f i c i a l s «nd troops* wilson*8 Fourtoen p o i n t s a:... tho 
Anglo*Freneh Declaraition of l%ovemloer 7« 191u* prw{aij«ii;y 1:;-
dependence t o the iurob countr i e s «11 the;jo c^:.triijatea tu^  
i n t e n s i f y the n « t i o n a l i s t movenent which was growing i n <^gypt, 
Zn tho words o£ ^chonf ie ld , natio;.ali&m in i^^jjiit ''haci 
beon voca l before the ;^ ar but now they orguiiioou tho ujolvu^ 
9B i n t o the wttfd* under tho dynamic l eodezsh ip f ^;<uyulal 
P e s h s . 
w'efd and British Oovernment never readied t^  a^ . a^ r^eo-
nent regardinc^  independence* although xu^er pr@vaili..<j co;.^-
99 tions Brit«iin had to realize that she cuula not :(vaintain licr 
94, Robert Stephens* o», Cit.« p.15, 
95, The Middle Sast and ^^ orth Africa % 1969*70* p,709, 
96. Hagnus* op. Cit«> p«27, 
97 . J . C . Hurewita* D^p^ornacy i n tb f Lear and ^^dulc ^ast i 
A Docuroentary Record t I«>i4>i9i;6. (Loiidot;. 1956) . Ite l . 
ZZ* p«90. 
9S, ^ichonfield* Op. City* p»75, 
9 9 . i»ydrjey i^ett leton Fisher* gho I4idaxfcjuost » i diat.,ri.« 
ZZnd ed , (London* 1971)* pp . 4 ^ 9 ^ 5 2 , * soo aisc^ ijonc* 
s«ws*^# OP> Ci t . * pp . 47?-478, 
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interest without giving some concousion to Egypt. 3y 
the end o£ 1921 the situation became more con^iicatcu« ana 
General Alienfay« ttm High Cuxmlaoloims in •^gypt« uryeu the 
abolition of Protectorate. ^ Ultimotei:^^ o:. FeorutiXi 23, 
1922« the British Guver^'mont issued a uiiilatcirai Jeclaratioij 
anaouncing the Abolition of the protectorate and rocuyr.iaing 
£gypt a* an independent sovereign state. The aecidratiQ£^ 
left the fallowing points to the diereetioi. w£ his Ha^Gtut^ * & 
Govemineiitt 
(a) TtnQ security of the co aminications of the 
British Entire in Egypt; 
(b) The defence of isigypt against ail fwrei^i: 
aggression or interforeucet direct or 
indirectI 
(o) The protection of foreign int^rost^ it< 
Egypt and the protection of oiinoritieiil 
(d) The ^udan.^ 
wulta;. Fuad« whw iiod succeeded his brotnor* Hasauxi-p 
Ir. 3 
Kam i l in 1917« v;.U3 proclaimed the King as Fuad tho ^irst. 
King Fuad was satisfied* but the nationalists* partxculorly 
the wafd never accepted this partial inuepe..v.^ .'Ce. ^ .gypt haci 
been a British Protectorate from 1914 t^^ 1922 at>u evei. until 
100« iiarlow« G P . Cit.* p»235.« 
(London, 1950), p.Bl. 
see aiso The Midule Aiautt I9b0, 
101. The Middle aast t 1950. (London, 1950), p.b., see 
Hobert ^tophena. O P . Cit.. p.26, 
102. Hurowitz, OP. Cit.. p.102. 
103. Sch»nfieid, pp. Cit., p.75., see Fisher, Op. Cit.. p,4b-i. 
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1936 certain aspects of the protectorate coutiijuoj".^ '^* 
During the p«rlo<i between 1922 arid 1936 vcirlous political pur-
ties woro £orroeu In Egypt but no political part^ get so much 
iQS 
popularity than wafd, ''•' AB a result of wafd oppoeitlou :.tj-
gotlations for a treaty on Britain's dictated terras were 
failed. The status of auda.i and presc.ce of iirltish 
troops In £gypt were tWQ male obstacles betwcan tno way 
of agreoinsnt, J^ tls situation continued until 1936. 
The iinglo ggyptfan Treaty of 1936 
Tba dead lock over Anglo-l^gyptlan alliance e::ued In 
1936* With the beginning of 1936 various tnajor cha:igcs tou<. 
place In the £gyptlari political scone. In .\pril 1936 Klnv, 
Fuad died. He was succeeded a^ his sun« Farou;.« stlii, a 
minor at schoul In wwltaerland. in parllatTK^ ritary electlo^ 4^ « 
which were held In I4ay 1936# "wofd won a resoursdint, victory 
107 
at Poll**, r.ahas pasha« whc lod the ..afd since Zagnlul 
died In 1927« had ayoln becoi« the prirtio Minister o£ i^ gypt. 
Above all« the Ztalo*Abysslnlan war (1935-1936) pr^vlaed on 
opportunity to both ii^ gypt and Britain to bargalr^  at tnls 
104, Schonfleld, Op, Clt.# p,75. 
105, Lenczowskl* Co, Clt,^ pp,480*4bl, 
106, Ibld|, p,479,« see also Tho Middle «:ast i 195C« 
pp,81-^2• 
lC7, Leiiczowsklt gp. Clt.# p,4a2. 
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occasion taking their rospactivo interests in view. i^« 
risa o£ Mussolini thrsatonea British and £g;k^ p^tiat> Qovarn-
ment? alika* in view o± the prevailing situation bwtii Gwven— 
laents decided tw reach on an agreement. On March 2« 193C»# 
conversations bogan between t^ gypt and His Hajosty's Ucverri-
nent to conclude a treaty with more satisfactory terms.^ '^ '^  
For the first time all political partios unitedly representee 
figypt at this occasion* Finally an Anylo»£gyptiaz. treaty of 
tweiity years duration was signed in London on v^ugust 26, 
, » 109 
193©« TtMi treaty placed Egypt under new oDlijations in 
return for some conodssions. it coitained the followii^j mail. 
provisions! 
(1) The militorj^ occupation of Sgypt hy British 
forces was terminatedi 
(2) £gypt and aritaiii ei^ terea into a military 
alliancQf according to which Snglaiiu was 
bounu to defend ^^ gypt against foreign ag* 
gression while ^gypt was supposed to placo 
her coradoinication facilities at Brit<ii; *a 
disposal in cose of warf 
(3) She treaty provided for the removal of 
British forces from Cair4> and Alexandria, 
but efl%>cwered Britain with a limitation 
of 10*000 laiKi forces and 400 pilots to 
station in the otiea Canal aone until the 
jggyptioii array was in a positiv^ n to ensure 
the security o£ the Canal; 
lOis. Hurewita* w • Cit«# p«203« 
109* Ibid., For details seo i^ isher, op. Cit.# pp0 457-4S8. 
i6 
(4) It also provided for the unretitiricted 
landgration of Egyptians into the Sudani 
(5) Britain promised Egypt tu support her in 
aeouring mesoberahip o£ the League of !.a« 
tions as weli in tlMS abolition of the capitu-
lation f 
(6) The oiilitary clauses of the treaty were tc 
loe valid for twenty years* while any modi-
fication proposed lay either party could be 
considered after the expiration of a period 
of ten years,*10 
She treaty has been considered as an iii%>ortant lu .. 
marK in the history of ^^ wngilo-£gyptian relations* liilatoral 
character of the treaty satisfied the KgyptiaiiS* 
who previcMisly objected the unilateral decision of the Bri-
tish Goverrunent regarding the independence of .^gypt. Legally 
£gypt came under tlva category of sovereign stote;3 but factu-
ally 3ri tains* predcnninant position in Egypt r^ Odifieu if .tact. 
In the words of JUenczowsKi« Britain*£> defacto co.;trul 
of the wues Canal which was obviously the £>ri.T.ari aint of the 
British Ouverniaent in £gypt« "obtairied Jturldicai co^ ifirmatios. 
by the Anglo-egyptian Treaty of 1936*• In thiQ treaty it 
was reoogniaed that the Canal was an integral part of ii:gypt# anci 
the purpose of the British forces stationed "in ti^ tairly 
112 
sroall area ca l l ed the carnal asone"# was t^ o safeyuarJ the 
110* Ibidy^ pp*204-211, 
111, Lenca«»/6Ki« Qp> Cit«« p.&15« 
112• OiQrwint and p e t o r Calvocoro£iiii« Middle li^ast c r i s i s ^ 
(Aylesbury* 1957), p.37« 
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SMMZ Canal, Tho British forotts wer« to bm withdrawn £rum 
the Canal sone at any tiina after 1956 when the Egyptloi^ 
army was eupposed to be c^ p^ojble of protecting the candl. 
During world war seeondf "Britain virtually alone had 
113 defended the strategic Suez Canal region** from the 
114 
repeated attacKs of powerful iiazi forces tovjards £:yypt. 
At one occasion Hitler discus^CKI the war strategy 
with Admiral Reader* the Chief of his :;aval atoff, in the 
following words• 
'*n>e Sues Canal nust ha toHen, Zt ia doubt-
ful whether the Italian can accomplish thi;^  
alone I support 1:^  German troops will be need-
ed. An ^varioe from Sues through k^alostine 
and Syria as far as XurXey is necosc^ary. If 
we reach that point Turkey will be in our 
power"*** 
£g/pt had becoroo a vital strategic factor for tne 
British* and lator Allied hane in the Hidalo ^ost. 
"Cair.. was a real hub of Allied dipl<Mnatic and economic 
117 
activity". In fact* the British Ooverntnent tnisiiused 
the sacred treaty.in securing a base la ^gypt to naii.taii. 
her military pcwer throughout the Middle i^ ast. Both world 
113« Bowie* UP. at,t p.t>«* see also L«ncso..sKl* op. ^t.# 
pp•S97*59&. 
114. LencaowsKi* op. Cit.. {qp.4t»4«4tic. 
115. sohonfield* op. Cit.. p.lOO. 
116. Lencscwski* op. Cit.. p.485. 
117. ;b|d. 
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wars have proved that aritain virtually vioJl«^ ted the provision.^ 
of Constantlitople convention o£ IQLQ "by 8t*^tionincj warshipe ir^  
the Canal« by refuelling* and by taking or; iit^a lanoing war sna-
trial and txoops at canal ports and canal aoue". On both 
occasions Britain freely used the Canal f.jr nur ow:. benefit 
119 
while her enemies JOtQ re|[used access to the Canal. Foe 
their parts* Germany and Italy had made ropuuted a.tempts 
to seise the avaz Canal* but without success. 
Xt is irony of the fact that in the near future when 
Egypt had done the same against Israel* she> was accuueci cf 
having violated lb66 convention by Allied p..vers, iiy^ -pt Jus-
tified her action "ixif analogy to the iillieci practice ir the 
first and seootid world wars and by Article 10 o£ th lau6 
convention"• 
The Owd of world war IZ* had cha;<yed th& pattern of 
intornutioaal politics in %ie8t Asia» Prior to th<s^  uoco i. u«^ riv^  
war« the United states hapt her away from «K;tiv-^:i partici;;^atio; 
in tho t^udle Eastern affairs. During all these year;» aos^iu: 
intortorieuce had beon mir.imal. Inter t?ar <Jevclopm&i.ta, axi^ 
the r^ev.' diacoveries of oil rosourses brought u.:;^ .:^ . 
to west Asia in a big way. Ihey enoriioa am ttx^  ew masters of 
the .vest Asiun regior^. The clash of iuturoste of th«j tw. su^ ^^ r 
118. aowie* Qp. Cit.. p.fj, 
119. i:«er:C20WS}ti* op. Cit.. p»613< 
120. k^AJie* op. Cit.^ p.S. 
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Powers further con^llcati-d the s i tua t ion . Tha post war 
wediuiesses of Great Britain made her unobX }^ to meet new 
challen^^s. After the withdriUiri from Palest ine iu 194a« 
Bri t i sh Oovemment iiaraenseiy desired to reraain iii ^yypt 
to protect her in teres t in the region. On the otiier hand 
the Egyptians vra.ttod to eiaanoipate herself fron the iiriti&h 
inperialisfli. AS the time went 2^« £9ypt*s r.ati«^nc»lism got 
momentum^ and becasno more assert ive ti>wdrdi» the demaz u o£ 
the revis ion of An9lo->£.yyptian Treaty of 1936. These oevo-
lofNiients came to head %;hen president Uasser uatior>ali£:ed the 
Suez Carnal* which ultitnately resulted into the t r i p a r t i t e 
aggression in 1956* against the ilgypt. 
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Ch«pt«r • IZ 
r^ioK or isRAgXt t ITS IMPACT (H* 
-S2t'im^m^*miitiEjmiJsm!mi^iM&. 
Creation of Zsr4Mil i s the resu l t of «i hlstoriccU, tr<iln 
o£ events th«it bagao during Morld war Z* lAtsiAixy, the s ta te 
of ZsraeX oeiae in to being on May Z5« I94b, but £«kctu«illy 
i t was tho comniunication iiAiich came tQ be tavjvt> ae the 
• Balfour Deoloration* of 1917* promising Briti^Jh help in 
the establiahnent of a Jewish national homet in paiustinci. 
I t was always intorpretod ta^ the jews as a d e a r Bri t i sh 
ooRmitmont to a pol icy of hamiin^ over polustine to tham. 
The poliCi^ ^f supporting the Jews was not to ta l ly b«uiea on 
humanitarian grounas as asserted by roost of wester.. coui^trio8« 
but i t was on account of Jewish support foj: <U.lieu v;ar airo^* 
There were a number of forces anu factors* which lou Great 
Dritoii) to niake contradictory promises to the jows uiXiU Arabs 
with regard to i^alesti.io* 
Israei. come i.^to existorioc aa a resul t . f a nundxir 
of es^pooietit and diplomatic p o l i c i e s foliottfoci Oy tho ^uper 
»^ Keesinq's Conterox^rarv Archives^ (London* May 1^-2^* 
X94&}* p.9273. 
2 . J . c . Hurawita* Dj^ ^^ ocaacy in the Near ana Middlu ^oat i 
A PocuioBntary fteoord i 1914*1956* Vol.XI. (London^ 1956) > 
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Powers during the t%ro world wars* West /isla, h«u3 always been 
a coxitro of attract ion to a l l major powers due to various 
factors Imit most i n ^ r t a n t one tire the geographical proximity 
to o i l r«3sourcos« iiq;>&rtant connunication l ir .es , fa i th ci:.d 
ideology« which contributed to the s tra teg ic inpurta; ce c£ 
t h i s region* The area i s a highly iits>ortarii cc^niunicuticii 
hub,It i s a land bridge between threo continents - aurcpe* 
3 
Asia and Africa* "Zt is a symbolic and erootiotial ar^ ju'^  
here are situated the shrines of three of the world's great 
religions, Christians« Huslims and Jews have ai.1 claineu ttioir 
ancestral heritage to this land* The pat^  iUrob and par. Zsiam 
movement flourished here* "its influence e>ctended west ward 
4 
to Ho8occo« deep intu Africa* east ward t<j Inula**. 
The openintj of the Q\i»z Canal ir. 1U69* and the estab-
listunent of the British £^pirB in Isxila provided i;cw dimen-
sions to the eoenierciai and strategic importance u£ the west 
-Asia* 
It was the land where Zionist movement yot monentum* 
and succeeded to achieve its primary gout the creatiur. uf a 
Jewish state in the heart of pales tine* T^a creatlo:^ of 
Israel opened a new chapter in the history of world politics 
3. Hanson w* Baldwin* *4>tratQgy of the Micidle ^ ast'* 
Foreign Affairs* Vol.35 (£iew York* 1956-57}* p*656, 
4* Ib^d^ 
S* Besindrawath Dewa.:* war and Peace in west Asia* 
(New Delhi* 1969). pTHZ 
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Pouar vacura was filled by OIMI big pcnmr or the other, so 
that the wholo area had gradually becuraa a centre of inter* 
national diplonMMy* 
War Aiw and Political Strategy of Great SritaiK 
Prior to the nineteenth oentuary Great Britain hctd no 
great political influence in this region* although she was 
eoiuiidcrably interested in other natters like commerce and 
trade with the beginning of nineteenth century British com-> 
meroial interest transformed into Political interest, when 
the first world war broke out in 1914# Great arittiin was 
deeply involved in the Arab world ana in cor^ tact with the 
various political forces and factors.^ During the war 
British concepts regarding the Middle East under went a rooLl-
7 
cal ehaijge. 
On the eve of F irs t World war when Twc>^&^ Join&d the 
Central Powers* Britain and her iULlies bectsuno seriously a lor-
taed about the s t ra teg ic irqplications of the combined uii i l i tary 
action of Turkey ana Germany • Earlier Bri t i sh tJovernment: hau 
usually looked upon Ottoniars Turkey as a ttim:^^:.^ power to 
protcict her in teres t s and oocttmu<icdtion in i:;yypt, Xhe s i tua-
t ion had cot(f>letely changed after — Turkey *s eiitry iiito trie 
6* a.ii, Houroni* Great Britain and ttm Arato .«orl^* (London* n . d , } , pp«14«16. 
7. George Lancst^w^ki* The Miadle i;;ast in uiurla iifiairs^ 
e d . I i l , (London* 1962}* p«643« 
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war* In response the Bri t ish Oovernment begors to encourugQ 
the growing natiorioi and anti TuuekS^h Bentijaot.tii of the Ara^ 
subject of the ottcman £a$>lre. Br i t i sh diplomacy v;a5 to a&-> 
taoh the Arabs frco the hold of Turkey, she was (imclous tw 
mobilise the opinion of the Arabs in favour oi: western i^XXL^B^ 
Keepin<j a l l these prospects and possibi l i t iu& in viev/« 3rit(iir: 
had promised to 8up£K>rt tho independet^ce ot the Arab areas of 
the Ottoman Bnpire i f they would revolt acjainst the ir TuriU.sh 
masters. The Arabs saw the ir chSiiC^ to enia.^ciputc tn^imoivQu 
fr^a cttoman over lordn»ship. 
world War 2 had led to a goj^ral p o l i t i c a l COK&CIOUB-
neS4> among the Arabs* This conciousnooa yavo birth tw ^irab 
nationalism, prior to tho war« in Islamic coui.trloo tiio 
word nation connoted a re l ig ious cunnunity* The ctovulo^Kiiont 
of the nation states* as i t i s und«;2rstood ii. tho woo turn 
world# has been a r e ^ n t concept tw tiie Arab world, lifter 
1914« i^ urab nationalism "becamo moro polit iuai . ly uriui:^tou'*. 
Bri t i sh diplomacy tu secure Arab*8 help lu ixir ..or 
e f for t s had been succeeded. After some husitation* <<xaiu 
decided t c Join the Al l ied c^^p. Before JoiiJliiy thu /vl l ies 
they warated sat is factory promises from the side of j x i t a i u . 
&• Fred J . Khc^ uri* The Arab«»lBraeli Dilen»iMi< (. eu 'lorh, 
1968), p . 7 . 
9 . Halph H. ManijjnuSf (ed.)« Uocumeiits Oi. tlie £iiuale »ai»t« (Washington, D.C, 20036, July, 1969), p.E;. 
10. Khourl, Cip. C i t . . p . 6 . 
This roijulted In a sorlea o£ idtt@ra €txcha; god b«)twecn 
sherif Hussein o£ Mecca ana s i x Uerary m; Hsihox., the Bri t i sh 
High Comoissioner in ^gypt. ausseiia pr«>fiiis&a tc. supp^jtrt 
the ^ i i e s against TurKay« an a l ly of ttw Ciermaii Kaiser. 
Through out the war the Arabs Kept *hls* ^aorm, Gcnoral 
AllenJbiy# Oofiniandar«in<»caiie£ o£ the £jQ>editiQnary Force^ 
12 <liscribe4 that Arab help had been "invaluai^le**. 
After the First Wurld i^ ar« the M i i e d Gwvarrun@i.ts had 
not f u l f i l l e d their pruniises made to the /grabs azid "aivideu 
the region anoncj th^nselvas** 
The Arabs l i v i n g for centuries in ttva boca^ v wora ottc^nati 
EB|>ire did not have any p o l i t i c a l experience, rhu^ were i;^-
suf f i c i en t ly aware o£ the "dytiOmics ana sulatletias o£ i a -
ternatio;^al diplosiacy &r.6. i^jnotGnt of how to pt^SQut their 
14 cause e f f ec t ive ly" . Xn fact« tliey were u>nablc t c con^re-
hend correctly Mc i4ahon*8 corresponderice droftv^d in vatuo 
ainguage. 
11 . Hussein A« Hassouna* The l«eaque of Arab s ta tes a:iu 
Reoinal Pfooytg i A sjjpuciy pj MidOle East confl icts^ 
IT^ ew )(o-rK« 1975)# p.241. For cUitails see Hurewitss« 
OP. Cit.^ pp.13-17. 
12. Huarowita# op. Cit.^ p .54 . See also Khouri, Oi?. C i t . . 
p . 8 . 
13. Hichard W. Manc-bach« Yale u. Ferguson and ^^naic. w. 
i*a:npert# The l^b of World p o l i t i c s t u^n ^tate .^tors 
in the Qlobal i*ysti«ai (t;ew jerswr> i~jl'6) ^ p .71 . 8e<ta 
a lso ichouri^op^ C i t . . p»8. 
14. Khouri, op. Gi t . , p .15 . 
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Six nonUuB a f t e r He MdiK>n*0 assurances regarcULiiy in* 
depondence of tlw Arab ^ta t«£ a f t e r the end c£ tha war# foX-
iowed the c3yKee«JPicot egreement* 3^his was «in agre&m^i^t i>3t-
ween the a r i t i s h « French arid Russian QovQSr.wiQmsi, which @m» 
JE)Odied iDUtual undertttandiny as t o the por t ions o£ tn& d i^ in* 
tegra t in t , Ott(»ian En^^ire t h a t each country intai^dua tu claim 
a t tn» eiid or the war* 
The ^yko8«Picot a^reometit* there£oro« was cloari.y a 
breach o£ the Pledge with Hussein she r i f o£ Mecca* hussf^in 
did not known about i t unt i i Decetabet 1917* ih& iiol&nevXka, 
a f t e r cwaing i t i tc power in auss i a discovered trie st^cret oyKes* 
P i c o t Agreetnent in the archives o£ the ^ius^iion Fur&igxi u f t i ce 
16 and published i t to the warld* 2 t t l iereforo l e a ts. co.troverwj^ 
but the B r i t i s h government was shrowd oTiOniih t o make tht. Arabs 
17 
s a t i s f y . 
The Balfour UQclarat4.ont 1917 
During First »orld war Britain was badly it. xiCH^.. w£ 
£inat.cial assistance. The year 1916 was disastr<^u& £or tha 
18 
Allies, It was presumed ii. Groat Britain that JK;r cu^ K^^ rt 
for Zionism **w>^ uld produce a r.mt ally in th«s fonn u£ wwrlci 
19 
Jewry*, Z ionis t inovoiT»ont# which had defined itiJ ai.a a t tii<s 
For a c t u i i s seo 15, iiussoln A, Hai^Swuna, op, Cit«< p«24i« 
Hurewitz* Op. Cit ,# pp , ia»22 , 
16, Khouri» kPju-Si^* p»8» See a l so --er.esi»w3-.i, w^, w i t , , p,7'; 
17, Ib id . 
18, iiarai Haaawi« B i t t e r Harvest i P a l e s t i t ^ 1914<»67. {i;ew York, 1967)« p * l 7 , 
19, Lenczowski, Op.Cit./ p.77. 
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F i r s t Z i o n i s t Congress i n 1697 as th® croat ion for tha Jev/ish 
people of a heme i n P d l a s t i n e achievad s ig i i f i c o i i t pruyro^s 
i n i^r.giand« and obtaii ied formal B r i t i s h support d u r i » j w^rlu 
War I . This was done vmder the dynaitiic lc:udcxsU.p o i Dr» 
Chaim 'Weissmazi^  a Russiaii born Jev; who was «^  lacturc^r in 
21 Chemistry a t :4anchoster Univers i ty i n England, He proved 
tu be wise enougfi t o siesie t t u s opportuni ty . He cui^triouteu t c tn 
B r i t i s h both morally and niater ia l ly i n return of B r i t i s h 
support fur the Z i o n i s t cause , At t h a t tlim^ twc irtajc^r dove-
Ic^pfoents touk p lace i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s , which proved 
t o be favourable for the Zionii>t {iiovemsnt* The f i r s t wau the 
RiUiSian r e v o l u t i o n of 1917« the second* ftmericon's e r t r y i a t ^ 
22 
the A l l i e d cac^* Tairwitig icito account a i l the&e f a c t o r s , tim 
B r i t i s h Gowrnfflent dec ioed t o supj.>ort the zJLoni&t cause with 
out g iv ing any weight t o those promi£*e« alx'eady m^^& with ttm 
Arabs, 
On :^ iOveflid3er 2, 1917, Arthur Ja:(ies DaXfour, arxt i^n 
Foreigt'^ Min i s ter , addressed the fo l lowing l e t t e r t c i«oru 
Rothschi lds 
I have !»uch p leasure xn conveyiiic^ t o yv,u, 
on behal f of h i s Majesty ' s Goverr;anent, t t o 
fo l lowing d e c l a r a t i o n wf synipathy with J«^wish 
Z o i n i s t a s p i r a t i o n s which h^xa O&QX. submitted 
to ar.d approved by the Cabinet . 
His Haje@t:^*8 Uovernnik;«nt view with favour 
the establ ishinent in p a l e s t i n o c£ a n^tioi.^i 
hCKao t o r the Jei^ish peop le , «»na w i l l use t h o i r 
20* Hussein <^i, Hassouna, wp. Cit .# p . 2 4 1 . 
2 1 , iiorman iJentwish, l a r a e l t Ucttions of thv. awJ^r^. t^orXd, 
(i'^ ew YorK, 1952) , ,^.29,see a l s o t^.iCZ'i/^auit c> .^ c i t . , " 
pp*77-i.3 & 374-376 . 
22* LrenczowsKi, O P . C i t . , p . 7 9 . 
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beat ondoavours to facilitate titet <icnxttvu«. 
ment of this obJ«ct« it being ciaorly Ui.dor 
stoud th jt nothing shall be donct which rauj, 
prejudice the civil arid religioi^s ri9ht,& 
o£ oxisti::g non Jewish cuia luritios ii^ polue-
tine, ur the rights and jpolitic.il st«itus 
enjoyed hy Jews in an^ other c<^ untry» 
X shall bo grateful if ^ ou •moula briny 
this declaratio:i to the kiiowledyo of t.h& 
Zionist Federation,23 
24 This •ill-fated" letter is popularly' /u.owu as the 
aalfuur Declaration* !nULs declaration hod i>.^i. d&scriDou as 
a docuiOEint in which "OUQ nation solemr^ ly pronvls^ d to a seconu 
25 
nation the country of a third", Thai>, whut cvct mlyht hau 
been the stress oiid strain of war ur^  i@c whicn the Jai.£our 
Declaration was i^ s^ued, whether to secure tiie entr^ ot 
United states in the war against Germany ^r to get fi^ .a^ cla^  
support frcwi the J«ws, "it is difficult t^ avoia tJic in^ pre-
ssion that the Britisn Govornmant blundered int^ thu palesti; u 
in 1917".^^ 
Hussein ' s corifidonce in the J r i t i s h Government wae 
s l i g h t l y shaker, a t the publication, u i tlie iialfour iXiclaration 
but l a t e r revived a f t e r the asourai.co r,ivoi. D '^ ccnsnia. ucr - . J . 
27 Uogarth« on behalf of His Majesty 's wcvernrt^nt. 
23* Ilurewitz, op. C i t . . pp.2S*26. 
24, ^asni iiadawi« ogj Cit»< p . l ^ 
2S« *^thur Koestl43r# Pron4se aiid rul£ila<cnt* (..ow i^tu) 
p»4, , Uuoted in ^ionry Cattuii^ ir'tale^tii.Q and xiitor" 
riational Low t The j -^ j^ l AGpects yf t t ^ ^irab » Xaroali 
conf l ic t* Ci^noon. 1973)^ p . l Q . 
26» John iiagot Glubb, J r i t a i i j nsiU the «>rab3« (Liof>aun.lJu9) .;.>. 140 
27 , JJencsowski, O P . Ci t .* p.8» a— Khouri* op. C i t . , pp .b -9 ; 
and a l so Saoii Hadawi* op .C^t . . p . 2 0 . 
iS 
This Situation could act pevall loiiy&r« "Ir: October* 
19I&« Arab doubta about Britieh intontion beyau^ . tw ri^e ag«ar.« 
ana Arab unrost ^row",' .» 28 
x^BtubliahBiant of the B r i t i a h MataOate over paloatii>e« 
U n t i l 1918« PalQstiriO was a part of Syriaii ytoviicou 
of Ottoinan ^n^ire , Turkish r u l e oncie«a as a r e s u l t of the 
military* v>ccupation of P a l e s t i n e by Alli«id Fc;rcOw. ^fter 
the war the questiot . cf tiie futures of Palestiti^^ cUiU uther 
Arab countr i e s occupied by the A l l i e d Forcos wuu» tiiu s u b j e c t 
of d i s c u s s i o n a t the P a r i s peace Conference ope^iud c;r; JaiiUciry 
13, 1919* At tha t tiine ever^ partar uf the ^ a l i e u v/ui.ted t o 
Share the p r i s e of v ic tor^ and i t was not p<^&6ibi.c t o con^-o'. 
r i s o n with t h e i r c o i i f i i c t i HJ i i . t c r - a t s . a v e . . t u a i i j , u rei.«uy 
was found in the form of *t4arKiate*« Ihc coj.vc..ai:t ot ttie 
League of l^atioas v;ai:> drav/i^  up by tho ccMt^torcco oi.u tilg.c^u 
at Veraai lee un June 28* 1919. ^trtical 22 ot tnc> Covo;.ai;t 
which was adopted on Mf^til 25, 1919« provided £c.r a riu; date 
29 
system orit^inally proposed by General i^ ouiti^ . 
The problem s t i l l exi;^tcd a^ t c who should exvacX;je 
ttui mandatory powers i a s p e c i f i c a r e a s , it. ^raec ts. £»olvti 
the problum, preaioont w v^^ drow wi l son , '^xot^a&a tw aj..p. ir t ^n 
28 , Khouri, Co. C i t f . p . 9 
29* & e^ Hus^suin A . HUSSOU 
Cattan, Qp. C i t . , pp. 
30* Iiencsowski, op . Cit«< p«8ti 
. S^  . ussouna, op^, ^^.t* P»242. an ^ a^iio nm.V;/ 
. 25-2T. 
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Zntor Alllttd Commlsion to visit Middle £aat to «iscertain 
the wishes o£ the people "dixwetly conct^rnea"* France 
refused to piurtieipate in this admission and the British 
representative with drew* Ultimately* with the approval of 
the Supreme Council at the Paris peace Conference the united 
States appointed Dr, Henry C, King and Mr. Charles R« Crane 
tci tb& Coomission of inquiry* Between Hay iund. July 1919« 
these two /American Cc^ acnissioners made a six week tour wf 
32 Syria and paleatine asiu conducted their invostiyations. 
aha Ccxomission presented it*s reports to preside.it wiXaon 
on i^gust 2&« i9i9* Ijenc20wsivi# has reotar/ioa that "the re-
pi^ rt was too hlunt aiid tuo frank tu please either Fraiice 
33 
or Great Britain"* £he report was not rejected^ but 
deliberately neglected* Further more* when Peace conference 
met at San RmxtOt it adopted ti:^  measures wiiich were exactly 
opposed to these reconxnendations. 
Thiis, f^at ever taight had been the int&ntic/n o£ British 
Oovern^nent in i917« no one could deny tYiS fact that the hap* 
poiiinys of the Port World war X had made her positi«^ n sus* 
pecious* especially in the Arabs eyes. TYva Kin<^  crantj re-
port* though made in 1919* still attracted the attentlun of 
various scholars and Den uf knowledge. It had become a great 
31. Ibid. 
32. Ibid. 
33* ihid»« p*90. 
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sourcNi to Justify th« allecjations taade by the /\cahe to tha 
Br i t i sh GovornniBnt* 
Zt would be inter«8ting to note that — ipresident 
Wilson* who «ppruvsd th* B^f^ur Oooiardtion ana nappend 
to be a great supporter o£ 2:ionism had daelarea in liia 
34 
fortesi^ points* that the population o£ evc^ r^  cuuntry 
ahuuld be free to chose its own form o£ govenunents. It 
looKs very difficult to realize that Milsoa* "inuut hvtve 
believoii that the majority of the people of palei>tiiie were 
35 
already Jews". Wilsoniari principle of self deterntlriatior: 
was not acciqpted and* perhaps* it war store susparisiiig that 
when the Paris Peace settlement was mode* ix> iisnericar. dele-
gates »ere present there, 
HoMiver* the iii^ perialiste * dream was realised wheti 
the Supreme Council of Allied Powers 8»t at Sar^  Ke.a<^  ur; 
April 24* 1920* anu decided about the future of the terri-
tories occupied by the Allied Force, FramcQ was giveh ayti^ 
and i«ebanon white Great Britain was allotud a saau date over 
35 
Zroq oi^ d Palestine. The terms of mandate over Palestine 
37 
were not settled yet. The terras of mandate over Palestine* 
34.For Wilson's Fourteen Points See Hagnu&i* OP. Cit«. p.27, 
SS.Glubb* Qp. Cit.^ p.134, 
36.lienesowski* pp. C i t . . p . 91 . 
37. tienry Cattan* Palest ine atid Intt-rnatioaal l<aw 
The Legal Aspects o^ the ngab » XsraeJ - - — 
(London* 1973). p .26. fggitl. 
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00 ub£ierved by Te.-qperiy# w«ce settled by t^ ie British ^^vorn* 
nent In conaulatlon with Zloxiiat repre£@nt«itlve&'*. 
The Zloni:^ t claim to an M.storlcal title to Palestine 
was first advanced by the Zionist Organization tc the knaco 
Conference opened in Paris in 1919. In its mcmoraoluum o£ 
February 3« 1919 tu the Supreme Council o£ <^ U^.lied powers 
at the peace CQ:iferei;ce# they demanded the recognition u£ 
the "historic title of the Jewish people tu Palostii^u mid 
the right of the Jews to reconstitute ir. Pidlestiric thsir 
- 39 
li.atior.al Home". 
However^ the final draft over paiestiue roaiiddte whicn 
was approved by the Council of the League of i.atioriS on July 
24« 1922* was in accordence with the terms proposed by the 
Zionist organisation previously,*^ 
About the position of the Palestiniai^ Acaim, J.^. 
Olubb had remarked I 
The word Jew or Zionist issued twelve time 
in the mandate^ but the Arabs, who funnod 
ninety three per cent of the Peculation, 
are not mentioned at all.^^ 
Another writer* Henry c uttaii# had also poiiitad out that 
"the parties most concerned, the Arabs of palestint^, were 
42 
not even consulted** 
3@« H«w,V, Teirq^rly, History of the peace Coaferei.cc o£ 
P a r i s , Vol.VX, (Hodder arid wtoughtou, 1924} • p . 1 7 4 . 
Quoted i n Henry Cattan, up. Cit»« p . 2 6 . 
39, Hurewita, Op. Cit., p.45. 
40* for the fuil text •^f Palestine aandate se^ Uonry Catted, 
Op. Cit., ^^pendix II, pp. 176*160. 
4 1 . J . D . Glubb, v p , C i t . , p . 2 6 . 
4 2 . ^lenry Cattan, Qp. C i t . , p . 2 6 . 
42 
Thaxmioie^t the fact oould not t)0 dieaied that mandaterv 
agreement wes totaly based upon tlie Jewish interest, Zu the 
Arab*8 eyas* the inclusion of Balfour i^claratlon in the 
text of Mandate was an aet of "pure iiqperialisn* a mort-
gaging by Britain uf the fut\u:e of a land tu which she had 
43 
no right ful claim". 
Despite Arab resentaient arid protest^ the mandatory 
administration wa@ finally established* \^ iic^  soon graiited 
44 
permission to the Jewish itk dgration into Palestine. 
British government ^^ ypo^ ^^ c^^  ^^^ Hebert i^ amuel as the 
first High Conmissioner of Palestine* who was definitely 
a pro Jew. He adopted a iMnant and favourable policy to* 
wards Jewish poople. AS the time went by* more and oiure 
Jewish iflMigrants were yrantiny permission to enter ii^ to 
Palestine* They had a definite plan about their future in 
Palestine and to materialize this* they waiited Palestine 
tu remain under the British mandate* until large soaie 
imn<igration could bring tbMi in majority. They started 
to pur^ase additional lanu to maXe rocm for the increasing 
nundaer of imcoigrants. The Jews of all over the worla began 
to unite for the Ck^llective efforts to achieve their ^oal. 
43. jbarry Collins & Dominiqiie Lapierre* 0 Jerusalem im 
(London* 1972). p.24. 
44. Shah Abdul uayyum^ The Arab « Israeli Cor.flict* 
(Aiiyarh* 1975)* p.U. 
43 
The dfitabllshiactnt of the nandatoxy ai^ tolriistjrdtiori did not 
provide £QX an iodepeixtont state to the Jew£. But tho^ er» 
joyed a^any odvdntaigeA over the urlginaX inhabitants of 
pelestine* The Arabs* who vere already hostile over the 
denial of independesice k^ British and France after the Hcria 
i^ ar Z# became more a^ inv^ yed with the unrestricted Jewish im-
45 
migration into Palcuitine* 
It was righcly said thatt "the British Governrnent 
opened the gates of Palestine tj official and ili.&9al 
46 
Jewish ianigration**« 
An official statistical data of the maridate had 
provided that! 
The nt^ ober of Jews at the tinie Q£ the 
British occupation of Palestine in 19l4>« 
w<^ 5&«000« or 8 per c»nt &f ttMs tutal 
population. Four years lat@r« and under 
the itrmad pro taction of British arnw# the 
number of Jews was raised to 83* 794# or 
•£:>^Mi. 12 per c^nt of the total population 
By 1944 ttHs number of the Jews had reached 
554«000« or 31 per cent of the total popu* 
lation* ^t the tiao of the establishment 
of Israela-Stateff in 1948« the Jewish popu-
lation figure was 650«000# this at a time 
when the natural increase amony the Arab 
population was higher by 1 per cent than 
of the Jewish population*^? 
4S« see A«H. Hcmrani« great Britain and the Arab worlds 
(Itondon* n*d.}« p.l7. 
46* Al«>Hakam«Darwasa« The galestiae ijuestion i A brierf 
Analysis* (p,|i«o, Indian Officey New Delhi« n.d.i 
pTI?, 
47* 3^id** pp.2S.26* 
44 
Mom«n 3«intwish# • Zionist Jew who held f^r sovsroX 
yttara the o£fio« of Aitomvy « O^neraX of PalestiiiO during 
tho British M«iKidt«# had said that "paieatine of the Hatxlate 
was tha woob of the Jewish eseation". Before 191b, the 
Arabs and Jaws ware in vezy good terms in palestirie. "The 
Arabs did not oppose the Jaws as a religiovts entity"« nor 
they did object to the icomigration of Jews into palostix^ 
49 
**as long as thoy Game without political notivces". 
The years bet%feen 1918 and 1948 saw the growing Arab 
ndtionalisa and political Zionism side by side. At the ir>i* 
tial stages the Arab;; opposed the pro Jewish policy of Great 
Britain by rather d«nocratic means* They resorted to violent 
methods only *when appeals* protests, arguments, oeraowstro-
tions mid strikes failed", ° 
Zt was a reality that in all those years nither Britain. 
nor France and America bothred about the hue and cr^ of the 
Arab worlds instead, "they lent syiqpathetic ears to the zio* 
Si 
n i s t arguments". The Brit ish moiidatory aumlrJ.^tratloii of 
palofiitine even forgot the tenuous sofegnards l o iu down Ln 
favour of the ori&ii:al inhibitaiits of pulootine both in 
52 Balfour Declaration anci in the mandate i t s e l f , Thrcaiyh 
49* Khouri, GO, Cit,^ p«l l* 
SO* sami Hadawi, pp. C i t . , p.60 
51, Khouri, Oo. C i t . , p , 5 . 
52, Henry Cattan, Qp, C i t , , p , 2 8 , . For d e t a i l s sue Article 
(2) and (6) o f t h e Bri t i sh Mandate for Pales t ine , July 
24, 1922, 
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out the British Ha»dato« F«l«stine was tho aoene o£ conat^t.t. 
<li@turb«knoes and tujcmoil* "The British thought o£ th«aoeiv«36 
OS the lihttrst^rs of the Arai>8 tsam the TurKes«l»ut the ^ \£sl>6 
S3 thought of them as the new turKs"* 
The 44rab natiunsiism which wiks cyLrected ayoii.st Tur^ 'voy 
during Worid w«r Z« was divert«»a towards Britaii: aiici Fraaoe 
after 1914^  and finally towards the Jews* By 1933« the ^ orabs 
bitteiri::»ss reached at peak when tlM persecuted Jews from all 
ov«r the world started rushing towaris palestiiie not because 
they were in need of a refu^ pi* "but In order tu fulfil th@ 
political aspiratiotii of a aajor ideological mjvmmi.it called 
54 S5 
Zionism"* Hitler's "Psychotic hatred* against the Jews 
made the situation of Palestine oiore aggravated* no western 
couTitrieSf so called liberals cone forweurd tw yive refuge 
to the helpless Nasi viotiraa* Instead* the CQUi<trios of 
western Europe and i^ m^erica began tu supp&rt the Zionist 
8K3iveiaent t^ tooth and nails and pressurized the ma.idatc'r^  
administration to permit the entry of moem and inor» Jews 
in palestir^* This resulted into a new wave of Jewish iinni* 
gration into Palestine ai^ caused further unrest. 
S3« Guy wint and Peter Calvoeoressi* Middle £ast Cris-ig* 
(Aylesbury* 19S7}• p*lb. 
54« sami Hadawi« The Middle £ast Reality i aet%ie<an'» war 
and peace* (Dallas* Fexas« w,d.), p«7l« 
55, Carl Hesmann Voss* pna Palestiue Problem Today i 
Israel and its I*»iyhooura< (Boatoa* X9S3)* p,16. 
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Ttm iltst out break of violence in PaJLi^ stinu oc* 
cured in April 1920« the seoond in Hey 1921« the thirU 
erupted in August 1929# end during the period betwoar. 
1936 end 1939« an ail out relMllion broke out which w«u( 
follo%red by a general strike* The Arab nationaliittn in 
Palestine was inspired by the success oi t^ io nationalism 
in £gypt« Syria and bebanon in winning conf::essions from 
57 
aritain ana France* 
S«A. Morrison had described the inten&ety o£ thu 
Arab nationalism in the following terns • 
The cotqplexity of the situation was 
accentuat«i»a oy the fact that no where 
in the world was nacionalisa more in* 
tense than in Middle £ast« and no i^ere 
was it more dooply seated than ir^  
Palestin,*^ 
The disturbatices in palostine* therefore* continued 
and became more coiqplicated to deal with« because it be-
canie a matter o£ prostige for the neighbouring Arab dates. 
The feeling of indignation was intense ir. wyria* rrai.sjuiraon 
59 
ana Zra^* This move of the neighbouring <urab coui.tries hoc 
to have soitie practical value* particularly at a time whei^  
56* ^ami llad«wi« op. Cit«* 18« p*60«# Sec also J,a, aluob, 
Qp. Cit.* p*154« 
S7* Hurewit2« ^p. Cit.* p«219,, Wint it Calvwcoressi« ua. wit.# 
p«20, 
58* J,A, Morrison* Miualo fiast Tensions! Polittcal* i>ucial 
and Heligious* (JNew York* 1954)« p*33* 
59. J.B* Qlubb« Op. Cit.« pp«l&1.291. 
47 
the cioud« ot Second VwcXa w«r xmre guthoriiic., j r i ta i i . was 
aiixlous "not to antagonlae tha ATdias whos«i h o s t i l i t y tsvlyht 
fin have adversely effectod** her war ef forts* 
Zt was interest ing tu note that onl^ in 1939 the Bri-
t i s h Government rem;jnhared the promises she had maje to the 
Arabs during the ivorld war Z« £ven on i^ ovecnber 5, 19J6« 
61 
when the peel CcMsniis^ ion was just to arrive iu Palestii'e 
to investigate the causes of unrest« the maiidatory adminis-
tration granted permisiiiOQ for further Jewish immigration •^ '^  
The Royal Connisaion spent three raonthe in ^ alestii:.o. oix 
months later# on July 7« i937« the Cotanissioti * s report 
was issued* zt recooaniended the temiiAtion o£ the Handuto arid 
partition o£ the Palestit^e iiito three po«|^ t.ions» H Jewish 
i^ tate was to occupy the Ck^ astal strip and Galili, the 
British control was recwiin fzuta Jaffa to c&s.aalo^n, ana 
the remaining portion wf the country was to ho united to 
Trans-Jordon, 
The Palestine /iraibs rojoctod af^ y form u£ partition 
and even the Jews were reluctant to accept the iaea ;.f 
60. iihah Abdul uayyujtw op. Cit.« p,l3, 
^^' KeesfnQ's contenyoorar^ - Archlver^ (July 2a-29, l'J3tj), 
p«2203* 
62* See J*B* Glubb« Qp« Cit** p.151, 
6 3 . Zbid., p .153 . . See Khouri, op. c j t .^ p .2b , , ami also 
Nonsan Bentwich« up. Cit.^ pp.32-33. 
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64 Partition at this stage because they were still a minority. 
The Arab resented violently to partition of Palestine. They 
also decided to challenge the authority of British Mandate, 
Through out August and September, organized gurrilla warfare 
from both sides resulted in the loss of many precious lives. 
The mandatory government tried to control the situation by 
taking repressive actions against the Arabs, On October 1, 
1937, the Arab Higher Committee was declared illegal. The 
prominent and active members of the Committee were arrested 
or deported. In order to avoid his assest, the Grand Mufti 
of Jerusalem escaped to Lebanon, From Lebanon he directed 
the activities of Arab gurrillas in Palestine, Later on, 
the exilled Mufti reached to Berlin and Broadcasted his 
appeal to the Arabs in favour of Germany and her allies. 
The Arab rebellion reached its peak in 1938. More and more 
British troops were poured into Palestine to deal with the 
aggravating situation. But despite heavy casualities inf-
licted on Arabs by British troops, the rebellion did not 
67 
end until the spring of 1939. 
64. J,B. Glubb, Op, Cit,, p,158., see Khouri, Op. Cit., p.25. 
65. Ibid., p.154. 
66. Ibid., p.279. For details see Khouri, Op. Cit., p.31., 
and also Elizabeth Monroe, Britain's Moment in the 
Middle East ; 1914-1956, (London, 1963), p.90. 
67. Dilip Hiro, Inside the Middle East, (London, 1982). 
PPT51-52. 
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Moan wiULXe« the Britiiih Qovrrmmnt ^pointea a 
technical Conmlasion^ hoadsd by sir John Wood ho«^ d, to 
work out the partition plan reconmended 1^ the Royal Peel 
68 
Cocnmlaeion* The new OcNHftiesion landed in Palestine on 
i^ r^il 27* 1938 and remained in the country until Auc^ ust 3# 
1938* 2tie Cooniesion found that the ixspleinentation of the 
partition plan aa reconmended i;^  Royal Oooniaaion* was not 
possible due to the wide dispersion of the Arabs and Jews 
all over ~ falestine. 
The Wood head Coranission* therefore* suygeated a mooi-
fled sehenie of partition but it was rejected by the British 
Govemnent itself* Instead His Majesty's Goverraanant invited 
all the concerning parties to attend the London c&nfex:e:)ce 
whi^ was to be held during February and March in 1939* to 
69 find out a solution of the Palestine probl<un« The iiondon 
Conference exKled with out eny positive result* 
Both the iurabs and Jews were adamant to ac^ e^pt iwthing 
less they had d«nanded« AS for the Arabs* they were Justi-
fied for their claim becaus«i they had inhabited the pales-
tine centuries ago* But the validity of the fantastic claim 
of the Zionists was still doubtful* and it h«id become a cha-
llenge to all pedce lovin^ ^ nations* 
68* Keeeinq*8 Contemporary Archives* (hov^mber 12* 1938)• 
pp* 33l7«-l&* 
69. Xhid,* w?*3318*19. 
so 
our lat« Prims Mlx4.0t«r« Mrs* Indira aandhi^ oxpre&-
s«ci thtt siraiiar viow while she was criticising^ ^^ unprs>vo* 
k»d Israeli invasion of the Lebanon, she soidt 
India had genuinely syo^athised with Jews 
\^ xin they were harassed in Europe* But we 
did not support the Jewish home laiid at 
the displaoenent of Palestine,'^ 
During the years* immediately after the First vjorld 
war* there %fere possibilities to bridge up thu tjulf botweer. 
the Arabs and Jews* But the double dealii^^ of British Govern* 
raant widend the gap between the two cofiii«ii^ ities anci mado tho 
situation uncontrolable* After each new crisis British Gov-
emiasnt used to se^ id an inquiry Coards^ion to paiestiiie tc 
71 
find out the Arab grievances* The roconraeiidations w£ these 
inquire GofBoiis^ ions had nevor been materialiaoU Uue to the 
various practical difficulties* 
The year 1939 brought about a radical chan^ j^  in the 
world politics* Duririg this period a nunaber of iiiterriatiotial 
deveiopnierita took place whlcii bruuv^ ht the Arabs in a bargain* 
inij position* Betwoen 1922* which may be coasiderod as the 
beginning of the mandatet and 1938* Just prior to World war 
II* Je%ni enjoyed a better position than the palestitui /ucabs* 
70* Indian express* C^ew £>eihi* July 10* 1982)* ^ j*l. 
71* In particular* The Palin CoiBmission of 1920* The 
Havcraf t Co«aission''^^iaSriK^Ihe>r 2g=gsS?5? 
of 1930* The Royal Peel CowraUsion of i^3Tan( 
- -T—r—7 — '- snd 
The Wood head Commission of 1938. 
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This position was changed when "l^ azi Germany and Fasci<^ t 
Ztaly i»g9n to threaten British interests in the Miuaic 
72 Sast**. British Government was in a cjuardary* she had 
to satisfy two conflicting nationalism in Palestine tc gcULn 
their suppc>rt in the approaching war .'mis situation was ex* 
ploited by Germans axid Italians in their war efforts, rhe 
unhappy Arabs seeiaad to be nore inclined towards Italo* 
Geman progapanda whic^ was intentionally accelerated in 
the Arab Bast* Realising the international davelop:»onts 
and anxiois to retain Arab yood will in the region so 
vital to British iiqperial defense* wabarrasing chamberliii 
Oovernment published the white paper on May 17« 1939« aii* 
73 
nouncing a new policy for Palestine* Tho new policy 
adopted t^ tiim British Qovenanent representing a consi-
der«U>le victory for the PalestiiKiian nrabs* had become 
challeage to the Zionist novemant* The whole of the Jewish 
wwrld was united "in its exposition and in declaring this 
act to be not only wrong but also utterly devuXc of moral 
74 
or legal validity*** They considered it as a joetrayai 
of the promises given to them by the British Gover.nnent. 
72, Khouri* OP* Cit** p*26, 
73, Hurevjits* (to. Cit** pp*2l6«226*# See Keesing^s 
(M^ 17, 193lTrpp.357S.3576* 
74* J . p . Garg« Israe l & Zionism. (Ghasiabad, 1979)« 
p.57* 
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n^iey «aous«d Britain to follow «i policy o£ placatiiy oraoi, 
to regain their support in the aq^proeohiny war. In tii@ Uni-
ted States of Aa»rica and in many other countries* in£laeri-> 
eial Jews started to protest against the enforooiner.t u£ Bri-
tish v«dte paper led to controversy among British uf£iciaX£i 
75 themselves• 
On the other hand« the Arabs too« having a bitter 
experieace in the past did not want to tm cheated agaii). 
Although a few nodor^ t^e Arabs appreciated the British policy 
76 
and considered it a "modest victory" over the Jews. The ma-
jority of the Arabs and the iur^»-Higher Ccaimitteo# however^ 
rejected it. 
Jews needed the fjrasedom of unrestricted innigration 
to Palestine becaiise of their constar^ t nisery anci suf-
77 fering.« while the Arabs demanded its abeoluttn terniii.ation. 
AS for Britain* it was againat her war struttegy to allow 
unlimited Jewish imraigratioii in Palestine* Oerroaray awaj^ 
of the fear and frustration of the Sritish (3uverx^ ment« 
started dumping more and more Jews into Palestir^e. To 
the Zionists Palestine v/as the only country where tho 
Jews might flee in time of peril. 
'5* Ke^sioa's Contemporary Archives, (May 23-24, 1939) 
pp, 3SS2-3583. 
76* Peretz Don* *Tho Paleutino Arabs t A i;«itionaI ;^ ..tityi 
in Micfiael Curtis* (ed.). People ana Politics in the 
Middle Sast# (new Jersey# 1971). p.78. See alec The 
fiifT*' "^^^'^"' May 22, 24, and 30« 1939). 
77. See J,P. Oarg« Qp. Cit«, p«&5.# and Koxman Bentwich, 
OP' C^t.. P.3S. 
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Rammixttlng how violence and terruirisim were provea 
to bo the most effective weapons® in the paist tc pressurise 
the British G<;^ ver]:unent in Paleetine* tha ;«i.onist Xanncheu a 
war of terror end deatruction^ against the British officials 
78 
and service personnel. £iinultaneously# t;h&y propagated 
their activities on the political front* But thi£ time 
the centre of gravity of the Zionist roovemssrit out side 
Palestine shifted from London to washingtoi;. It was be-
lieved« that in U*^«A« a iMll kint a;id finfiincially sound 
Jewish comtainity had its say in the Press* Public and par-
ties. They could inpose their preferences in making and 
7d 
unmaking the U*s« OovernRients, 
Whan the Second World war broke out i.n September 1939« 
the Jews supported the l^ ritish cause* not it:>ecduse they were 
friends but due to realisation that "the fi.yht ayainst Uit-
ler was a fight fcr their life*** ^  Althouc|h« no relaxation 
took place in Zionist propaganda or activit:ies directed ag-
81 
ainst Britain and white paper*** Ttm hrab policy was not 
nearly as clear cut as during the First woirld viar. Upto 
World war ZZ« Zionist never demanded the eiitablishmant of 
7&« For the Zionist's Terrorism see Sami liadawl* UP. gJt** 
S3« p.75«# see khouri* (to. 9^^r' P*'^ *^* ^^^ JmmT^dm. 
aayyum* gp, Cit.« p«lS«* and also J.B* aiubb. OP. Cit.. 
p.281. 
79. see :^acnl Hadawi* Qp. Cit*^ 53« pp«7S-7ei. 
60* Normal^ aentvvich. Op. C i t . , p . 3 4 . « s a c iiXm. i^nGzovB.^1, 
OP« Cit** p«634« 
8 1 , J . S . G l u i ^ , Qpp C i t . . 280, 
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d J«wiah Stata in P«I«atina« It v^a done iu May 11, 194a« 
when a Zionist conference was hold at the aiitmore hiotol 
in limv VorX. At this oonferesice a programcae was chalKed 
out* comaonXy Known as BiltflK>re. programne in which the 
Zionist openly deoMunded "the estahlishnant of Palestine 
as a Jewish^Oosmon wealth** • It also denounced the Bri-
tish white P«|>ter of 1939« which limited tiie Jewish imai-
gration in Palestine* 
prior to l^rld war II« united utate*» role in the 
Hiddle Eastern affair was minimal* After :L939# this role 
seemed to be enlarging. By the end of e^c(;>nd world Mar« tn 
U«S*A, had become deeply involved in the Middle Eastern 
region* tiios»an«>Bentwich a Zionist Jew had written that# 
"Palestine was now not a purely British* btit an Ar^ igio* 
83 
American problem"* 
Of course* America had solved the pniblmi b^- ignor-
ing the rightful claim of Palestine Arabs* ana supportixig 
the creation of state of Israel* It proved to oe a wonuer-
ful solution which in the result had ereat<»d an over liMtH'-
itiij problem in the west Asian region* therefore* whatover 
Britain had done during %K>rld vfar I* America had repeated 
82* Hurewitz* OP* Cit** pp*234*23S. 
83* !iorman 2entwich* up* Cit.* p«36* 
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it ciuJTing WorX<l War ZI« The Prosident aoo«QV<elt ana his 
suecesor« Prttfiii<l«int Harry Xruioan* made a zmndoor of contra-
dictory pronisas to Arabs and Jews which aggravate th& Pa-
lestine situation further. 
Zn August 31« i945«, President Truman« oxtei<aing strong 
84 
support to Zionist cauae, addressed an appeal to the Bri-
tish Prime Minister Attlee£or the imrnediate admission o£ 
iOO« 000 Jews refuges to Palestine* In respcmse^ Ernest 
Bevin# the British Secretary of State for foreign i^ffairs 
asked America to Join with his government in an luvestiga* 
tion of the Palestine Problem* The U«S*Gov«imment accepted 
the proposal irt>lch provided a new dineritsiori tu ttie eiitire 
problem* A Joint Anglowtmoriean committee of inc|uiry# ap-
pointed Ta^ prime Minister Attleearia presidcu.t Xru{nan« was 
65 
composed of six Britishers and six Americans* The report 
of Anglowuaerican ccxnroittae was a dieappoiiitmsut anci foilea 
to Obtain the approval of both the Arabs ana the Jews* 
The U*L>*^ *fl* had given its prediction prior to the 
submission of Committee's report that "it l^as yoi:;c, to play 
a mischievous rolo in the s^iear Sast*** 
84* Khouri« OP. Cit*^ p*33* 
65* Carl Hermann Vo8s« OP. Cit*# pp*l&*19* 
86* Hussein A. Hassouna* OP* Cit«* p*244. 
87* J*C* Hurewits# The struggle for Plaegt,it;e« (..ew \^KK, 
1950)# p*246* 
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In 1947« the ar i t i »h Oovomnent* exh«iu£ittuci ij^ uor 
of forts £oun4 hers«l£ unable to deal witti t:he prv^ i>len) o£ 
FaXeetlne any nore* Xlurough out the war ye^irs ana ove.. uft@i.« 
the /ar^ Jews ptatolem was oxaoaj^ated by trie 8;nuggli;.j w£ 
axms and the large acalo i l l e g a l Jowleh ixmiigraat^ Into 
Pa les t ine . Unable tu penoit any further Jeiwlsh imniyrd-
t ion into the palostiiiOtf 8\ibj«^t to fitroctg prosiiure s^ f 
U*^ « Gk>veminent supporting Ziotii^t ai.it« hairoasou b^ uio 
Zionist oaii%»aign w£ violence* and fruited by worlu wide 
oritioiam» the Bri t i sh Oovemmnt put tho {problem in tho 
lap of United tiations, xt was f ina l ly aiinoiUioed by thu 
Bri t i sh Govemaant in the parliament on FeJi>ruary 18, 1947*'^ '^  
The question of the future Governmeitt of Palest ine 
was the subject of discussion at two sess ions of the Gene* 
ral Asseiid>ly» on t4ay 1S« 1947« the AS6«nl>ly oppointoa a 
on Committee of 11 nea^ber states^^ to exaniine the problem of 
Palestine* the c^pmittee was JuKwn as the ynitod i«atXona 
38. Great Britain, ParUaaantarv Debates, liouso ot 
ooanons« Von433« dols.^b«9SJ^. (i>eb. :i8, 1947). 
89 . Henry Cattai:« OP. C i t . , p .37, 
90. Hurewitz, Op, Cit.. 2« p.28l.« see aisw i«enczuwsi.i« 
Qp« Cit.# p«393l 
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Special CosBmittttQ on pal4Mitln«« UK^ CP sujcmittod i t s mpK^xt 
tu tho Geri«ral Aa^oinbly in Scptsaber 1947« containifi^j two 
91 plans a majority Oi^ iol a siinority plaru 3ho *i4ajority 
Plan p;^poead part i t ion uf Palastinc into an /lurab ia>t«ito 
aiid a Jewish ^tate with economic union# jeruisalem vaa 
placed under tho U»t^, acb^nistration as an i;iterr;atio!.ai 
c i ty* While the 'Minority Plan* ouygested a federal ^tate 
of Palest ine Goi^toa&d of two ^states* Jewish and israh, each 
92 
enjoying local autcnooiy. ^t that titnc, "president •^'ruinar. 
91 
used his personal anu official irifluence" to secure a J.L. 
Vote in favour of partition of Palestiiiie as "suggested hy 
94 
the majority Plan", as a result of Politicai presi^ ure 
U«lu Gei^ral Assembly parsed a resolution en :.ovomoer 29« 
1947# racoomendiny a modified sohcuoo vf paj;rtj.tion uy a votu 
95 
of 33 to 13 with 10 aibstdution« The adoiition of the par* 
tition resolution was proved as fuel to tho fire o£ tiim 
Palestine problwi, Serious clashes between Arabs ai:u Jews 
occured in Palestine which msulted into t^ ie death of a num-
ber of innocent persons• "The Zionist forces which were 
91, u.t;. Docuneat V364« Sept. 1947, 
92, i«acaowski« Oo. Cit.,p«393«, Henry Cattan, Qp« Cit.* 
p.37. 
93, Henry Cat tan, Palestine, the jacab anu Israel i The 
Search for Justice, (London, 1969),0,2'?. 
94, Henry Cattan, 90^ Cit,, 37, p,37, 
95, U.ijt Rasol. of partition l»o, Isil (II) A. I:OV., 29, 
1947., see Hrewita* OP, Cit,, 2, pp,28:U295. 
5a 
carofully trained and asned during the monoute, Kga^ .^^ 
£ul£ii their role ailoted for that hour", ^^Montj tui... a;-
rooities inflictad on the Arab popul«ition of i*«ilc£«tii.u ttm 
massacre Q£ Ueir Yaaein on f^riX 9« 1948« viaa the heizi^  c 
97 
one. 
The %iajority* was reoeived with enthv^ia:. mm s«itis-
fiMtion bt^ the Zionist* while huth "Majority* mi<^ ainority* 
Plaroi* were rejected by the Arab Higher Consnittee* The <^ irab 
States argued that under Article (10) of tt:)&t u^u. Charter, 
the General AasenOaly was io^ povered to reoonmuu but nut tc 
93 
enforce the partition plan. 
agypt's involyeiaent in the Paltetstifio 
The Arab s t a t e s , (£:Qypt# Iraq, Saudi Arabia, TtAim--
an 
Jordon« Syria, the I^ ebarion and the Yeman) as inemoerii of 
the Arab League, rashed to support their brotlMvrs in their 
struggle against the partition of the Paleotine* They had 
tetaporarily for gotten their diffocenoes and Joinad hm^Os to 
face the 2!lionist and ia«»erialist threat. In this battle. 
96. Al«4iai&a»>^ arwa2a, OP. Cit., p.34. 
97. sani Hadawi, Qg. Git.. 54, p.7. 
98. LencsowsKi, Qp. Git., p.396. 
99. The Middle ^ast » 1950. (i:^ urope publications, London, 
1950). p.202., see Lenczowski, Op. Cit., pp.633-639., 
and also Hurewitz, Op. cit., 2, pp.245-249. 
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£9ypt as a fcwiaer oBndaer of th@ league «^f iurals i>tates« 
plfty^ d a l^adlcg role to defend the eeuse of Paleatlr.e« 
Prior to the formation of Arab League^ precccv^led v<ith 
her own national problecRs* Sgypt had ahowr: tittle Interact 
In the paleetlne Proi>le»« ^ "international politics ana 
the problem of getting rid of the Brltl«h"« said aii emi-
nent autlK^ r* "consumed the energies and ett^ entlon of 
Egyptlar^ leaders between world war I and 11", From 
1682 arltlsh Governmsnt had controlled Egyftt, Her 
foreign policies were guided and her suctxQf %ras controlled 
by ttm British officials **elther directly or Indirectly 
as advisers". ^ ^ The end of world war ZZ and Its later 
manifestations had changed the role of £gypt ccxopletely. 
Sgypt could not escape the Impact of the partition of 
Palestine. 
The arltlsh Oovemsient* as well as tlie united i^ etlons^  
were not unaware of the happenings* On April 1&« Z948# a 
8e<wnd special session of the General Asamti^ ly was convenad 
100. m» Middle &ast & florth Africa 1969«70. (^ lurope pub-
llcations« I«ODdon# 1970) # p*790# 
101. lhl,d,, 
102* Sydney little ton Fisher^ The Middle £«aat A History > 
(London* 1971). £d. zz.t pTtSST 
103. Joseph A, obleta« Th** enter-natlonal atatua of the 
sue» canal. (The Hague. 1970)• Ed. ZZ„. pp.8»9. 
104. Robert Stephens, i^ asser t A Political aiography. 
(X^ ondon. 1971). p.24. 
&Q 
to x«oonaid«r ^ M partition Pi«n« Both tho security coon-
oil aaA tbo Oonoral AsMMtoly rovoaXod that "SOIM oovom* 
WMita fjpMStioiMA tho ViMom of tHo partition Plaa".^^^ 
Y«t ovoa a final daeiaioii ooikeaniiiig paiastina prololoBw 
tlia British qovarniamt^ sont lAiat oonfoaad aa i^at to do 
ia thaao eireunttaaaaa« aimoanoad tha tamioation of ita 
Maadata and vilOi dirav thaijr adsdniatration iiml all thair 
fOKoaa frooi palaatioa on May lft« 3.94«* ^ 
A f aw hours haf ora tha aaqpiry of tha aandata, oairid 
Baa Quriowt Vith tha aupport of tha Uaitad Nations**, ^^ 
proclainad tha aatahlishnaat of tha Jawiirti stata under 
tha naMa of Zoraal* The united states oi Anarica and 
Jhtssia had xaoogniaed Israel innadiately after its founda* 
tioa".^^ On tiagr ^ 2« 1949« she toeeane the £ifty*ninth aii^ bar 
of the united ttations.^^ 
The Qeeation of the state of Israel was followed iane* 
diately togr A general Arab atta^» Robert Stephens had obserfedt 
The anger ^•» not nerely over the fact 
of partition and the ereation of a Jewish 
state but also orar what van regarded as 
the widly unfair nature of division. ^ ^0 
10S« Henry cattan# oo. oit^^ 37« p»7$* 
lot* KeesioQ's Contesporary Arcaiievefi. (May 15-^2« 1948), 
107* peter Mansfield, Hasser*s £gypt# l«ondoQ# 1965*« p«31* 
108* Wint 6 Calvoooressi, OD^ cit»» 53, p*26* 
i09» The Middle gast 1950, (Europe Publications, London), 
p* 203* 
110« Bobert SlM^phens, op* cit», p*73. 
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Ttoe Joint forces of figypt* Jordan^ Iraq and ^yrla 
•iiterttd into palostin* *in order to sitvo the country fwr 
her Arab inhebitente"*^^^ 
7heee oountriee plunged into the wer against the crea* 
tiori of lereel naioly due to the "emotional fervour mia a «» 
112 timenta"* although they were "without supplies* without 
113 
training* without organization and without discipline"* 
The Israelis* who were better ormeci and fighting des-
perately for their survival* "launehod a violatit counter 
114 
offensive** As a result* the Joint fotcos wer^ t dofaated 
badly by the Zionist forces. Unfortunately* the Acabs* ins* 
tead to prevent partition of Palestine* provided an qppor* 
tiinity to the Jews tc occupy a greater areo of territory* 
which was alloted to the ^^ robs under the w'»ti, partitioa 
lis Plan, In fact* since its creation isracsl had adas>ted 
a policy of expansionism* ZD order to annex sore and more 
territory Israelis had started to terrorize the /urab popu-
lation of Palestine* They were uprooted arid dispossessed 
from their home lana to satisfy the aspirations of ziunst. 
I l l , Khouri* OP* c i t « * p«73* 
112* Shah iyjdul i^ ayyum* o p . c i t * * p*84** soo a l s ^ J . B . 
Glubb* oo* cit«< p*289« 
113* J.B* Glubo* OP* c i t * * p*287« 
114* Peter Mansfield* The British in £qypt* (i«ondun* 
1971)* p*291. 
lis* Randolph ^* Churchill & Winston ^, Churchil.* Xhe 
alH l>ay war* (/irniy publications* Delhi* 1967)* p*21« 
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It was a oonsplracy of ttw Gxwat Poworo to dioose palostine 
116 
to pay tho prioa of "Suropaan Crimas against the Jaws'* 
Hariah Chandola* tha spaolal oorxwapoziclant of *Zn<iian ^ xpraas* 
for Mlddla £astorn affalxs atatedt 
Zaraal# of oouraa« is a racial* aaqpanuiioniat 
and aggrassor state* eraatad with tha ii^ >or<-
tation of pac^le from atEMroad"**!' 
7he i»wiy created United i^ ations aiade a nunddor of attert^ tc 
to cease the Arab ZsraeXi Asned hostilities* but failed to ach-
ieve that end* Open hostilities between Israel rnxd the Arab 
£»tate* "Came fomally to an er^ £^ virtue of the Armistic 
llB Agreanants of 1949"* This was done undor the suporvlsioii 
119 120 
of Or* Ralph Bunch* su<KM«8or of Bernadotte, in the 
first half of 1949 foiir AmijJtic Agro^ nentJEi 'were signed b;y 
121 Israel* with Sgypt on February 24* 1949* with Lebanon on 
March 23* 1949**'' with Jordan on April 3* 1949* ''^  and with 
124 
^yria on July* 20* 1949. Ilhis however had not prevent 
Israel fjcoa launching an attacX on the Egyptian front arid 
125 
occupying the whole area of the liogev. 
116, isatni Hadawi* OP* cit.« S4* p«71» 
117* Harish Chandola* * while derulte Bums** Indian tiXDress, 
(express Magaaine* August 1* 1982)• 
lie* £ami Hadawi* op* cit** 18* pJ16 
119. ^ e^e LenczowsKi* op« cit«* p*399* 
120* Saini Hadawi* op* cit** 54* p*7* 
121* U«K* Document S/1264/iiev«I« for more «i&tails ae® U.ii* 
Doeuraant S/902|Kesol*Mo.S4** (July IS* 1946). 
122* tf.t^> pocumont S/1296/Rov*I* 
123* V^miim pocumant V^302/{U3V*I* 
124* U|t4. poouit^nt w/13S3/Rev*I* 
125. Al-H«Jcaa>4>arwa»a* op. cit** p,36 
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"Tbtt hiatory of the Amistloe Agre^wntfi*** said H«rury 
C«tt«m# "wM marked 1^ nuinarous flagrarit bre^ohas oomltted 
by l araa l i acnad foroaa** But genarally i t was ixiiieved 
that "though narrad lay nuoMurous vioiatiorus« the Anniatic ra* 
4 
gina pravantad major hostilities unlit 19S6"«' ;- 127 
Sffacts of fffyitinc war (194a«>49) on t^oyoti^T^ 
5n3r!inL*-;o.Mi: 
The hvnlliating defeat in Palestine w«uc had a pro* 
found an immediate effect on egypt*a national politics* 
Xt hastenod the revolutionary process whicli had already 
began in 1919 and subsided as a reault of 1936 Anglo &gYP^ 
tian treaty and the second world war. At the same txm, 
it also high lightened the corruption* cowardice* aiju 
128 
"criminal inconqpetence of the man ruling Sgypt"* 
Throughout the waut Egyptian Govemeent misguided its own 
129 
people hy giving them wrong infomations about the facts. 
When they knew the truth they were shocked and humiliated, 
"A lost war and a national humiliation nearly always produce 
dooMStic vq;>heaval*'« ^ It also proved to be corjc&ct in Sgypt* 
126. Henry Cattari* <»>. cit*^ 37, p. 120. 
137. John tjorton Moore* (ed»)* The Arab * Israeli conflict* 
{l%ew Jersy* 1974) . Vol. 1.* p«ll. 
12&. Peter nanafield* oo, cit«* 114* p«291. ^ ee Robert 
Stephens* op# cit.* 104* pp.91«>92. 
129* £ee J.B. QluJaib, op. cit.» p.268. 
130. Wint and Calvocoressi* OP. cit.* p.24. 
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The old regiiMMi which wars dcHiRinated t^ Ft^aeh <*na iiritiea 
iaporlAliMn, wr9 now Iwing cAi«Il«ng«<l hy €i n«w generation 
whose eiiRS included not only to acdkieve ooiqplete national 
independence but eleo to bring out social ima eounomic ro-
form in Egypt. Thm younger generation was <tware of the ra-
pidly changing situation in the Middle East and throughout 
the world* Zhi^ saw that France had gone from the liiddle 
East altogether and Anstrica and Russia had begun to taJh^  
131 
a serious interest in the area* Ttmy also realiaed 
that in the paleatine war Egypt's policies ware faulty 
and military strategy was wrong. The lack of unity and 
rivalry of the Arab states were the major causes of their 
defeat,*" 
The revolutionary thinkings of the younger generation 
were inspired by the preachings of extrenists groups* Fascist 
influence 44>peared in the s^ocialist Party* formarly known as 
Green Shirts* Organization* while Musliois Brother hoo<i* com-
bining extrane nationalism with islamic fundaaontalisa* dovo-
loped a terrorist wing and threatened the established autho-
133 
rities* These groups were active in the anti Governnent 
and anti west oaiq;>aign. In tioveni^ der 1948* l«okrashy Pasha 
131* Robert Stephens* 00. cit>* p«69* See also Mint & 
Calvocoressi* OP* cit«* op«20*26. 
132* J*B, Oluhb* OP* city* pp*28c.^b9** see Wint u 
calvocoressi* op* cit** 23* and also Robert 
Stephens* OP* cit** p.96* 
133* See Robert Stephens* OP* cit|* pp*34«*65** See 
Peter Mansfield* c«>. cit** 114* p*292** and see 
also l«enc8owsj>i* OP* cit.* p.489. 
65 
dissolvttd Muslim Brother lioool (Cl*ZHhwanot Muslemlii) and 
ita branehes closed. On 0«eeinb«r 26« 194a« ho x/as os&cujsi* 
natcid Ijy a Mxisllm Brother. Two months later the wjuprcaiao 
OulcUi of Musiia Brothera* sheik Hasuan et i^ anno* was aico 
aasaasinated, UnCMurtainty* <r\iatration and anyer caused 
the out break of violence and aeatruction in gyypt* i.ihehQy 
Cm Chatter ji had descrihedt 
Between the Palestine var and the out 
breaH of revolutimi* £gypt hopped from 
one political crisis to another i Prima 
Ministers ^tanged with a rapidity and.^e 
facility which bewildered the public* 
Anti British feeling was intensified by the anti* 
Israeli sentiments growiiuj in Egyptians. They Uomandod 
the evacuation of British feroeo* with out conditions from 
their country* and rejected the ;^ idlcy*Bevin agreement initi-
ated on October 2&» 1946« for a conditional withdrawal in 
1949* The del4i^ ing policy of British GoverruMint irrita-
ted the li^ gyptians further* AS the tinia went by« the;^  be-
came more and acre suspodous about the British intention 
regarding evacuation of Egypt and the unity of tho i.ile 
Valley* "This political disillusion and social uu;u ucotr^ omlc 
134* Peter Hansfield* oo* cit.* 114.« p*292. 
las.i.iKshoy C, Chattorji, Hudale of the tUddlo iiaat# (new Delhi, 1973), Vol* ZZ*« p*106* 
136* Randolph s* Churchill & Winston £>* Churchill, op. 
p*19*. For tho <tetail see Hurewits, QD. c i t . 
pp.271*273* 
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oUscountent prociuae a fextMnt which naedcxi cnX^ a leader 
137 to niv© it a rovolutlonory force^. The j.9«(d«ir v^lis^  c»rwO© 
was Gamal Abdul i ass^r^ tho Chiof aschitect of tho cuap uo' 
et aX o£ 19S2. 
liasser and hia eolioayues had ixseii curoaminy a rovo* 
lution t;o oviic throw "ia^ria i ienv iiionarchy ana ~oaualii;a"« 
which wer«i haunting figypt alnce VQXY long* They did not 
g*t an <^p|;)ortunity unt i l 1949. The revolutionari niovectcint 
139 
whic^ began "in ambryo fiorta in 1942'** was seriuosly ur-> 
ganiaod after the huntiliatiny defeut in tiui «*al«9£itiao and 
resulted into the death of Egyptian Monarchy* 
137, Robert i;>tephens« op* cit»* p«15. 
1^« ^bid. . P.49. 
139* Ib^dt 
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Chaipf r « ZIZ 
n^i* Egyptian revolution of 1952« «nd ths 8Ub««qu«nt 
ttwnta which ultiautoXy X«d to ttm British iuid French inva-» 
sion of £gypt wero tho dir«ot consoquoncos of tha Arab da-
faat in paioatin* war* "The loaa of Palastina", aaid srsiane. 
B« Childors* *waa a great disaster with far reaching results 
for the very existence of the Arab nation"* The figyptians 
felt nore hwailiated than any other Arab ooimtry because 
"They were expecting a quick victory and were over wheXined 
by the news of their defeat"* The young soldiers* who re* 
turned frooi Palestine had a better eiqperieneo of war* Timy 
saw their friends (l^ ing miserably due to inadequcitc medical 
facilities* The supply of essential OMsnodities was irregu* 
lar while arras were criMolete and in soma cases defective* 
Often grenades blew V4> in their hands and caused the death 
4 
of many soldiers* More over* senior officers had given then 
meaningless and contradictory orders* which made the situat* 
tion bad to twrse* Despite all their efforts Egyptian amy. 
1* firskine B* Childers* The Boad to Sues* (London* 1962)* 
P*101* 
2* Gordon waterfield* £gypt^ (London* 1967)* p*152** 
•^y,l^.ll1l<^f g y y m& ^y^<^ t ^ ^^"^g (Surope 
publications* London)* p*79l. 
3* Peter Mansfield* The British in Bovp^ (London* 1971)* 
p*291* 
4* £skine B* Childers* Qp* cit^^ p*93* 
5S 
had to i&om m humiliating dofeat in the P«a.«stino war« vihen 
they knew atootit th« Axam •oandol* involving king and the 
p«rliaineiit« they were ehocKed* Thia newa that "the Ki»g and 
the Oovemoant thcMwelvea were making money out of buying 
defective araa**^  provolced the revolutionary thinking of 
young ax»y officers (Free officers) who were already wa* 
tehing for the right momint to strike. It also evoked 
resentflttnt in Egyptians • "They were unanimous in fixing 
7 
the blame on Xing farouk". The yuung Egypt bec<um iz^ c-
reasingly hostile to the old regime* which had nieth(»r 
succeeded in getting rid of British totally xyot it had 
made any progress in the sociOii>economic fields* The i&Mgryptian 
intellegentia began to realise the inevitability of a revo* 
lution to over throw the corrupt and o];^ ressiv«^  ruyal dicta-
tor ship* No doubt* Bgypt had a progressive and educated so-
ciety which under stood the iMieds and many of the ways in 
whi<di Egypt's social and economic problems could be solved* 
But political power remained in the hands of those who were 
inefficient to face the new challenges of Post war Sgypt. 
Egypt needed a firm and stable government* which it did 
not have* 
5* Bobert Stepliens* Kaaser i A political BJoaraphv. (u»odon* 
1971)* pp*78«79** see also Erskine a* Childers* OP, cit** 
pp*6d«93, 
6* Ibid** p*7S. 
7* Nikshoy C* Chatterji* Muddle of the Middle East* Vol.XZ* 
(New Delhi* 1973)* p*105* 
8* Sydney Nettleton 7isher* The Middle east i A Hfstory* 
IXnd ed* (London* 1971)* p*691. 
"9 
n M waldi which had again returned to pouter in 1950# 
"realising *oim past nistakaa*** "^  triad to reform in certain 
fields• The fotandation of Egypt's first social security schena 
for widows* orphans* disabled and ola* was laid in 1950.^^ 2he 
wafd govert»ent under t«ahas pasha "began its long drawn out 
struggle with Britain**• The FXVM officers** as they had 
now begun to call theniselves* gave it their full support 
"from behind the scene by helping to train eomntandos to 
12 
fight in the canal sone"* 
n^M3 bright prospects of winning the conservative party 
under the leadership of C^ iurchill in the ss^roaching British 
Parliasientary elections had made the question uf treaty re-
vision most urgent* The Egyptians %rare aware of the fact 
few w^xs age Churchill had criticised the i.abc*ur Govern-
meat for edopting a lenient policy towards Egypt • Thrgugh 
out 1950 N«d>as pasha tried to settle the twin burning issues 
of Egyptian politics* the with drewl of British forces from 
99. firskine B« C3)iI4ers* op, aitmm p.97* 
10» Peter Mansfield* op« cit«« p»294** and ErsKine a* Chiiaers* 
11 • peter Mansfield* i^ asser's Sqyp^# (London* 1965)* p«40 
See also sydeny liettleton Fisher* OP. cit.^ p«693. 
12. Ibid,^ p«40« 
13. See Shah I Abdul gayyum* fiqypt Reborn i A 6tudy of Kqyat's 
Freedom Movyaants i 194».S2(Kew Delhi* 1973}* p«l36.* 
> D.A. Farnie^ f^JiT^ West of Swg i The Sues see also D.A. Farnie^ ^ ff_^ West of Swg i The Sues 
Canal in Histo^ i Ie54«l956* (London^ 1969^ p,69^. 
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Egyptian SolX« and ttm unity of tha Mil* Valiay* Egyptians 
had bacooft irretatad to ome any British aoldiar in thair 
country* It was a tragedy that both Britain and ^gypt had 
a4optad a policy o£ raprisal %^aoh craatad naw problams* Tha 
out braak of koraan war in June 1950 had a graat intpact on 
tha Waatem search for ways to develop a "iiituation of strength* 
in the tiear and Middle East* with the etaergenoe of ^v^iet 
Ruaaia it had becona nore iiqportant than ever for the wes-
tern countries to Heep the Middle Eastern region in Uieir 
grip* During two world wars« Egypt* due to its peculiar 
geographical location* had been proved as a vital military 
base for the Allied forces* After the withdrawl from Pales* 
tine it was against the British strategy to ieav@ ^^ .gypt* 
It was the bacHground in whic^ Anglo*£gyptian talks regar-
ding the revision of 1936 Treaty began* in i:«oveinber 1950 
Mahaa pasha fojRoally requested the aritish auveri^nent to 
IS leave the audan and the Sues Canal iwne* Mean while 
British aovemnsnt with u*£>* support had succeeded tu 
find out a rmaedy to remain in Egypt* 1!he United •»tate* 
Britain* France and Turkey projected a sehinae tc estab-
lish a Joint allied force in the Middle East* similar in 
16 
scope to the North Atlantic Treaty organisation. 
14* J*C* HurewitB* Oiplomacy in the Near and Midd 
^ SST"^"^**^ «aCorg-| 1914-1956, Vol.II JLondon. 
15* Sydney Hettleton Fisher* OP. cit.* p*693* 
16* JdC* Hurewita* op* oit.* p*329* 
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On October 8» 19S1« triillo the proposals for the reglotial 
security pact w*r« oa the way« Kahas pasha« ooftpel led by 
n a t i o n a l i s t ' s fervour and the interactabl l l ty of the a r l t l s h 
QovemoMint* uni la tera l ly abrogatcKl the Anglo^iigyptlat. Treaty 
1*7 
of 1936 and the 1899 Sudan Condominium AgrcMunent. Four 
days later, on oet^Der 13, 1951,*^ the western Powers* In 
the name of the United states* Britain* France end Tur>^ ey 
presented proposals to Egypt for a Middle i^ est Defence 
Organisation (MSD0) of which ligypt would be a founder 
ntKoboXm British Oovemn^nt annotanced that If £gypt would 
accept this proposal* she was ready to abandon the /^ iglo 
19 
^9yptlan trsaty of 1936* The four powers suggested that 
an International cofBolsslon be appointed to supervise the 
preparation of the Sudan for self goverrimant while ensuring 
20 
£gypt*8 rights In the waters of lille* on October lij« the 
^^VPtian Governmant rejected these proposels cutd slmultane* 
ously the draft decrees presented k^ l«ahas pasha for abro-
gation of the 1936 Treaty and the li:i99 convention on the 
Sudan* %fere approved by the e^ sorptlao parliament proclalnw 
21 Ing Parouiv as the "King of Sgypt and the Sudan** • The 
17. P.J. vatlklotls. The History of &qypt. Ilnd, ed. 
(Xiondon* 1969}* p.368.* see also ersiULne B. chllders* 
op. dt.* p.97. 
19. J.C. Hurewits* OP. fit., p.329.* see also S.N. Fisher* 
OP. dt.. p.693. 
30. J.B. Glubb* OP. Pit., p.310. 
2 1 . Qeorge l<encsowskl* The Meddle Sast In Viforld Affairs . 
Iixrd ed. (London* lUDrVMlT 
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MSOO plan vas oLismlBsctd fep the Egyptian Ctovernmaiit on the 
groiUKi th«t it would have n»«tnt an occupation o£ tim canal 
22 
sono by £our powars instead o£ one"* It was aluo a inatter 
of concarn that Sgypt waa invited £or a reuionol security 
pact l^ four powars* one of trtwo was occvy^ing ^gypt ay<ii!jst 
her will from ldd2« another of whc»i# Franc«)« reluctantly with-
drawn her troopa from Syria and x«ehanon« uiiuor the pressure 
of Britain* tihile the third* Turkey was a couiitry from whose 
auseranity the i::gyptlans had cstruygled for a cantury and a 
half* &gypt along with other Arab cou.)tri«j& h^d to pay a 
high price to free theaasalvea from their TurKi^ ih loaaters. 
The fourth waa U«^«A* which had played a vital rolu in 
23 
Croatimj the State of Israel. 
The Cairo Riote 
The bo<kd ^ tep ta}<.en tiy Eyyptian Guvertim-^ nt onc^urog&d 
the activities of volunteer guerrilas* of students* Huslin 
Brothers* oonmanists and other extremists* groups* who att* 
ao^ed the British forces wad raided British residential areas, 
Anti British demonstrations had begun in Cairo and Aloxai;dria 
soon after the AnglOi»£gyptian Treaty was abrogated by the 
24 
unanimous vote of Egyptian parliament* ItKt aiaro^ation of 
the Treaty did not realy eha>>e off £iritalri*s position regor* 
ding the Sues and the Gudan« but it satisfied tl^ e ego uf the 
22* ito>bert st^hens* op« cit** p*96. 
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Egyptians to some ext€2nt« 
TtMB Conservative party which came into power ^s a 
result of general elections held on October 25« 1951« 
ad(^ tcci a horah and uncon^rcmising attitude« rhe British 
Ooverninent declared that the unilateral abrogation o£ the 
Treaty waa illegal* and the 1936 Treaty anu tho Condominium 
Agrueraents of 1699 %#ere still in force. The U.:^ . Government« 
•up^^orting the Sritiah atand* upheld the validiti of the 
26 
Treaty and the ;budan Agreements, 
AS a result of these dttveloj^ nents tension between 
£gypt and Britain increased. The warseniny internal situa-
tion of Egypt "reached a stage which could be called anarchy*. 
By the beginning of 19£>2 the guerrila war fare anu the British 
reprisal in the Can<ai Zone became more serious. The British 
Coaraander in ie^ gypt* General Ers^ vine* with a new Churchill 
£:dcn Govojnsnent behind hiiiw handled this situation "with 
28 
rutjUless energy** on January 19« 19S2« XSinaila* a chief 
town and base on the canal* was converted into a battjie 
field* The fighting continued for six days. At last* on 
27 
25. The Tiiaes* (London* October 26* 1951}. 
26. LencsowSKi* op. c i t . * pp.498«499« 
27* li.C. Catterji* oo. cit«* p«lC6. 
26. Robert Stephens* op. cit.* p«97.* see also 3hah 
Abdul Qayyum* op, cit.* p.156. 
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January 2S« 19&2« Zsmfldlia waa captured* ar.d aii Egyptian 
anxiliary forco was wiped out i:^  the British forces. in the 
course o£ the battle more than sixty Egyptians were xilled 
29 
and seventy tw& wounded* This ghastly act ccKtralttod in 
Zsmailia "lit the fuse which exploded in Cairo** • The 
next day, on January 26# 1952, rioting occurcd in unpruco-
31 
dented manner* There was a mass hysteria which th«i #a£d 
governinent was incapable to control* R^ie vaious "radical or* 
32 
ganisations" and the hostile students organised demonstra-
tions, which soun turned violent* In this holocaust ^ -^ hich 
erupted in Cairo, raore than 700 establishitienti; mostly aaso-
dated with British and other Suropeans were burnt down« at 
least thrity people lost their lives, ana several hundered 
33 
others were wounded* £»hepheards Hotel, Barclay's Ban.., 
tho Turf Club, whero tvielvo people, includincj nine British 
vivilians v.^ re brutally murdered, Groppi restaora its, and 
the Circurol and Chemla departmer<t stores were among the 
34 buildings which «rere destroyed by the angry mobs* By the 
time the IS^ptian orm;^  was called to bring the situation 
29* Lenczowsni, op. cit., p*SOO*, see Robert Stephens, op^ 
cit., pp*97«>98*, ana also P*J. Vatikiotis, op« cit., 
pp*368*369* 
30. Gordun waterfield, OP. cit** p*154. 
31. iiQQ Vatikiotis, opy cit|,* p*370*, and see also Gordon 
Watorfield, op. cit., p.154, 
32* Ibid*, p*366* 
33* I b i d . , p*370., ses Robert Stephens, op . c i t . , pp.lOO->l01., 
and sea a l so J . 3 , Glubb, op* c i t * , p*3l2 . 
34* l«encaowsKi,op* c i t . , pp.500*501 • 
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under control^ most of the central Cairo was put on flames. 
The smoke from burning ]3uildinga« human flesh and oomnodi* 
ties "was already rising in a thicK pall over the city". 
The streets of Cairo "were covered with broken glass, the 
blood of victims and the trampled debris of fashionubie 
stores' « 36 
The British and^assador in Sgypt, Sir Ralph Stevenson, 
was in a very enborassing position* He could call British 
forces stationed at Canal Zone to bring the situation under 
its control* But at the same time he was aware of th«3 fact 
that a "aritish take over in Cairu would be a political di» 
37 
saster^ puttiag the clock back seventy yearns"* no had to 
wait for the Kings* action* He knew that tho situation had 
become so grave that the King had no way out except to or-
der the Egyptian anapiy to intervene t^j save his uwn position. 
After imtch destruction had beon done* King FarouK summoned 
th& £gy^tian ani^ to intervene in order to protect the life 
and property of British and other foreign natioiials* He had 
delayed action because he was not sure about the loyalty of 
33 the Egyptian amy* He had been afraid that it might mutiny , 
35* Robert ^tephen&, OP* cit** p*101. 
36* Ibid. 
37* Ibid*^ For the det«iils of the events which tooK place 
in 1882, see Joseph A* Obieta« The International wtatua 
of the Sues Cana^^ Ilnd ed* (The Hugue# 1970}• p*lo*« 
see Hugh J* Sclbonfield, The 6uez Canal in peaco ana wari 
Id69*l969« (liondon* 1952), p*29*« and see Ouy Wir.t U 
Peter calvoooresei, Middle i^ ast crisis^ (^ y^lcsburi, 1^57). 
pp*36*40• 
38* Guy Wint & poter Calvocoressi, twiddle iiaat Criais. (Aylesbury, 
1957), p*40* For details see Robert Stephens* op*cit** PP. 101«»3 
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against him and was relieved when the Egyptian ar:ny dortc 
it*a tasH %iell« With in three hourae the situation was un-
der control* Zt waa diacoverod later that the Kiny*s colxQt 
waa temporary and hia doutota were not baaeleas* "Xho army" 
it ia said "had obeyed the King only because its own plori 
39 
for revolt had not by then been cooipleted*"' Mart^ <il law 
waa introduced that evening and a curfew waa impoa&ci for 
an indefinito period in Cairo* Next day* on Januar;^  27« King 
FaxoikdiaoRiiaaed c^ahaa government and brought bacK All naher 
40 
a reputed "strongman" of Egyptian Politica to form a new 
Oovernment to niaintain law and order in the cou:;tr^ , The 
diamiasai of wafd government was not merely the need of the 
time but the result of the humiliation which King FarouK had 
41 gone through due to I<ahas pasha in the past. All Hoher 
formed an independent government and tried tu in^rovo the 
prevailin«j situation in Egypt* At the same time h& tried 
42 
"to kaep In touch with the wafd« the Xing and the British" 
govermoent* He also expressed his will to reopen discussion 
43 
with the four powers on the question of Middlo iu<SMt defence* 
aut Ali Maher Pasha was not prepared "either to dieais& parlia-
44 
merit or tc be harsh enough with the wafdists". 
39* Ibid. 
40. VatiKiutis, OP* cit*^ p*370. 
41* The Middle East & North Africa i 1969«»70* sixteenth ed, 
'(L;uropa«^ ublicationL.« London}*, p»790. 
42* Robert Stephens, op. oit*^ p*l02. 
43* Middle East Journal* Vol* III*# (Washington, February & 
March 1952), pp.6i«-97. 
44. Robert Stephens, op* cit*# p*l03* 
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Disagroemint with the King arose on these issues saiC ulti« 
loately ha had to resigr from the of£ice o£ the pjcenuer on 
March If 1952 • Ali«Mah«r w«s replaoeo by /thmaa l.eyuio Li* 
Hilali« a formsr I4inister of EcLiiccktion who had resiyned from 
th« wafd party in protest against its corrupt prdct:3.co8« Hilali 
t/as an intelligent raan imt he laciu»a political insight* hi& mjued 
with the King to dissoXvo parliament and to «3xiXe 4iir«ijudai:.« 
the wafd Secretary General by puttinc- the entire respoiisibiity 
of the * Black Saturday t on the v&fd government, :^ty x^ ^^ -^ '^ 
who found guilty it. the Cairo roits was puniahed* ^ i ;iai^ e£ 
had t aken lenient view in all thesie matters althuugh he dejj-
ounced of those wtiw were responsible fur tha Coixv trajedy^ 
He did not wont to breaK tiie inational ur.ity at any co&t, He 
kXi^M that it would makfc nis position ;veai.er to e^ai with 
the arition Governxoor.t s iccessfully. Contrary to that# Hilali 
tried to win the support of the nation by aiiburin.^  that he would 
eradicate corruption from public lifs* Hie promises o£ a clean 
and stable government did not serve the purpose. Teaqperamenteiy 
Hilali was an educationist and not a shrewd pclititian. In fact« 
his Oovorriment was a weak Goverrjnent with no support £roni the 
palace, parties or public* By Knowing the weai^iosses of Hilali*s 
Government the Great Qritain did not modify her staid on the 
q[uestion of the audun, Hilali failed in his laslci ai-v^^  re-
45 
signed on 28 June* 
45, Shah abdul aayyum, OP. cit** pp*162«J^ 6di 
i^. ^ y^ 
78 
*ievoluti.ori & ilepubXic 
By tho time l i l l a l l ' s Oovermnent oamta t c an &na« 
King Faruuk*s *True-»8el£* vf«6 escipooad t c tiie poopla, !i& 
was the most hat«iol person in the eyes of fkXa subj4i»ct&, B)i 
the passage o£ time h i s iinpopularity increcuuiid. ;hct s t o r i e s 
about h i s s i n f u i i l i f e had heCKMm publ ic* Pet.cr tidD&lielii 
has wri t ten* t h a t " the hartdsamd and wi id i i x^ <^^ l< i^^  Wy»King 
had been transformed i n t o a cartoon s a t i r e >£ frtXddle uyou 
46 
debav'chery ••, iiuriiiy the per iod tn^nn wanu*«ry iy52 „ij 
wards Egypt had yone through d VHXTJ dji.tuaiiK^ a t a t c v;lt.h 
var ious fvroes waitii.y l o r t n e i r oppor tun i ty . 3ut t:^j -tain 
b a t t l e was now openly start&d between t^ie Kiii^ a;.J thu r e -
volut ionary anny o f f i cexs . They were waitl^^i f^r lou,, fc r 
a r i g h t moaent tc; over throw itnperiali;S£:<# mo^iarcii^ aau 
feudaliSiTv and re^icue £>y;ypt from Chaos. The r e / o i u t i o r a r y 
Committee in the &rri^ continued to watcn th:^ ;situution very 
s e r i o u s l y . Hobert i-ttsptMsas h<i(i writteia t i iat whe -;Qcxot o r -
ganisa t ion i i ^ i d e the aruQ which as laLor .r<>.wn ..£ the 
*Froe c f f i ce r s* "began it . enibryo form in 1942« held ttm f i rf t t 
organised meetings in 1944 and becume ^iore .^^riuutl^ c>rjani« 
aed a f t e r 1949**» Xhese o f f i ce r s were i.eari.^ a l l yoMi.j tmn 
46. PetlMr Kansfield* O P . c i t . * 3, p . 2 9 3 . , t^sw ulsv 
Robert Stephens, op* cit*> pp 45-46. 
47 . Robert Stephens, op» c i t . , p*49. 
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who had fought the Palestinian • Israeli war o£ 1943»49. 
The Palestine war "was a bitter but valuable and matur-
48 
ing exporienoe* for theau The humiliating defeat ir. Pa-
lestine war haa changeci the political out look of the youn-
ger generation completely* niey Knew that it was King Faroor. 
who was mainly respondible for their huoiiliation* iuispito taa 
opposition of the Egyptian Prime Minister tiu^ roahki pasha and 
General i^egxiil>« FarouK himself decided to send the £;gyptian 
amy to the war. His decision was merely "a response to that 
49 
taken by King Abdullah of Transjordon**. Thts uut come w£ tlte 
war proved that farouk decision wris faulty.He uad placed with 
the livos anc honour of the Egyptian armj to satisfy hi:; own 
ego. 
Economic crisis* political instability« contusion* 
feeling of insecurity frustration* anger aiid hatred had 
been the main reasons,which changed the very nature of 
the Egyptian political system. 
King FarouK was not unaware of the revolutionary acti-
vities of the *Free officers*. But he unde* estitnateu the 
gravity and intensity of the movement. 
liasser the Chief architect of the i::gyptia!. revolu-
tion was the shrewdest man amorg the 'Free Officers•• He 
had engineered the whole plan wisely and cecretly. He Kfio-w 
48. Peter j^ anefield* op, cit.i 11* p.39. 
49. Elie Kedoarie* 'Egypt* the Arab states and the ^uoz Esqpe-
dition»* in Keith M. Wilson* (ed.) Imperialism and nation* 
iMS-ll&i^^LSna^n^ Its!} ^^**Q|^g^*^^<^1r4*P ^xps£i?ne9 t 
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that %ftwo the time c&mt "they would ne«d a B&uiox officer 
with a iMJLl known naroa who would act ao their figure hood 
and givtt thair atovenent weight and re0pect«a>ility at home 
so 
and abroad"* ^ 
Masaar found the nan in General Negikib who waa very 
nUOh poimlar in the mxagf as well as in the publicGeneral ik-guio 
waa elected aa the P resident of the Revolutionary Committee 
in January 19S2» 
The existence of the revolutionary (noveinent became 
52 
widely Known* but not the names of its leaders* Sxipici* 
ous King Farouk dissolved the military club on July IS* 1952 
and took steps to deal with the suspected anny officers. Thia 
revolutionary ooflmittee had thus chosen the right time to 
strike* :>ecret asettings were held to finalise the programaa. 
Zn the beginning Revolutiot^ary Executive Coonittee had feared 
that Britain might intervene to protect the King but it 
did not happen* British Government had a wrong ia^>eression 
that "it might be easier to deal with soldiers than with 
wily politicians"*^^ 
On July 23* 1952* a group of young axsi«y offioars 
\uider the leadership of General 24eguib seised power in Cairo* 
50. Peter Mansfield* oo* cit** 3* p*298* 
51* Peter Mansfield* OP. cit** XI** p*40. 
52. wint 4i Calvoooressi* OP. cit*. p*41. 
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Nasscir* "the ro«l h^ad of tho orxny revolt" remained In 
the background* on July 26# the Egyptian arn^ surrouiidod 
the royal palace In Alexandria* and preaauriaed the King 
to Sign an intaadiate alxiication in i^ avour of his infant 
son« Ahmad Puad 2Z« The revolutionary officers invited 
the veteran politician All Mehar to form a goveimment 
under their control. TtMi King had no way out, signed 
the official document of abdication* Farouk sailed to 
exile the sama day* Oeoeral Mohaflxnad l^guib waH made oom» 
mander in au.ef of the armed forces and head of the mili-
tary Junata* A Regency council was formed in u^igust, A 
new cabinet with (Seneral x;eguib as Prime Minister was sub-
stituted for that of Ali Maher* Real power« however, remain-
ed in the hands of nin officers who formed the Revolutionary 
Command Council. On December 10* 1952* General j^eyuib annc>un«i 
ced the abolition of the 1923 Constitution and the Postpone-
ment of the elections for thr«« years* On January 16« liS3« 
all political parties were dissolved* On Jiine 18« 1953« 
monarchy was abolished and the personal property of the 
ro^al family was coufiscated* £gypt declared a Hopubiic 
with i^ eguib as the president and prime Minister as well as 
Chairman of the Revolutionary command Council* beside ..eguib 
there emerged a very iniportant person colonel Garoal ^bdul 
Nasser who was remained in the background for some time. 
§3* j b j ^ 
32 
H« was itpgointmi i^puty Prime Minister of Interior,^* Despite 
I«teguiJa*8 enormous popularity, the people of £.gyxrw begaj to 
realise the man who Cv^ uut^ a was Gamdi /Abdul i.asser. 
Astrugyle for power soon developed between K eguib and 
l^ osser* "l^ iosser was in an inoreosixigly stroncj position to 
estoblishe his own authority and defeat the chollenye of 
any rival", AS a result, t^ eguib subinittetd his roBlgna* 
tion on February 25, li^ 54tt When the news o£ hia resigna-
tion spread, Egyptian public became violent because t^ :;^  
were psychologically attached to him. In order to avoid 
an awkward situation l^ egiiib was prossurized to withdrew 
his resignation. 
By April 1954 sharp differences arose between pro 
Keguib and pro .^ asser groups which took a serious tuxn, 
Ultiaately, on April 7, 1954, Neguib resigned and was 
succeeded by Gtiuaal Abdul taasser* i^ eguib was put unoer 
house arrest, i«asser was now master of £<jypt. He ticjht* 
end his grip over administratiuu imoediately, nusxiin 
Brother hood, which was taKin^ active part in national 
politics was banned, Xts leaders anu many tb^ usaxids uf 
its followers were arrested. Any person who cor<spirod 
against liasser \>i<^ punished, it is aaid that "i.asaer 
had been a revolutionary ever since, and his wholo out 
56 look and style had beoa influencod by this £v»ct". 
54, The Middle i^ aet 6 Jj^rth Africatl 69«»70^  (auropa publications, 
U>ndon)# pp»791<»792, see also £.a. Childers, o». cit,< pp. 
102-103. 
55, Robert Stephens, op, git.. p,123, 
56, canaries D, Cremaano, The Arabs arid the world 11.osser's Ar*ab 
nationalist policy, (i«ew York, 1963), p.28. 
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JaSBEsk mtm pbloctiviia of the mivolu« 
Thm xwvolutionary regime which came into povrer anu 
ended the reign o£ the Mohanmad Ali dyneaty had three iinme* 
diate objectives tu be achieved; to get the British out of 
the country^ to solve the problma of Sudan and reform Egyp-
tian i>ociety. 
The new leaderahip had to eradicate corruption* bribery* 
favouritism which had brought a bad name tc/ the non«urohical 
regime* Majority of the Egyptian pe<>ple welcomed the change. 
They had expressed their happiness over the overthrow of 
King FarouX* They wanted full independence of their father 
land without any foreign* especially ariti&h influence. 
Tlwy were e^ qtectinc, a lot from the new regime. 
The now Egyptian leadership had given the first prio-
rity to the third objective. They had devoted all their ener-
gies to-wards domestic inq^rovement. "They realised that their 
movement would lose all its appeal and motivation if it failed 
to deliver sc»»thing sound and worth while in terms of ecuno-
57 
mic betterment and improvement in public service** • 
Mith in two and a half y;ears all these throe problems 
were solved with different success. Regarding the s^ uestioti 
o£ 8udai« they did not got what they nad an ambition for. 
S7« Shah d^adul ijayyum* op« cit>* p*179« 
04 
Th«y hod to drop t l ^ i r pr@vloua damand of 'l«ile vollu^ 
Unity* ana Aec«pted a sacund se lut lon which thoy hou 
thought hettar at that tlnie, 
An Anglo»£gyptian agreement waa aigned un Foi>ru«ur^  12tf 
1953* %Aii€A) andad tha Condocainiuin Ctovornmarit and laavci t t o 
quastion of Sudan to ba daoidad by the £>ud(iinle6 themsalva&« 
According to th i s agraanont Sudan was to pass throuijh a 
transitionary period of three yaars« duririti which i t would 
develc^ s e l f governing i i iSt i tutions preparatory tw i t s f inal 
SB 
emancipation. At the end of three years i t was up to the 
^udofieae to decide the ir future national status* i^igyption 
asqpectation that they wuuld l ike to remain ui;ited with 
Sgypt was dlsiqppointcd,'"' 
'^na AnQi.o*Egyptiari Agreement on the ;>udan# enabled the 
two govemsnenta to concentrate on sottliiig thoir dicputes 
over the Suaa Canal base* Zn the wues negotiatio(;a« and 
in those on u^aart UJ preaaxire contributod subctantiaily to 
the ulti.nate result* "It was acdiiovad" said ii^ rraot^  Finer 
"only after the strongest prasaure on tlKs iiritish by Uullos 
and Eisenhower"* During his visit to Cairo and other capi-
tals of the regioti ir. Hay and Juno 1953« secretory uulles 
58. Sea J.C* Hurowita* oD»cit.* p*33S*« (Art.X u iz)• 
59* The Middle i^ ast U liorth Afyica i 1969*^ 70* op. cit*. 
p. 792, 
60* J.C. HurewitSf OP* cit** p.3U3. 
61* liermon finer* Pulles Over Suea i The Kieorv u pract ice 
of his Djploi^acv. tLondort. 1964). p . 16, 
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an«iis«d the gravity ^^f ttia political aitxiati^ n^ prevailing 
in £.gypt« 
Guy Wint ana Petar Calvocorassi had oibaerveut 
AimtiQ*xzi policy v/as vacillating^ but a 
iMSic Anariean baliaf was that tha prima 
•lanant in tha transactions was tha strug* 
gla o£ nationalism against inparialism* in 
yiht&i t^fiarican synipathy ought to ha at laost 
partly on tha side of nationalism,62 
Tha negotiations between Egypt and Britain were con* 
ducted in three stages namelyt "imfiorraal" i^ril 27* May 6« 
July 30* October 21« 1953« "heads o£ the agreament*** July 
ll-27« 1954, "final** or teehical stage", i^toi^r 19« 1954, 
The first attempt towar<jis a settlement had been faileU due 
to uncompromising attitudes of both the parties uo 
Meanwhile, Egyptiati politics had gone through a change. 
Ijasser tooK over as the new ruler of £gypt« Both th& cou.nt* 
ries started negotiations again in a new atmosphere with a 
note of hope and a promise of better ^J\u»tment. .iftor a 
fi4 
prolonged and "freq[uently interrupted" discussions the 
"Heads of /^reoment" %#ere signed on July 27, 1954. Details 
of the procedure regarding evacuation of th& ^uea Canal wore 
doCided later, and finally the ^^re^nent come into force wn 
62* Wint 4 Calvocoressi, op.citi^ ^ p«45, 
63. J.C. Hiirewits, OP. cit.. p.383. 
64, Lenc20wsKi, op, cit.* p.509. 
66 
October 19, 1954, 
Ttie *Agreemant* provided for the abro<iation of 1936 
*Anglo»£9yptian Treaty *« eoav>lete with Orawal uf British 
forces from £gypt with in twenty months from the date of 
signature, maintenance of the Carial isase by British civi-
Xian-tecdinlcains under the control of l^ gypt, Egyptian Goverr.-
ment allowed the rs«>entry of British forces in i^ gypt if there 
were an armed attach by any out side power (except Israel) on 
Sgypt or on any other /urab country which had sic^ ned the .irab 
collective security pact in 1950, or on Turkey. The duration 
of the agre<^ ment was to be seven years. £gypt*s sovoreigiity 
over the Suez Canal was rooogniaod oiiu froodom wf navic,ation 
65 
under Constantinople convention cf I8b& wa£i i,uamateeu. 
The Ai)glo->£gyptian /igreomoiit of 19S4, enhanced the popu« 
larity of Kasser in iugypt* Although a section con^risinsj com* 
munist and Brother ho<wd militant was critical to Nasser's mo-
derate policy giving some con^ssion to the British Govern-
nsnt* Ih»y denounced him as a "tyrant" and a "collaborator 
66 
with the %#est"« Nasser had told John Foster inillos during 
his official visit to Cairo in Hay 1953, that "tho only 
communist threat to i^ gypt emanated not frtxn tho soviet 
67 Union but from the local coffl:tiuni8t parties". 
65. J.C. Hurowita, OP* cit«» p.509, 
66. Robert Stephens, op, cit.« p.l35, 
67. Karen Oawisha, Soviet Foreign Policy Towards fcqypt^ 
(Kow York, 1979), pp.*16 & 512. 
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On octuber 26« 1954* an Qttm^t on uas8«r*s l i f e \i<is 
aeute while he was explainnintj the ^tmmmnt at a hug& public 
meeting in Alexandria* Fortunately th& shot missed ai^ d Gou 
saved h is l i f e * he controlled hinsolf with in momenta ana 
iii«nt on speaking* 
The fiijyptians in general wer@> happy of the Bri t i sh with* 
dr^wal. They rea l i sed that i^asser had rotaineu th@ir national 
pride their dignity* 
According to Kedourtt i 
The £r£iein<j of Egyptian ferri tory from a r i t i s h 
military anu liaval forces^ vAiich the monarchi-
cal regime was unable to brint- ai^ ^ut* bocane a 
feather in passer's cap«69 
His recline under tooK land reform and industr ia l i sa t ion and 
made on over a l l atten^t tw brinv^ Sgypt undor the cat«3v>ory 
of modem nation state^^* The liew msiQuikiikmr Ckn^rriment 
which came to power on January 20« 1953« analisod the post 
world war II developments very seriously* His prcmuse uf 
American " i s ^ r t i a l t y " in dealing with the twiddle ca;^ t^ 
gave new hopes to the -^urabs* Tk^s creation of s ta te of 
Xsr^wil with the strong support of Truman's Qovernment 
made the us pos i t ion suspicious amongst the .^ab world. 
The reorientation of thu United iitates pol icy towards 
6d* Childers, oo* cit** pp*l06 & 123* 
69* Kedouri« OP* cit*^ p*127, 
70. Carlo Caldarola^ (ed*) aelicions and Societies t /^ia 
and the Middle Sast^ (i^ ew York, 1982)« p*l34. 
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the MXOdXe East liad had its economic* political dtxl stratetjic 
intereatu in the bacKground* "Soow on lookers in Britain be* 
littvecl that they could detect behind the ^^ Aiurican liberalism 
the interest uf oil circles and would be in^perialist in /iiaorica, 
who saw in the** Anglo*Egyptian "conflict an qppor^unit^ to ro« 
71 place British by American influence*** The new revolutionary 
regime of figypt enjoyed American approval from the very be<;in<» 
ning. United £»tate8 diplomatic support helped the aew cjovem* 
msnt to acdiieve its overriding political o];>Jectives« '*Dulies 
72 believed he had made a yuod deal with i^ asser"* Zn order 
to prcxnote her friendly relations with ii*gypt the U..^ , had 
cjranted $ 40 million in economic aid after the sicjuii.^  of 
the Anglo»£gyptlan Agreetnent in 1954* Abba jkiban hau written 
that the annuunoement of the Washington *s new policy towards 
the Middle East "which consisted of avoidiny the traditional 
efi%}ha6i8 on friendship with Israel" was "an effort tw win 
73 Arab smiles", 
Zn the post uar years Britain was gradually losin^ ^ it& 
military and political power to maintain its authority in 
the Miodle £ast. "Suez had become the tet^ t of Britain's 
74 
survival as a c^ reat power" in which tier stratec,:^  failed. 
71. Wint U Calvocoressi« op« cit«> pp«45-46• 
72. Herman Finer* OP. cit## p«16. 
73. Abba^Sban* Hy Country t The ^tory of Modern Israeli 
(U>ndon* 1972}* p.llsT 
74* Jon Kimche* The Second Arab Awakening^ (iionaon* 1970). 
p«65. 
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'Britain in 1954 havo given up with grace what she cuuid 
75 
no longer hold by force". 
The oollai>se o£ Britain*e Hiddle Eastern policy^ the 
inten«i£ieation o£ the cold war and ttm exaggerated <i^ pli» 
cation o£ the strategy of oontainnent to tmro and naore new 
areaa o£ the world by the new republican government of £gypt# 
id 
conpellled AmeritMi establish military pacts with Middle juas* 
7fi tern and Asian countries* iynerica's conoern ovor coititinu-
ing Soviet threat to western influence in the Middle iiiast 
was eiqpressed by Dulles in his address to the American 
nation on January 27« 1953* He statedt 
In the Hiddle East# w find that the 
eoomunists are trying to inspire the Arabs 
with a fanatical hatred of the British and 
oxurselves* ^ at area contains the greatest 
known oil reserves that there are in the 
votXd^ and the Soviet interest is shown 
by the fact that j;^ talin« when he was nego* 
tiating with Hitler in 1940# said that the 
area imist be looked upon as the centre of 
Soviet aspirations* If ail of that passed 
into the hands of our potential en^mi^is, 
that would maAe a tremendous shift in 
the balance of ecorionio power* Anci fur<-
ther more this area also has CKi^ ntrol of 
the Sues Canal and that is the portion 
of the world *•* which has long been 
guarded and called the life line which 
made it possible for Surooe to be in 
ooonninication with Asia*'' 
75* Ibid**86* 
76* Yair iivror;* The ftiddlQ gaat i Nations, super powers 
and wars* (new YorKs* 1973)* p*32* 
77* Department uf state Bulletin* (February 9, 19^3)* 
pp*2i3»2X4* yuoted in 7ais S* Abu-Jaber* AsMirican*' 
Arab^ relations from Wilson to tiixon* (Washington* 
JO 
At that tlma Britain artU Anerloa %rare so obsessed with thexr 
plan for the formation of Middle fiast Defence Oryanlaatlon 
•gainst the potential soviet threat In the region, that they 
failed to realise that the Arabs in general and i^ assor in 
particular "discounted the ik>vlet throat arxi consiaered 
Western donlnance the greater da;ujer*** i^«^  lio (^ o^vern* 
ment supported Free officers republican revolution in 
Egypt against King Farouk In the hope that the new leadership 
might accept their olu proposal for a defence pact. 
It was in this Kind of atmosphere that ^^cretary Dulles 
had raised the rejected M£D0 idea again with Colonal uasser« 
who also equally contradicted the idea* Kasser was of the 
view that external defence alliances "would bo political 
79 
suicide for the new regime". "His primary concern" accor-
diny to i'^ ikshoy C. Chatterjl "was the succeeds of the Hevolu-
tion he headed; he did not expect any i>ieologiCdl threat to 
islam".*^° 
Nasser appeared to be more adamant in tiXa opposition 
to tt^ very idea of western defense alliance thun th^t of 
monar^lcal regime of King Farouk. 
78. Robert H. Bowie* Suez « 1956^ (London* 1974), p.e. 
79. Gewrgiaria G* .>toven»* (ed,}* The Unitea states and 
the I'Uddle £ast^ (Prentice Hail, 19^4} .,p.l59. 
00. K.C, Chatterjl, op. cit., p.123. 
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It voa statod that "tuid iinnedlato rojoctlon onyaxou 
the Uniteu states Doportnent Uit w«ui rocoivoU with ^r^tifi* 
cation in Moscow** • The ^vvlet Union and Israel wore tho 
twu main countrlad wtUch reacted un£avour<ibly aria ov^ ii hor&hly 
to any friendly reletlons between the Unlto<i ;utate£i ana ^ t,ypt« 
which w<i8 ener^;^ as a loading power among tho Arab ^ t^atus 
aftor the Second iriorld v^ or* Oy the end of 19S4 ^ ^ypt'o ro-
lation with the weatert^  powers detsrloratod ovur defus.ce 
issue* Their worsening relations laenefltod the Soviat Uni* 
on and Israel directly* Both the countries tuo^ ^ full cKivori-
tage of this situation* 
After £gypt*s rejection of the proposed MEDO plan* 
Dulles had pursued the idea of a niorthern Tier* alliai:ce 
which was soon forwarded by Britain* "It was to include 
those northern non i4rab i^ddlo tiast states" haviiuj a .jrea* 
ter danc^ er of soviet penetration* and '*wero a<jroeablc to 
creatine sucdi a pact on their own initiative **« 
Turkey* which was one o£ the four powers* along wlt)i 
Great aritain* France and the United «itates that projected 
a scheme for Middle east defence in 1951* ayain Joi2;eu the 
same powers to reintroduce the old idea of weltert. defence 
01 • i 'a is ^* Abuojaber* Aiaexican^.Arab*»relatlono from Wiloon 
t o :.ixon, (irfashln^ton* 1979!)* p*97* 
82* See i;..a. Childers* OP* c i t * * p*1206* and sea a l c o D, 
Crov/ley, The Background to current ^^ffairs* 3rd e d . 
(London* 1963}* pp*316«32i* 
ii2m Faia ^. Abu-Jaber* O P . c i t * * p.70* 
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aXlian^ with the now leoacrs o£ £gypt« i^g^^^^t aijdir. rejectoa 
thera proposola aa it aid In 19U1. Majority ^t ttia other Arab 
statos foilotied the i>gypt<&in load* Anonc; the ijcau la^^&ta v/hw 
%#er« inclined to the idea o£ uoatern defense oxXiance, the 
name of huri ais Said^ a atrony man of lraq« wae protttinent* 
Apart from economic and defense considerations^ i.uri as-
Said« "who tv;>o dreamed of Arab unity" found a persotjul 
enen^ in president l«asser« Both Hashemite dyrtoaties o£ 
Iraq and Jordan were nervous of passer's growing pupula-
rity in the Arab world, Charles D* Creriieans, hod writte^ i 
that "in accie ways the conflict was a revival uc tnc old 
iSgiptian* Hashemite rivalr:^". which resulted into a humi* 
liatiny defeat in 194d«>49. 
Both the U;^  and British Governments km^w that ira^ was 
the "weakest linK in the «^ab Unity Chain"* Ultimately, 
the U^ and British diplw^ naciy worked and the;t./ succueviod in 
bringing the Iraq to Join the pact. On January &« 191>S 
Turj^sh prime Hinister visited Baghdad on his way bock 
frun Cairo, on J<unuary 12« 195S« the Iraqi Goven^ntcnt 
announced its decision to conclude a military alliance 
with Turkey which already had a pact with paniatan again;it 
the possible threat u£ iioviet Union and Iniia, i.o^ scr Cv^ jLled 
64, Chatterji# OP. cit«> p.123. 
85. Charles U. Cren^Qcu.^, op. cit.« p,i42, 
66. Fois J&* AbU'-JQbeZf op cit*# p«79. soo olao Robert 
Stephens, UP. cit.< p.8«s. 
9: 
•n emergency msetdlng of Arab premiers &i>d £oreiyn i^ Xnii^ ters 
on January 22, t<j condemri Iraq's action which "would destroy 
Arab solidarity in international politics* would there oy 
%fea>ven the Arab Ijeacjue security system and would accorainy* 
ly curtial in the west the bargaining influence uf £.<,ypt" 
the league's dominant roember* He denoui^ sed the pact; ^is 
B6 
a neoocolonial threat" to Arab independanoe. The t^ rime 
Ministers* conference did not effect Zraq*^ ! decii^ion. The 
Turco*lraqi alliance was fonnall^ signed on February 24, 1955 
and came to be koovn as Baghdad pact. Britain Joinod it on 
April 5« Pakistan on wopta-nber 23« and irart on wctc^ ber 25« 
89 
1955. The United states which was tho real ori^jiuator 
of the project ana supported it financially an^ militarily 
never formally Joined it. Zt was tv avoid Arab resent nont 
in general and Egypt in particular* tha Ui; Government v/as 
aware of the ill feeling which b09an to develop amon.est 
the Arab after these developments. The American boci^ ed 
Iraqi action "aroused the ire of not only r^ asser ana his 
governments but Arab nationalists throughout the Middle 
fiasf.^^O 
Zt was thus an irnportant turning point in the hicits^ ry 
of Miudlo £ast affairs. The developments which too^ . place 
after the <x>nclusiori o£ Baghdad pact wore embarassing to 
&7. J.C. Hurewitz« 
88. Robert R. 3owie# op. cit«. p.9. 
89. J.C* Hurewitai« oo. cit.< p.390* 
90. Faia i», Abu«jaber« OP. city* p.G4, 
94 
th« vmat. U9mB9f from the very Jaeyinuiny of nis Accession 
to power dr«anioa cf Arab unity. In 1955, he shiftea hU at-
tention from domestic reform tw <A militant i>aii ^ r^^ policy. 
Baghdad Pact challengod his policies and tiire<ate<tu hi& role 
as a leader of the Arab worl(;i. H1& rt^action was sharp* xt^  
April 1955« an AaloW^friC€u^i conference of rion-41ign«»u states 
was held at Bandung in Java* liesser attendiid this c<^i.£or«nce, 
and here he caioe into contact with Oiou-^ii Lai« the ^ricne 
Minister of china« Tito* the Presidctf.t of ^uvosxcivid, 
t»unarno« the President of Indonesia* aiid 2«ehru the ^rirae 
Hinlster of India, It was at this coiiforence tliat i.oaaer 
enunciated "positive neutralism" as the main principle of 
91 his foreign policy. The United State did not like title 
move* while the iiovlet Russia tooK full advantage of the 
worsenlny relations betw<3en Egypt and the v;eateri, powers. 
Hussla hacKed mora and more Arab natlonali£it domarvu 1 i^ide 
and outside the United i%ation&« Before 1950 the .^c^ viet in-
fluence In the MlJdle East i;orld was not very cor.:; Iderable 
Faiz S« Abu«Jaber had written thatt 
Whether the Atnerican bacKed ira^i action 
was wise* or whether the persist^mt .-aneri-
can policy of viewing th^ Middle BASt Pri.a«»rily 
in terms of u'.fense against the wovlet Union 
was correct* was hajcd t.-._ .. r-t.!_^  •-•t the .ime 
But the subsequent reaction of i^ Sgypt* aygra-
vated by the pereMKLal Jbgyptla.^  and \^rab dis-
pute with Israel, and the vrester:: role in the 
piilestine jueetion* all helped tw call up the 
very Soviet "devil" the west was seei.ij.g to 
deter.92 
91* Karen Dawisha* £PxCitj;,* p*10«* soe aobert K, j^wia* 
op« clt«# p.9«# ano sec also Faiz 3* Abu Jaber* o^« clt«« 
pp«107«l22. 
92« FAla ^* Abu jaber* op> cit>« p*a5. 
ss 
Calvocores^if oxprm^seu the ^ame viev by sayi.n_ 
that "th© machinery uf the Baghaad alliance propellea 
Russia forward",'" rhe 0«aa Raid of February 1955 
further promoted the Russian involvement in the -iTob w 
world, £stablishiaent of closer tie:* betwee. Arab world 
and the ooviet Uni«-n Challenge the westuri. Supreraacy 
in the region* As a result of -Ji» sovuit rivalry, "the 
laddle £ast was brought fully into the noxtu^ of the 
94 
cold war", Zn fact , the active ^viet ana l^acrican 
involvemsnt in the iUadle East and the supply of 8<H>hid< 
ticated amts to both the Arabs and Israelis heightened 
the already charged situation in the region. 
93, wint li Calvocoressi, op. cit., p.i^ l 
94. i^ adav a^fra;.« Tr^m w r to war i The Arab» 
Israeli Confrontation t 1948-1^67^ (Kew York^ 
1969) «^  p. 101. 
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Ghaptsr « zv 
eampg TO ma TMPA«m8 AoaaEsaioii i ittS6 
Tkm ami £gyptl«n XsadscstOp^ wli i^ CMMM JUato powir 
• • a roftult of July xmolutlon X9S2, •OQA r^allMd that 
tlwir hop* of good solatlont with tho woatoxn powors vmm 
•upturfielol* Xhoir golotiono idlth the wost including the 
Unitod StotM bogOQ to dotocioffato aaialy over the ques-
tion of joining the Ud epooaoKed anti Soviet a i l i tasy 
paet and the <]yaatioQ of araa m i ^ needed to figypt for 
her defence againat the poaeibia thsoat of Zarael, 
Having auffexed the hiiMiliatioa of defeat in Palestine 
var in 1948 and accepting the painful reality of their 
tfeakneaaea* liaaser and hia oolleaguea i«anted to acquire 
nodem •xme to rebuild the Sgyptian aray* Qy the Tripartite 
Declaration of 19S0« the United fitatea* Britain and Fraioe 
atteopted to control the atvply of arms to Zarael anu the 
Arab states* The aim of three ponera* Declaration was 
to preaerve the * Armistice AgireQaents* concluded in 
1949 after the paleatine war* On February 28# i955« 
1* Ankttsh a* sawant# 'Recent ebanges in figypt Pcreign 
Policy** India Quarterly* vol* 35* iio*lt (January-
March 1979)* p»20« 
j*C, Hurewita* afe^^ffWY .JiB,ftf fi^Wf ^ ^ Kji 
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just oftMT thcoe d«y« o£ •ignlng of Bft^^lAd p«ct« and vx-
«etXy a wwik aftar Bon^-Ourioo** ratum tc» tlw govornnant 
«• dsfaao* Mini0t«r« Israsli anwd fosoM attacked s^ptlan 
raUitacy inatallationa in ttm Oasa strips killing thirty-
oight Arabs and wounding thirty ona* Xha Oasa Aaid was tho 
first invasion of Egyptian oontrollad territory which "had 
satious and lasting eonsaquaneas".' Zt is oonsidarad tha 
*nost fatafttl"^ ineidont in Middla £ast history, sinoa 
long« i^ assar had baan trying to aequira acns frma tho 
wast* Ha had aohiavad vary littla sueoass in this ragard. 
Mastam eountrias did show pcoaptnass in granting aooaoHtle 
aid but adoptad a daloQrihg policy ovar tho <|uaatioa of 9v^ 
plying asB»« Xha Oaaa raid had ravaalod ttiat "Zsraal was 
f raaly ao(|uiring acaw frcsi tha wast ragardlase of tha 
1950 Tripartita Daolaration"*^ Nasser was awara that 
tha wastarn powars pursuad anti<i<Bgy|KUian polieias <^ ia 
to his rafusal to Join wastarn aiilitasy alliance* Accord* 
ing to Khourii 
tnia United (States, anicious not to arcmse 
Arab antagoaisi% agreed to sell Israel only 
a limited aaount of ssMll ams* At the saai 
tine* howevert AiMriean officials quietly 
encouraged other countries, especially Canada 
and France, to seU Israel IUM latest war planes 
and other heavy equipsmat*^ 
3* Freed J* Khouri, The Arab>israeli Dileaaa. llnd od. 
(New York, 1976),p«201* 
4* Ouy wint and peter Calvocoressi, Middle east Crisis^ (Aylesbucy, 1957), pp,S7«S6, 
5. Fais S. Abu jaber, ^g tg fn -^?^ ,^J '«^oo» ^ « » Wilson 
ff> Kiyn^ (»ew York, 1979}, p«l«6« 
6, Frad J , Khouri, oo^citf p»203», see also lOJcshoy c* 
C, Chattarii, HuaMla of the Middla &ast* (Kew Velhi, 
W73), p p , l 3 8 - r o r 
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Ttm OftM raid* hovwmxt •sq^osad th« w^ fiOciMas of tho 
ggyptian asBQr* l^ ow i t ha« beooiM « quMtlon of i^ «a8ar*« 
pVMtiga to obtain M>S« «snaBMnt« andi train his ajRiv to 
4*«X with an aggraaaiva ZaraaX* 
Tha zevolutionary xagiiaa« whioh oama into powar in 
1952« aavotea a l l ttwir anargiaa primarily to intarnal 
aeenomie* aoeial ana pol i t ica l raf ojcta and oonoid«red 
tiM palaatina quastion aa a oaeondaxy ona*^ Tha naw 
Egyptian laodarahip ooi^pciaing •Fsoa Offioara* waro 
oppoaad to laraalt bfut thay did not want confrontation 
at thia a to^* 
TliB yal>r«Mry 28« aaaault waa proved to ba an "alam 
ball" to tha Egyptian Oovankoexit. Egypt naadad aciaa quio* 
kly for her aalf dafanea* In i t ia l ly tiaaafur approa< i^ad to 
tha traditional %faatarn aouroaa* Having failod in the 
attooq^t* "ha eoa«>latad arrangcnnanta hafora i^epterabar 
to obtain Soviet ama through CBaohoalovaXia"*^ Aa a 
raault an azna race batwaan Zaraal and Egypt had bean 
atartad whi<d) heightened the eriaea atmoapbere in the 
?• Xbid,« p.20i» 
8. Rc*art lU Bowie, f i m $ toterna^na^ gFl^lf « ^ 
Itmt (London* 1974)« p*li« See alao 
ntenporary Archivaa^ (October l*d« 1955}# 
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Middla fi««t for y«ar« to ooraa* 
The <3UnrttXqp«»iits whleh \mKm tmkXag plmom In £gypt 
«f t*r 19S3« iMd « distuxtoinQ mttmet on ZsrasU govern-
RMnt* Smn Ourioo «nd his siqiportttrA IMIC* of th« vi«w that 
th0 MMrgenos of « •txong Bgypt« wouXa in the long sttn poee 
« greet danger to Xerael** eeeurlty* *A iNieuua in the Middle 
£eet* ereeted hy the British eveeuetion of the ^ uee Cenal 
son«# *vee hi^iiy injueioue to 2ereei*e interest,"^ The 
entry of Iraq into the western eponeored Middle £aet de» 
fenoa ayetaa ereatad fear among the zaraeiia* They iaeli-
•ved that it iieaicen the guarantee to larael under the Tri-
partite Oeeiaration of 1950* The Jewiah lobbies in vm and 
Q^A tried to prevwit supply of axa» to the Arab world. 
Zt has already been poinl^id out that prior to Feb-
ruary 19S5« the rsvolutionary sagiae in Cairo did not 
10 pay Wbeh attention to Israel* Zt was the oasa Raid 
w h i ^ radi«ally a^snged the situation* Al this SMMnt 
l»ass«r decided "to give defenoe priority over dcsvelopiaent** • 
He realised the Zionist designs against Kgypt and its wider 
inplieations for the entire Arab world* unaole to obtain 
m i l 
9* lOlcshoy C* Chatterji* Muddle of the Middle gast^ Vol. 
IZnd (Siew Oelhi« 1973); p*I5i: ^™-'*= 
10* wittt & Galvoccressi, op*cit** p*5S« see Khouri# sSpmt^Ltm^ 
pp* 189*^03. ^ ^ 
11* Fred J* Khouri # fp* oit** p«202* 
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ams from the western countries on conditions co%adtiable 
with the aims of the Egyptian revolution^ l^ aaser moved sowly 
into the Soviet Ciaqp* 
Robert R# Bowie had written that the Oaaa Raid o£ 
February 1955 opened the way for Soviet entry into the 
area"* 
"The Czech arm deal was negotiated ana consunmated 
in secrecy*" In a broadcast on S^tember 27« 195S«^^ 
Egyptian prime Minister* Colonel liasser* made a sensational 
announcwaent that a conroercial agreement had been signed 
under which Cae^ioslovakia %K>uld supply arais to iiigypt in 
exchange of cotton and rice* 
on October 2« 19SS# Nasser made a major speech before 
IS 
an anaed forces exhibition in Cairo* Zn his speech i^ asser 
ejqilained the circumstances that cc»i^ l^led him to go East-
ward* He j^ aid that ligyptain Government (RCC) had ta>.en this 
step after its repeated failure to obtain arms from all the 
three western countries* 
12* Roberd R* Bowei# op.oit*# p*10 
13* Abu Jaber# OP* cit*^ p*135. 
14* See Keesinq's Contemporary Archives* (October 1*8« 
1955)« p*14449*« See aiso Abu Jaber* OP* cit.* 
pa39. 
15. J.C. Hurewitz, op. cit., p.402. 
101 
H« vsnt on to SAyt 
rraooo «lw«ys bargalnod with us« sho 
b«rg«inod with ii» cfwmr North Africa, 
Sh« s«ys to U8« wo will giire you axmo 
on ooodition that you should not criti* 
Giso our position in North Af rie«« and 
on oondition that you rolinquiah your 
*Arabiaai% that yuu ralinqcuiah your hu-
oMitarianiMi and on oondition that you 
should koop silont and closo your eyes 
whsn you sso the oHuiaerss in i^ orth Africa. 
nmm—x Cotttimittdt 
This is the stCH^ of France and nuw 1*11 
tell you the story of Aneriea, 
rrom the tine of Aevoluticn we asKed for 
arms and we were promised anas* And what 
was the result 7 
The promise was a proadse cireumacriDed 
with conditions • we woula get <irn» if we si«> 
gned a mutual security pact* we would get 
arms if we would sign some form of alliance. 
we refused to sign a imitual security i'act. 
we refused to sign any form of alliance. 
And my brothers« we could tmv&t yet a 
single wea^ pcw from America. 
AS ior Britain he saidt 
England told us that she %»s ready to supply 
us arms* We accepted greatfully* What was 
the result 7 England provided us with a 
quantity of arms i^ hicSi was not sufficient 
to achieve the goals of thsi Revolution.«6 
£«asser alleged that the %#estem powers denied arras 
to JBgypt (ttey always attached the unacceptidole conditions 
for the supply of arms and it was considered as an indirect 
refusal iay Egypt) which at the same tiine Israel was acquir-
ing arms frum Britain* France* Belgium* Canada* Italy and 
16* Il)id.^  pp«402^0S. 
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fxon VATloua otber statae* 
It was also pointed out that the western n@ws papers 
had been propagated that the Israeli arav wa:? stronger and 
better equlped and cotild easily defeat the Egyptian army 
17 
and ail the iurab amies co«l»lned. ' 
Nasser olalned that the ^^ yjrytidi* -^^siriaa^nt W«IG it; 
pcAsesslcm of secxet British and French eiilitary InteXll-
^nce doeunents ** whlcdi oonfomed that the three western 
powers (UK«USA«li France) had been aming Israel £or nonths* 
It was also alleged that the British Oovemnent as well as 
Franee and the united states had a prior knowledge of Israeli's 
intentions to invacie Oasa strip an £gyptlaji controlled terrl* 
19 tory* TtitY eiMsoiiraged Israel to do that in the hope that 
it might — bring Egypt into their fe&t* But the later 
develc^ f^fiKints proved them wrong* 
I4as9er*s allegations were soon conformed by other sources, 
In these oircnuastanees £gypt had to seek arms wherever she 
could get th^R* Cseohoslovakia offereu ann& to £:gypt with* 
out atta«diii^ aKQr condition as a pro-requisite for the sup* 
ply of arms* Sgypt ^:oepted this offer without delay* 
17* Ibid.* p*402« 
^8* <g—oi»a. (October l-6# 1955)« p.14449*^ see ab|i Jaber« 
fo* eife»* p*144*« and also Robert stej^ns* iiasser* London* 1971)« pp*157-lS8* 
19* Abu jaber* op* cit** p*i45* 
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Zt WAS tmdorstood that without the ogroeinent of the 
Soviet Union* CsochoslovaHia would not havo sont <ina& to 
f^ Oypt* Zt was later oumittod by Nasaer hiioeaXf that ttw 
deal was in fact with Russia not C2«chc^Iovaiaa« "soviet* 
Arab relations in the inter<-war period were extromely nebu* 
21 lous". Zn 1947 Soviet Union had voted in favour ol the 
\3ti resolution for the partition of palestiiio. "Soon after 
the establishffnent o£ the stato" of Israel* said i.«ai.|u«.ur« 
"the first uofriandly oonsisntaries boyon to appear i:. tiie 
22 
Soviet press*** Rtis&ia extended her sii^ port in fuvwur of 
the Araba as against the Israelis* /«ccordlay to ^aiz ^« <iij«>-
jaberi 
Soviet favour began to shift in favour 
of the Arltiae in general and £gypt in 
particular* since Bgypt was the :Leader of 
Arab opposition to the western defence sys« 
ten since 1951.^S 
Before 19SS* it was done mainly through the agencies 
24 
of the United Nations* The events which «fore taking place 
in 1955 and on* brought Soviet Russia frotcn the periphery to 
the heart of the Middle £ast* Their Soviet arms deal '*enaur* 
ed that hence forward the Middle East eM>uld no longer bo re-
25 gardbed as a purely western sphere of influeiKn*** Thus aus&ian 
2d* Gordon tiaterfield* ggypt* (london* 1967}* p*167* 
21* Abu jaber* op* cit** p*90* 
22* Walter Laqueur* The w>trugQle for the Middle ^ast i 
The Soviet Union and the Middle £ast t 1958-68* 
(London* 19<&9)* p*44* 
23* Abu Jaber* op* cit** p*95* 
24* Xtoi-d** pp*93 & 102* 
25* Robert Stephens* lias^ er a A political Diography^ (London* 
1971}* pp*161«162. 
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involvoments in a big way in tho MldtUe JSastern affaire 
int«Q8i£iod ths ooXd war between the two super powers in 
the area* A«G« Naidu had writtont 
The rivalry o£ the two super powers and 
the thrust of their respective policies 
oondueted in t^ ieir own interests contri-
buted to instability ami hostility in the 
region.*^ 
As a cooseqtien<K» of increasing Soviet pejMtration in 
the iUddle £ast the Arab Israeli conflict becaoie "inter-
27 
twined with the East iMist struggle". i n i t i a l l y the Uussian 
involvement in anos deal with the Egyptian guvernmoxit hau. 
nothing to do with the iureb-lsraeli cortflict* In the %#ozds 
For the RusBlieuaB t h i s was a s ide i s s u e ; 
the ir nain purpose was« of course^ a n t i -
wee t ern . But the arsRS shis»ients direct ly 
afftiCted the p o l i t i c a l s i tuat ion through-
out th& areai tension con1U.nued t o grow 
and the Soviet Union gradually becafae in» 
volvMi i n the Arab-zsraeli confrontation 
as wel l as in other loca l conf l i c t •'^ ^ 
The annouxKMMaaint of the Egyptian Catecti anas deal had 
an inniediata aiui e l ec tr i fy ing e f f e c t on the res t of the 
Arvib world. Even tiasser^s c r i t i c s among the Arab rulers 
26 . A.G. liaidu* U.^. policy^owards the Arob-lsraoli . . Naidu, Vt^t ?gH<^yM|?y^'^M^ 
Conflicts (liew oelhi« 1981) # p . 2 . 
27. wadav Safran, ffffff ^ff $0 W<>f t ^ Arab i s f ay l i 
confrontation. 194a»l&67 (£iew yorlu 1969). p .101. 
28. Walter Lsquetir* op. c i t . . p . lO. 
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hailed thl« move* Thu i^ raJd* countrioa which hau roBeutod 
against th« rostriction i^>osed upon ttusm under tho Tripar-
tite Declaration of 1980# now had Jaecorae alarmed an hearing 
tha news that Xflr<^ i was obtaining arms secretly from the 
western countries* 7hey admirea i;4asser*s decision which as a 
ro8\Ut ended Uieir dapenderioe on the western powers for its 
weapons* Ttmy conAidered that iNasser had taken a bolu step 
by refusing "to submit to an arms control syotoni ii(^ >osed 
by the western powers which seemed to leavo the Hrm>a lit 
the loeroy of the Israeli ainctv"* ' Nasi>er had found a way 
out which no /urab leader had dared to do* It onhaziced ..asser*s 
presti^ and p<^ularity in Kgypt ij^ad throughout the ^^ rob world* 
AS a result of thisnnew develojKaent Egyptian (Sov<^ -r(iment succe-
eded to codUude defence agreeanents with Syria and witn Saudi 
Arabia in oetober, laSS.*" in April, 19S6 a similar military 
pact was signed between £^ gypt« Saudi /^abia ana the ¥og»n« 
Egypt assumed the leadership of the iirab world and i.asocr 
emerged as the ohie€ spo>:esiaen of Arab nationalii»m, Die 
32 
fa i lure of the Xenpler mission t o i:;rii^ Jordan into 
29* Robert Stephens, op* cit*# p*l61* 
30* Kneeing* (uctober 22«29« 1955) # p*1446i>* 
31* ^ Middle iSast & mxth Africa » 1969»V0* iiixteenth 
ed* (JSuropo-4>ublications« London^, p«792« 
32* 2 i^e OeOMiber* 1955 the Goverrmients of ruricey and ijritain 
made an atteiq;>t t o bring Jordan into t^ie aagdad pact* In 
t h i s connection the Bri t i sh Oovernroant dispatched General 
XtttBpler (Later Field Karshal) t o #«araan to discuss the pro-
posal* The pr<^>osal coula not be materialised due to s p l i t 
in the Oovernmont over t h i s issue* i t was accompanied by 
widespred s tr ikes and demonstrations* General l^oplor had 
t o retrun e i^ ty hand to London* For fturther d e a t i l s a&a 
Keeeing* (January 14-21* 1954* x^*14646*14647* see a lso 
isrskine a* Childers* Ttoa Road t o auea* (London, 1962), 
pp*140*144. 
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Bagdad pact in Doceinbar, 1955« and the dlsndscal of the 
oritlah Cooroandar of tho Arab Legion^ Oener«U. sir John uagot 
Gluiob« by King ilusaein in March 1956 had further revealed 
Nassar's growing influence in tha Arab statea. ** British 
Oovermaent openly accused i«a0;>er for the expulsion of 
Giubb pasha«« distinguished British soldier from British 
conzMKited Jordan, It happened at the tioie v4ien the uritish 
Foreign jiecrutary# Solwyn l«luyd« was visitimj cairo. juloyd 
was iafoSBMd by Nasser about the Olubb episode* Th& Foreign 
Secretary took this news in a very bad taste* It was wrongly 
concluded that liasser indirectly instigated Kiny iixissein to 
diSBiiss Glul^ frcMn his post and more over liaswer intention-
ally gave this ira%ra to Selwyn Lloyd inorcier to huioilidte a 
senior Minister of the British Governraant* tUkshoy c« ChatterJi 
had vrrittent 
OJbubb pasha's dismissal brought Britain* 
Prance and Israel togethar in opi>osition 
to their ^xnoon ant«igoni3t*^ 
However* advecse political ctovelopnients accolcfioted 
the drift between ibigypt and the western pov/ers. The ^ritisn 
prime Minister aix Anthony Kdan* considered i^ asser as "a 
dangeroiis and irreconcilable enemy of all British interest 
33« Keesing* (March 3*10* 1956)* pp«14737-1473i^ u (iiaroh 
10*17* 1956)* {^.14753-14755. £»oe also Childers* op.cit.^ 
p« 145. 
34. N.C.Chatterji* c^. cit.* p.148 
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in tha Middle i*afit« an mnQan^ to oe brouyht down k>&toco he 
did more serious daaiag©'**'"' iPranee and Israel both hod a 
vital interest in weakening the position of colonal naaa^t 
in the region* Israel saw Russian AXWB deal (arranged by 
j^ iasser) es a challenge to its supremacy ana an ob^ itacle 
in her expansionist progranme* In March 19S6 Tunisia ana 
Morocco toeeaae independent* "Inevitably^ Algeria becanw 
nore pr««ious" to framre. Despite o£ all her effurts 
French Government had fail^ to suppress the Algerian re-
volt* "Behind the Algerian resistance France saw increo^* 
37 
ingly the hand of Eg^pf*, It was a known fact that i^ asser 
helping the Algerian rebels with anas and radio propaganda* 
The US Gon^mment was directly hit by the Russian involve* 
nent in tito Middle £ast affairs* iierman ^ iner wrotet 
In oi^ single stroke^ in one adept thrust* 
the Soviet Union had vaulted over the iiag* 
dad pact# over the ^^ orthern Tier of Count-
ries# and after centuries of un-successful 
effort had Ji»%>ed brazen and powerful plumb 
into the Middle £ast*^8 
isasser had becoioe an object of hostility and press 
attacks* western news midia att^npted to portra;^ - Kas&er 
as a eoraoiunist^  anti we^ tt and a great enei% to both Israel 
and the west* 
35* Robert tttephens* op* cit** p*179* 
36* «i*B* Childars, pp. cit.# p.146 
37* Wint & Calvocores3i« op* cit.* p*65* 
36* Henoan Finar« Dulies ever aumz* (2«ondon« 1964)« p.26. 
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£vor sliMSO the revolutlondxy rejlme come into povvor, 
Egypt *a eeoiu»nlc dsvolopmunt nod been constituted <aB one 
uf the aasentiol objectives of the Egyptian £orcsign policy 
In edditioo to the land reform^ the dnti-c^^rruptlon drive 
and the withdrawal o£ the British troops* the new leader-
ahip wanted to achieve acM^ s thing more* It wds very typi-
cal of Nasser*a personality that hesidea his desire to 
rule over £gypt# he was especially icettn to win over the 
heart's of the £g^'ptians« attaaQX know this fact very \a&ll 
that he still "did not touch spontaneous popular affection 
as General Neguih had done***"' 
Among the projects high on the priority list which 
the new regine wanted to materialise was t^ ie construction 
of a high dam on the t^ ile near Aswan* Thv idea dated JoocK 
to the old regime* It v/as in 1948 that an Egyptian engiriocr 
nasMMi Adrian Daninos# presented a project for a high d«»n at 
Aswan. Farcmk reyiino did iK>t pay much attc'ntion in this 
regard* l»ate in 1952« the idea was again brought to the 
attention of the young officers of the Egyptian Revolu-
tion who were busy in finding out the ways and iiteoiis to 
ifl^ prove the economic conoition of j^ gypt* Tlrtio revolution-
ary council aMsepted the idea immediately* At the ena of 
39* Robert Stephens* OP* cit** p*ia7* 
Russell Bradon* Q\ 
(i«oadoa* 1973)« p, 
40* Suez t sa^itting of a l^ ation* 
"•|# p*43* 
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1952« D«iilnos« w«i3 sent to Italy« fftxincut Britain anu the 
United States to di&cus© about the feasibility o£ thu hXq 
dam project* In thi£^  connection ten international engineer 
net in Cairo in early 1953 ismd after exaraiaing the blue ^rint 
they unaninously reported that the project was feasible*^ iis 
planned^ the Dam was to be 365 feet in height^ three miles 
long and it was to create an artif ical laX«:^  to serve as a 
42 
reservoir* Zt was a grand project* Zt woula take several 
years to build and the to ta l cost of the dam calculated app-> 
roxiioately waa beyond the capacity of ti^ ie iii^gyptian f iuoiicial 
resources i f she cuuld not get outi^ide ass lstai ice . 
Ck>lonal iias£>er was very tnuch Intcreutau in the f%avmi 
High Dam projfltct* He was convinced that i t would provide 
« remedy for Egypt's pressing econcsnic problem, calvuccnmssi 
had described the reason behind ijasser's ambitions in the fol-
lowing wordst 
tjasser hod been naturally concerncsd because^ 
although in the Arab lands outside iiigypt he 
was admired as the syndsol of the Arab aspira-
t ion towards iinity* he had not icnown the knack 
of winning the affect ion of Egyptians* General 
lieguib had been much more popular. But i f i^iasser 
could build the dam« soniething as vast as ti>e 
pyramids and much more useful* he woula at l ea s t 
be accepted as the father and i:)eriefactor of his 
country.** 
41 . uuoted in Abu jaber« OP. c i t . « p . l S 2 . 
42. Keesing# (December 31« 19S5« Juanuary 7« 1956)« p.146.20. 
43 . Wint & Calvocoressi* OP. c i t . . p .66. 
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Sgyptian Government starteci to negotiate with the 
western countriea to provide econoolc and technical assis-
tance for the construction of the dam* western countries 
did show little Interest In this regard due to adverse 
political climate prevailing In £gypt. "figypt's Interest 
In the dam gained momentum In the fall of 195S« following 
the eonlcuslon of the arms deal with the soviet".^^ AS more 
and more »^ovlet azxnB folowed Into Sgypt the possibility of 
the western flnarK;lal aid to the High D«n project becotoe 
negligible. The news hinting that the soviet Union had of-
fered finance for the dan was more of a propayanda Kind* 
Factually* Kasser wanted the High Dam aid to come f rora the 
west so as to &voXd a further he^ivy dependence on conmiunlst 
block which might endanger his policy of non-alignment* The 
Soviet aid progiagactda "undoubtedly helped precipitcitti the 
western decision to maJoe offers to Sgypt** However, in 
December 1955« the United s^tates %/lth Britaiii* togwth«;:r 
with the International BanX (I«B*R.D«), offered to help 
finance Egypt's Aswan Dam* The proposals provioed for 
the Initial loans and grants of ^ 56 million from the 
United ;:'tates« ^ 14 million from the united Kingdom* and | 
200 million from Vne world Bank* W)wn Nasser got the details* 
he did not like the c^naitions Imposed by ti^ e world Bank* He 
was also dissatisfied with ttie terms of the grants to bo made 
44* George ijencaowski* The Hlddle East In World Affairs* 
Ilird ed* (London* 1962}* p*5l2* 
45* ^bld** P.S12* 
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I:^  tha U*S« and Britain* The oonoy offerod to him coraa to 
I 270 nilXion* But uasoor noedod | 400 million from foreign 
eotuitrieo, because it was estimated that the project would at 
least have cost | 1*4 billion. In February, 1956, Sn^one Black, 
President of the world Bank visited Cairo and discussed about 
the project with r^ ias&er* £ngone Black tried to persudo the 
Egyptian president to accept the offer* Finally, uas^er 
accepted the world Bank's conditions, i;>ut he requested to 
make certain changes in the terras of grants* The unitod 
States and Britain, although not happy witli the antl western 
attitude of ijasser, promissi^ that they would give "^yo^Mthe* 
tic consideration" and additional sum the project r^julrod* 
46 
The U*S* said it %rould "try to help"* 
Zn April 1956, Marshall iJikolai<»Bulganin Prime Minister 
of the U*i3*s*R*, and H* iUkita Khrushchev, First secretary o£ 
the Soviet Coanunist party, during their visit to Britalxi macie 
a suggestion that the united ;^ }ations should ijqpose an arms etti-
47 
bargo on the Middle i:;ast* It was contror;^  to uaoeor'a strate-
gy* without delay, liasser hod recognised tl-tu yovcrrunent of Com-
munist China on May 16, 1956 Calculating ti-iat if Russia would 
refrain he could obtain arms from the nev; source. "The reaction 
46* 0*S* Mews and World Report* (Fobruari 6# 1957), p.a4*. 
See also Keesiaq* (Docetaber, 31, 1955rJanuary 7, 1956), 
p* 14620. 
47* For details see Keesing, (May 7*14, 1955, ^ .rii 21.28, 
1956, April 2a-44ay 5, 1956), pp.14191, 14S29, 14833* 
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of the Unltad i^tatee was very slmllax to Britain's resentment 
«t Qlvibb paBha*s dioniasal but not so vocal" .^^ Zt proviciod 
«n excuse to the us Ooveriaiaant which h^u already consider-
ing to withdraiT ite Aswan Dera o££er* Tho u«i»« presidci^t and 
Secrotary %rere having trouble in Conyress in grantiny loan 
to £gypt« The Jewish lobby of the US Congress was trying 
to porsuade the At^ ninistrfttion to pressxiriae i^ypt to lift 
tho ban on Israoli ahip.^ ing through the Suez Canal* The Cot-
ton lobby of the Southern senators fearoa that the construc-
tion of a High Dara near Aswan developing the l«ile« woulu in-
crease in Egypt's cotton production and might eventually ruin 
the South *s cotton marHet. Mor^ »v«sr« there was a strong anti-
neutralist sentiments in the Congress which v/as shared by 
Dulles himself.*^ 
Mean while* tae date of final evacuation of the British 
troc^s from the Canal zone area under the iu3glo-£;gyptian agree-
nent of 19S4« oamm nearer* The last aritish soldier left Egypt-
ian soil after 74 years of oecvtpation on June 13« 1956« four 
days before t^ Mi eaipiration of fixed date to avoiu humiliation, 
Tho £.gyptian Oovornment celei^ratod the occasion on a very grand 
scale* Dmitri Shepilov* the new soviet Foreign Hinxster* visited 
Cairo from June 17-22, 1956« and was present at the oeleoration^. 
48* iJ«C« Chatterji« op^ cit*# p*148. 
49* y*s. ^ lews ana world Heport# {JTebruary 6# 1957) # p*84» 
See also £»B, Childcrs* op« cit*^ . pp*15S«lS6. 
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I>uring his visit Shepllov diaci^sed on various iB«ittera« but 
did cnrold to sajf ac«a3thlag about the Russian intention regar-
ding the Aswan Dais aid* *^ ventually« H^BB^r, now an eleeted 
prasldeot of the Egyptian JUipubllo by a pc^ulor franchise* 
Instructed Ahnsd Hussoln« Egypt's arobossoaor in Washington, 
to accept the proposed i^ inerloaQ offer. This decision was made 
piddlic by Hosaeln on July 17# 19S6« when h« arrived In iiJoshlng-
ton After consulting with umSiietm lie was ar4xlous unough to con-
elude the agrecsoient es soon as possible. ^  To tils sheer osto* 
nl8hmant# on July 19* Dxilles handed him a &tatc»r>unt announc-
ing withdrawal of the American offer* The statcmient soldi 
Developraents with In the succeeding seven months 
hove not been favourable to the sucoass of the 
project* and the u«^. Sovemraent has concluded 
that It is not feosli^ lQ in present clrounstonoes 
to participate In this project* Agreement by the 
riparian states has not been achieved, and the 
ability of ii^ gypt to develop adequate rosour^Mi 
to assure the projects* staecess has become more 
uncertain than at the tlias of offer was raoc^*^^ 
Tha government of Britain followed suit* Trie world Bank's 
offer, which had been coiKiltlonol on i^nglo-Amsrlcon support, 
lai;>8od automatically, zt was cxxnuonly believed that the main 
motive for refusing old was political as distinct from th@ 
econcmlc one* At the time of U^ wltiKirawai of /^won uom 
SO* John Dagot Glubb, Brltlan and the Arufc?s t A atudy of 
fifty years i 1908 to 1^^8. (l«ondon, 1959). p. 329., 
See Robert Stephens, ftp* clt.. pp*189*191., Chllders 
OP* clt.# pp*15&»157*, and also Wlnt and Colvocorossi, 
opp dt*. pp•67»69. 
51* Nc^le Fronklond and Versa King, (eds.). Documents on 
International Affairs i 1S6, (liondon, 1959), pp.69-70., 
Keeslng, (July 21*28, 1 ? ^ , p. 14991. 
114 
o££er# followed b^ Britain and the world Eank« president 
Nasser was In arioni in Yugoslavia^ holding d meeting with 
Marshal Xito and prima JUniiitor liohru. *\s aoon as Uiui^Qt 
arrived at the Cairo airport on July 20« 1956« he was in-
formed about the refusal of the loon by the waiting officials• 
i»lehru had accoe^aniod him back to £gypt* 7he u^ Govcrranent 
took this decision at tho tine "vrtten the three neutralist 
leaders were in conclave"*" Calvocoressi hod written that 
"by its timing and its manner* as much as by its cuntent« 
this was a stinging public sebuff to ^^ asser*** Another 
farnou* writer U^A, Farnio had also pointed out that "i^ iasser 
object<»l not to the withdrawal of aid but the insultiny man-
ner in which the refusal was conveycid and especially to tlKs 
escplanatory slur ^poa i::gypt*8 econ«»aic reputu.tion" • i^ asser's 
reaetion was harsh* while speaking at the opening of a new oil 
pipe line from Cairo to axj&z on July 24# 1956« he bittorly at-
taeked tim U& Govemi»..nt« fi;gyptian prcsst ani new maaia had 
35 burst into a "savage recriminations"* Dullos was accused 
of showing bad faith* of breaking a promise* of buiny a cl^ ieat* 
52* Rt^ aert Stephens* op* cit*^ p*193* 
53* Wint and Calvocoressi* oom cit*# p*694 
54* D.A* Farnie* gast and west of auez i Yha iiuea Canal 
in History i 1854-195^* (U^ndon* 1969)* p,719. 
5S* Herman Finer* ^PAJSHJL' P*SS* 
i:5 
Basidss Arab states* the majority of the <^ro->A8ian count* 
ri«8 critlolaied the us and British Covemonitns for thoir 
open diplaaatie black mail* panOit uehru* i^ io was witli i^ asser 
at thet tine the news was given* angrily denounced the ua act* 
ion, no one eould read the mind of artamotional revolutionary 
\Aio was deeply hurt and publioly insulted b^ the iiiv>erialiat 
potfere* There was talk of * Slapping tiasoer down for his new-
tralism.* The western pcnrnxu unitedly oonspirod to unaermioe 
the growing prestige and popularity of president t^ asecr* who 
d4y by d ^ was beconniing a danger to their futura planning in 
the Middle £ast» Nasser had become tho focus of %«orld attent-
ion* "PMiple began to placo bets on the nasne of iidsser*s sxic-
• 56 
oessor*. 
on July 22 e^am ttm reports of sons r<3is>Ai.k6 aade by 
Shepilov in Maseow ecxplaining that the U^oR did not rugard 
the question of financing the Aswan Dam as on"urgent problem " 
thous^ his goverrnaent would help othor c;gyi>t*s economic pro-
57 gramroe* £l«88er*s position beoame suspicious beaavise his 
govenwnnt repeatedly hinted that Russia had esq^resood her 
willingness to help in financing the High Dam project but 
he did not eecept this offer. In his sheer frustration r^ asser 
reealled the history of Egypt's e«>noiaic and political set 
baek in the hands of imperialist powers* Ttiis recollection 
56* S«B* Childers* <»>. cit*« p*162. 
S7* Keesioq^ {July 21*23* 1956)* p*14991. 
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of Ofvonts croatod an idea in Li&aaor*a mind and eoun Im 
reaehttd on a conclusion. 
Matiooitliaation of tha auea canal 
In a maniorial speech at Alexandria on July 26« 1956 
at the occasion of fovixth anniveraity of the ii;gyptiari re-
irolution President Nasser dramatically amtouncod that the 
Egyptian Oovernment had nationalizod tho ^uos canal Company, 
In the saae announceraant he had declared tlvat the revenues 
from the Canal would gc toward tlie financing of the <^wan 
uma project* The Company's share holders would h& paid fully 
in acKrordanc^ - with t^ ie last closing prices on the Paris aouxao 
on July 25# 1956* It was also stated that the navigation in 
the Canal was to be unaffected by the takeover of the Canal. 
Nasser had announced this in an angry opeme&im it was one of 
the FowDorable spoeohcss of his life* liKleed« the nationaliza* 
tion of the Suea Canal Company* twelve years before the actu-
al date of the expiration of the Canal's conclusion* was the 
act of an angry leader wlio was huioiliatcKi £tnd punished by 
the wesl^m powers for iiis defiance of their policies. The 
western po»rars« consciously or \inconsciously« nau touched 
Egypt on the most sensitive nerve her bankruptcy which in 
58* For the Pull text of Speech and liationalisation i«aw 
aee Khalil Huhainraad* The Arab- states and the Arab 
League t A Pyawntarintecord* Vol, ll.* (iksirut. 
IV? 
1375 h«d proTldfad Di8raeil« Prima Minister of Britain, a 
goidan chanott to purchase Egypt's £ourty four per cent 
•harsfi in the canal coiq^ any for four niililon pounoe* Tho 
original value of the Egyptian shares was sixteen million 
pounds* It was considered a fateful date in the economic 
as trail as political history of Egypt* Hob&rt K. Bowie had 
described the iiamediate motives «riilch preeldont i^ asser wan* 
ted to achieve by ijationaiisation of the Suez Canal Coe^any 
in the foUtfWing words t 
He wanted to relatiate for the iirestern refusal 
to finance the Aswan Dam and to paroviue an al-
ternative sourcni of financing I to denonatrate 
Egypt's independence! and to eaq^ loit nations-
lism and xenophobia at home and in the Mi- tUlc 
£ast as a wholo* For these pur£x>sea« the d»-
dsioQ to nationalise and the ;>puech announ-
cing it were intentionally provocative* tru-
otilent* and defiant.^9 
Dulles* provocative withdrawal of tho iwaiwan loan 
offer* and ^assur's angry response* both events were un-
expMtted by the concerning goverzsaents* 
The attitude of the general Arab and i\fro-Asian count-
ries towards Sgypt's decision to nationalise the ;iuoz Canal 
Conpsoy vas favourable* King Hussein of Jordan* in a laassage 
of congratulations to president Nasser* saidi **The ahadcw of 
iieperialistic exploitation is beginning to disappear from tlie 
59* R.a* Bowie* ODp cit^* p*15. 
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Arab ttorld*** ^  The L«a>ane8e Pdrliasient p«u2@ed «i roaoiution 
welcoming Egypt's move onu declaring the i.@bar^ n«s full sup-
port to Egypt, The juibyao prioe Minister^ Mustafa uixi iialiow 
deserlSDed the nationalisation of the Sues CanaX Coiapai^ y as a 
strong step towards safeguarding i^ gypt*s interostG, according 
to hla it was a purely internal mattor of Kgy^t and IK> out 
61 
Side power was entitled to interfere* iSven £iasser*c oppon-
ents among the Aral>*rulers and with in his own country had 
strongly i^ p^reeiatod his ix>ld action. Childers had des-
criJsod the jubilation of the Egyptian pualic in the ful-
lowiag wordst 
E^pt in general erupted in wild entiiasiont 
such as f-iad nut fx^ fore been granted 4y3del 
t^ asser* iievcr before had he managed so to 
reattii into £gyptians« so to galvanise their 
spirit and the dignity they wanted to osi^ ress 
with erect shoulders.o^ 
In fact# by tills c»nrgeou8 act president l^ as^ ser had won 
oyer the hearts of Egyptians* 
Reaction in the West 
The countries mo^t directly hit by the take over of 
the Canal i#ere Britain and Franoe# who owned ttte cjver whel-
ming majority of the coopai^'s stcw;k« "of the &«00«000 shares 
of the Coppa^y* the British Oov^ eriuient owned 3«53#204 and 
60« Asian Racorder* Vol«l«« No«84«« (August 4-10* 1956}» 
p.965, 
62* £.a. Chlldttrs^ OP* clt** p*166. 
ii9 
Franch 8har« holder* over 4,00#000".®^ Since the iilaraeii«s 
ttueoua bargon In la75, the Sues Canal Company waa totally 
doolnated by the western pen#er8, in hie 8peech« president 
cesser described the QXMZ Canal Company ae an "ej^ioltlng** 
eoiq;>any and a "state within a state** « ^ The nationalisation 
of the Sues Canal contributed to the aeterloratlon uf the al-
ready tense relations between Egypt and the western powers. 
l^esser*a action was received In the wiastern c^ lt<iils# par* 
tlcularly In London and parls« with rage and anger* Britain 
and France strongly prote£>ted against the nationalisation 
o£ the iixmz Canal Conpany* They accused tameet of his arbi-
trary act and comapared him with Mussolini and Hitler. They 
clolttod that the act of nationalisation was a violation of 
the International <^aractor of the Canal and tnat it jeopar-
dised the freedon of navigation* They threatened to use 
force against £gypt if the later did not ll&ten to thoa. 
Tkm nationalisation of the ;iues Canal Con^ pany had not 
been the only cause of the ^ o^iglo^ Freneh ho^ 'tiiity against 
uaoaQt but it provided the Kind of opportunity which the 
t%ro governments needea to justify ttMilr <^tlon against him. 
In 1882 Britain vlei«ed Colonel A T ^ I as u potential ttireat 
to her l8|>erlallst goal. He and his supporters were det^troyeu 
63. Quoted In iJlkshc^  C* Chatterjl, pp. clt.« p.l55. 
64* Keeslna^ (July 28«Auguat 4, 1956)« p.lSOOl. 
65. tiencsowskl^ oom cft.^ pp«623«i624.« for details see 
James fiayrs* (ed.j. The Cuwmoa wealth and gys *»f^  
Docuawintayy sorvev. (Umdon, 1964} # ];:9.i4«»2^36-105-l06. 
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by the British forces at the piece of Tei-ei*Xel>ir« Arebi's 
revoit provided an exeuse to the British Oovernoent to Just* 
ify her military presence in £gypt i^ich rfuaained till 1956. 
The sMUn objective behind this aove was to control over the 
Sues Canal* After Arabi*s revolt Britain haU become the do-
minating authority in internal as well external affairs of 
66 
figypt* Hoifevar« in the year 1956 adverse political deve-
lopsients intervened again* and Egyptians unoer the dynamic 
leadership of Colonel limBimx began to question the presence 
of the British troops in their country* But the days had gone 
«rt)en British (3overnment occvq^ed Egypt by force* in 19S4 the 
circumstances and political atmosphere compelled Britain to 
sign an agroemant with Sgypt under which her for^is had to 
leave Egyptian soil by June 20* 1956* Zt was dune under the 
strong pressxire of the us Oovernment which for its own rea-
67 
sons wanted to placate Egypt* 
Bagdad pact was another source of conflict between 
Egypt and Britain* Hasser not only refused to Join this 
pact but he continuctd to propagate against it* 7o covmtor 
it# he concluded bilateral defense alliances with i»yrla« 
6fi 
Saudi Arabia and Yemen* He also succeeded in his effort 
66* For the Arabi*s episode soo Hugh J* schonfieiu, rhe 
S^  
67* See Herman Finer* op* cit** p*16. 
68* ghe Middle East at ijurth Africa t X969»7Q» (£uropa pui>» 
lications* liondon}* p*792* 
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to 3(eep the other Arab ocniotries away frosi Joining the wes-
tern sponaored defence Pa«t* The defeat of the TMpler f'iis* 
eion had proved thla fact in December 1955.^^ In the prevail-
ing eiroumstances when king Hussein of Jordan in a surprise 
move disnisi^ed QexMiral OXut^ from the Arab Legion on M«r<:h 1« 
1956* ^ British Oovemment ignoring Hussein *s own reasons 
for the step« held passer responsible f<Nr it. aiubb'a dis-
missal was a great blow for ;:.den*s Ooyerranent* 
Nuri es«*Said« a personal onen^ of ueto&%r, e9q>loited 
thm alreiKiy charged situation in his own interest. Jealous 
of his leading position amoi^ the Arab states «ind his open 
(^ p^ position to the Bagdad pact« Kuri had corusistantly trying 
to get an opportunity to humiliate Nasser. It had often been 
alleged that behind the humiliating withdrawal of Aswan Dam 
offer* Ktirioes^Said had played on iioportant role. It was 
also alleged that he conspired with gden to make Diaies 
71 
the real scape goat in the Arabs* eyes . The la ter events 
disappointed Muri* while p r e s e n t ^ a golden op, ortunit:i to 
Bidmn0 » o l l e t and Benii^urion to destroy their cossnon Qsvm^ 
Nasser. 
The nationalization uf the Sues Canal reinforced j^aen*s 
69 . E.B. Childers« op. c i t . . pp.140-144.* ame a lso i^lisobeth 
Monroe* B r i t a i n ^ Hovement in the Middle iiiast t 1914«»1956. 
(JLiondon* 63)* p . 188. 
70. Jlobert Stephens* OP. c i t . « pp . l79- l80 . 
71 . £ . 3 . Childers, pp. c i t . . pp.l89-lSK). 
122 
distrust and hostillt:^ ftgaixuit u<as£ier» By this bold @top« 
pjni«idant Hasser ehallan^j^ Britain*8 hiatoric rola in tim 
Suez Canal and har widar interaats in the Maala ^aat region. 
UUca Britain^ 7ranoe too waa deeply attached to the ^uaa 
Canal* %ihicb was soma thing of a symbol of its pritstige in the 
area* Ttte taJcaover of tim eanal iK>t only ended French irapori* 
al legacy with Sgypt but it also Jeopardised her econcMnic in* 
terests* Already hostlla with Nasser due to his sup^ o^rt to 
the Algerian frewSoia str\^gle« the French Governmunt reacted 
hysterically over tiw rightful seizure of the i^ ues Canal Com-
pany by the Egyptian Government* Having suffered hxuniliating 
<te£eat of 1940i Zndo-Chinai Morocco and Tunisia* the French 
72 Ooveriwient did not want to lose tmt lost hope in i^ orth Africa, 
In Harc^ 1956« Pineaxi, the Fronch Foroign Hinistor, visited 
Cairo nainly to persuade iiasser to ceases supporting the Al-
gerian rebels* in return for French support of Ara^ a neutra* 
73 lism* Sie failure of his Cairo raisiiion was exploited by 
the French Right wing against the ruling part^. 
Thus* the nationalisation of the ^ues Canal Ccmpany 
provided a provocation as well as pretext to Franco to use 
force against Egypt* The French Coverruaent had beccHnie con* 
vinced that "disposing of Nasscar was the wa^ to defeat the 
72* Fred J* Khouri* OP* cit»* p*211 
£*B, Childors* OP* c 
Finer* op* cit«* K>* 
73* , hil  P* it** pp* 146*147.& 173.* aee iienitan 
41»42. 
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74 Alg«ricU) rebellioo'** After the nationalization o£ the 
Cenal French policy towerd* £gypt was also influenced by 
its close ties with Zsraei^ which £or her own national in-
terests planning a war against ^gypt, France* iirittiin and 
Israel had separate reasons of their ei^ ioity against •s.yypt* 
but they had a connon objective the de;>truction u£ i^ aisacrism 
This coincidence of the objectives of the three govarnatents 
was responsible for tl^ir collusion against ^^ gypt. 
The ua reaction to the act of nationalizatiwn was less 
severe than that of Britain ai>d France* unlike Britain and 
France^ neither of US holding:* nor her prestige was directly 
involved in the Su«2 Canal issue* Although "ua* shipping was 
a large Canal uuser ojod u«>>« business had oil concessions* 
75 
neither was crucial for the United states econonty*. 
Dispite bittor opposition to the neutralist policy of 
prisident ijasser and his growing ties with the Consounist bloc« 
the State D^>artmant was strongly opposed t:o the use of force 
against &giypt to vindicate western claisis* Th& UH Govorniafcint 
BOM the Sues Canal crisis in broader perspcictive. It presumed 
that in the prevailing circumstances the use of force against 
Egypt might facilitate Soviet entry in tlw area, wtiich ulti-
mately would harm American Middle £astern j[>olicy* 
74. R.R, Bowie* op, c i t . * p .26 . 
'S» 3pbid»# p«29* See also childcsrs* op» c i t .< p»211. 
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The inlti«OL prc»3K»unceiQent o£ the t^dt<ij Dep^rtineDt w«is 
made on July 27« 1956« in the absence of Dulles t^ ho at tlie 
tima was ia Peru, zt did refer to the ''eeisure'* of the ;»ues 
Canal Cc»qpany hut it indicated that titwt ixtatter was one of 
76 
concern mainly to the principal vtsers of the Canal • un 
July 28« tlra Acting Secretary of &tate# Herbert Hoover* 
had a talk with th& £gy^tian Asibassador* Abmea Hhssein« 
in v/hic.i he protoated not about the national J. isation of the 
Suez Canal Coiqpany* hut about the "int«iiK:rate« inacurate 
and mialeading statements" which President i«asser had inado 
to the US Govornoient "during the past few days, an^ parti-
ciaarly in his Alexandria speech on July 26,'* 19&6* After 
his return to Washington on July 29« Dulles said i "The i^ gyp-
tian action purporting to nationalise ttie &x3&z Canal Ccm^any 
striices a grievous blow at international confidence". on 
July 31« the United 4itatc-s frose all a&set£i of the .^gyptian 
Govornnisnt and the Sues Canal Coc^any pendixig final ^ ettle-
79 laent of the crisis • 
The US Govornment strongly disapproved i<ias@er*s action 
but its reaction was indeed quite different from that c>f Bri-
tain and Franco* Robert R« Bowie had written a 
rhe divergences between the unitetd .li^ tatos 
and Britain and France emerged almost at 
once. Th&y differed ^^ reately in tlieir 
76, Leila s, Kadi« A. purvey of American Xaraeli iielations, 
(Beirut* February 1969)# p»80. See also Finer# op. cit.# 
pp*62^4« 
77. Herman Finer, op« cit.< pp*62«-66. 
"f^* Keeeina^ (July 28-August 4, 1956), p.l<>003. 
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mppaa^iMiSkla of thm issues* the obj ac t ives # 
and thm s^propriate m^aaB*QO 
The news of l iesser's se isure of tki» Q%mz Canal was 
broken to the Bri t i sh prias MinistOE* s i r ^Athouy c^kan* at 
a time when ho was busy in entertaining his 9\(£ts->the young 
king Faisal of Iraq, and his exparieneed prirne Minister, i«url-
81 
es«»Said« the Chief arttiitect of the oagdad pact* en July 27, 
in the House of Cooraons, sir Anthony Sden denounced passer's 
action and declared that the nationalisation of the ^ uez canal 
COB^any was "in breach of the Concession AQireements" and ha 
refered to It as an 'arbitrary action* which wouia a££oct 
&2 both the operation of the Canal and "wi>ier questions'*. 
On the sama day after consulting with his Cabinet roeiMxirs, 
Eden sent a telegraoi to UQ president, Eisenhower, Itiforming 
him about the appraisal ana attitude of hisi governift^ nt. It 
was declared in the telegram* 
We shall not allow overselves to bec<»sie involved 
in legal quibles about the rlght£< o£ the luyyptlan 
Oovernraant to nationalise what i& technically an 
is:gyptian Cooi^ ieny, or InfInanclal argum&nts about 
their capacity to pay the coiqpenctatlon which thoy 
have offered. X feel sure that w«i should t<»J^  this ^ -
sue with them on the bro^ a^ ler Intctrnatlonal grounds, 
Zn view of the action taken by the Eg},', tlan (Joverniiient 
the Briti£#h Treasury blocked sizable Egyptian accounts In 
SO. R.R* Bowie, ouf clt», p«29. 
81. Herman Finer, o&» clt., p«6i« 
82* Jaoies Sayrs, ^Qm cit», pp«24«27« 
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X^ ondon on July 2&« on July 30 in the House o£ Ccnnmons Udan 
announced that all British exports of war : taturlal to ^gypt 
had buen stopped. 
From ttM very beginning the Franco-British poiic^ i in 
the Suez Crisis was largely dominated by thuir coinrrK>n desire 
to orusli :ia8ser« who was responsAble to Jocporuise their na-> 
tional interests in the l^adle i:;a£it. According tw :iov/ie« "£aen 
was <2Uite e9q;>licit about his objective mure tha f^ur montns 
85 before the ^uez Crisis. aritish govermount was nionoeuver-
ing hard to find out a strong plea to Justify ultioutu use 
of force against £gypt« The mere arguimaat that the takeover 
of the Canal was illegal in disrupting th& 'international 
system* established under the convention of lQhH» did not 
establish the right to resort to force to remedy it. 
Moreover* the i«abour party did not suqpport; any use of 
force outside the U.l^ . frame work. Hugh Gaitskcil« iKiade 
of the i^ abour Opposition* in his speech to the H,use of Com-
mens on August 2, coi^ pared President £4asser*s diplomatic tnu-
thods with those of Hitler and Mussolini, ijut at the some 
time he warned British Government to avaoid a position in 
which Britain might be denounced as «in aggre&isor by tUo .^ e^c-
urity Council. James i^ ayrs see p.36. 
84. Keesing* (Julj^  28«<iugust 4, 1956}« p.15002. 
eS. Bowie* OP. cit.* p.19. 
86. James £ayrs* op^ cit.* p.36. 
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In France* the reaction was nore united and more vigo-
rous. In paria the Foreign Minister* M, Pinaajj* used a harsh 
language to the Egyptian Ambassador* In his first comment to 
the act of nationalization* on July 28* Pineau declared that 
France would "not accept the unilateral action of Colonel 
87 
Nasser" %rtU.ch was "less legal than political"* In a press 
statement on July 30* H. Mollet* the French priote Minister* 
described Colonal Nasser as an "apprentice dictator". He 
shared British view of Hitler and Riojeland analogy with 
those o£ Nasser and Suez Canal. Quoting from Ccl r.el Nasser's 
pan^hlet, tXta pilosophy of Revolution* (which M. Mollet said 
should have been entitled 'Main Kas^f*) the French Prime Mi* 
nister said that it was apparent that Nasser saw himself in 
the role of a "hero" and creator of an Arab eiiq;>ire strediing 
from the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic. He declared that 
French Oovernraent had decided upon "an ezisrgetic and severe 
coiuter stroke" to the Egyptian dictator* which would take 
the form of "concerted action by the western allies who are 
90 pledged to uphold Law and Justice". He stressed that the 
western powers were not protesting against an ordinary act 
of nationalization but against the Egyptian Governments' 
87. Noble FranJdand and vera King* (eds.)* tHacuments on 
International Affairs* op. cit,* p.74. 
^^* H0ig»* See also Keesing* (July 28-August 4* 1956)* 
p«15003. 
39* Keeainq* (July 28-August 4* 19S6)* p.l5003. 
90. Ibid. 
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unilateral «iction in bre«uan^ an inter national agre ai at, 
Financial measures against £gypt« ioantic^l to those imposed 
Ql 
by Britain wer@ also announced Joy the French Governraent, 
un August 2, Frencdi Asson^ly, with only tiie conmunist 
dis843nting« resolved that president :<asser WUB "a permanent 
HMinace to the peace" «i3d his actions mxat l^e checked by tiK.* 
92 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l cc^nr^iuni^* p i n e a u ' s apeech t o the As^exi^ly 
on August 3* c l e a r l y e:iqE>vSed of h i s govornni&nt' s approach 
93 
to t l ^ c r i s i s * 
?he British and l^ 'rench hostile attitude to i«a&..^ r':j 
action alarmed the U^ OwVermiMiint at once* Xakli.g into acc-
ount o£ tho sjrave situation* I'rasident ii;isanhower sent 
aooer Kurphy* the U£i impute Unaer secretary of otate« to 
Xiondon Just to discover the intensity of ti^i^eir seriou^snc^s 
Rolbert I'lurphy* arrives in i^nUon on July 2&. 'i:hx:ii& Powers 
discussions ^n the ^uez Cdsia vrare opened in London on 
July 29, hettireen Solvyn i^ loyd* the British Foroyin Kl-istcr 
H» Plneau, the French Foreign iiinii.ter, ancl liOi-^ rt Wurphy, 
the especial envo^ o£ i-resident Eisenhower the Senior of-
ficials of the Dritish, French and the \}i^ Foreign s,fflees 
v/ere also prosont. Th<» discussions were cor^tinued on July 
30* when the British Priios Minister* E^n, had separate 
meetings with H» Pin<^ an and Murphy* After talking with 
91* Ihid* 
92* FranHland & Vera Kings (eds*)* Pocumonts on Inter-
national Affairs* op«^  cit*« p*74* 
93* il.w. Bowie* OP* cit.* pp.27-28. 
i:; * 3 t 
thQ arXtXsh ana French offlci«Xs« Hurphy diraw <» conclusion 
t h a t both the Goverrseient8# inorcter t v pr<dV€tnt tlK^ir n a t i o -
nal interoat3# v/i..uXd not hdsitat@ t o use force aga ins t ^^gypt* 
He Imoddiateiy infpraiod Ma presicSksnt alx>ut th€^ r i s i n g temper 
94 
of France and B r i t a i n , Robert Bowie hau quot d tiurpijy as 
sayingI 
It was left in no doubt (by Maanl.lXan) 
that the British Ooveroniont beliervoa 
that ij\mz was a tost which CK>uld be 
BKst only by tii© use of forc»,^S 
In the mean tima DuXXes had CN;>ine back to Washington 
from Latin i^ raerica, lie aXso sensed the AnyXo*British uncom-
promising attitude with the Ui» Government in tho ^MBZ CanaX 
dispute* on the parsonaX i.&tructiuiut of pxesiOent Eisen-
hower# DuXXes fXew to iiondon on JuXy 3X to take part in 
the tripartite discussions on the £»uez CansiX question. 
Dulles* efforts for peaceful soXution. 
DuXXcMS arrived in London in the m&ralc\g of Auyust 1, 
1956. He was accor^anied with his XegaX CQVLnS€i« Herman 
97 PhXeger* AS soon as DuXXes arrived at Loncion airport* 
the waiting Murphy iiriefed him about the details, iloburt 
94. Herman Finer« op. cit»< p.&4.« see Keesina* (July 2Q -
august 4« 19567* p.X^0Q3.« and aXso see Hoi^ t&rt ^ ta^ h^ens 
op. cit.# p.206. 
95. yuoted in Bowie^ op. cit,y«p.3X. 
96. Herman Finer, oa. cit.. p.68. 
97. Ibid., p.es. 
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Hiirphy left to Washington shortly after the arrival of 
Dulles. 
>^ulles*s efforts to resolv>i^  ttie dispute 'o'ji peaceful 
means begdn on August !# whon he w^nt into session with 
the foreign ministers of Britain ana France* During discu-
ssions Dulles tried to assure his government's full solidari-
ty with Britain and France in resolving the Sues Canal pro-
hlcBQ. He also agreed with softie of the arguments made by i<loya 
and Pinean concerning the gravety of the situation after the 
nationalization of the 4»ue2 Canal by the Goverranent of agypt 
Zn order to delight thexn* Dulles spoJce of finding « way **to 
98 
maiitm Us^sex disgorge «^at he was attee^ting to swallow"* 
At the same tiras he made it clear that the vm Government 
would like to emphasise tim utilissation of all the possi-
bilities of deliberation^ coafere»»tt# negotiation and r^ iSurt 
— - to the United £«ations and to avoid force altogether. 
AS a result of Dulles* efforts a tripartite statinent 
on the nationalisation of the Universal ^ue^ Canal Con^any 
was issLwd at liondon by t)u» Goveriuasnt of the United :jtates« 
the United Kingdcmw <^ nd France on August 2, 1956* In the 
statement^ the three powers agrcMd that the Egyptian deci-
sion involved *for inure than a sii^le act of nationalization", 
;hey olaimod that "it involved the arbitrary and luiilataral 
98. Ibid., p.97* 
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aoiawre ]0y one nation o£ on international agoncy un which 
the econoBiG^ « cooKnerco and security of the w^ i^ rld depends". 
'Xhoy alleged that the £yyptian action "threateraid the free-
dom and security of the canal as guorontottd by the Conven-
tion of 1888"* In the end the^ r proposed a conference of the 
signatories to the 1886 Convention and other nations largely 
concerned with tho use of the Canal, The announced pur^ iose 
was to consider steps to establish "operatiny arraugomunts"* 
consistent with "legitimate Egyptian intero0ts"« under an 
"international system*' designed to assure operation of the 
Canal as guaranteed o^  tho Convention. The conference was to 
Oe held in London on August 16« 19S6* 
Dulles^ back in Washington* made two stateotents on 
Augtist 3# 1936. "one was a short monologue* tho ottiter a 
radio and television appearance with president iuisunhower". 
The U;;^  president introduced the subject while secretary Dulles 
explained to the Ainerican people the whole backgrouna of tho 
"uongerous** situation created by the Sgyptian Government* 
Na£:ser was bac»3ming increasingly alamsied to biilicose 
mood of Britain and France* in order to cocl down their 
99* For the Tripartite statement on the :J€itionalization 
of the iiuez Canal seo An»rican Foreign policy t Cur-
rent Documents t 19S6* (Deportmi^ nt or it^ ite publica-
tion 6811# Washington* X9S9)# pp*607-€>08« 
100* Horman Finer* op» cit.* p*103« 
101. The Department of at ate atilletin* Vol. 35.* no,694,, 
Publication 6i?9* (.august 13* 1956}* p.259. 
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102 t«ar^ per he redfflrraad on July 31 ^yypt*s intention o£ 
maintaining freedom o£ siavigation in accord«mce with the 
constantiiK»ple Convention* d^espite of An<ijilo<»Franch refusal 
to pay todls to ttie new Egyptian autifiority he continued to 
allow uritifih and French ships to pass through tlie Can«>i, 
He did not wazit to provide any op^  ozrtunity to the Govern-
ment of France ar^ Britain to Justify thair excusa for 
military action against Egypt* lirskin® 3» Chiluer!^ had 
b«Mn stated I 
i^ othing had ]oeen said i^y jiasser, either 
explicitly or ia^licitly# trireatening to 
close tbM Canal to Britain^ Frazw:Y3« or any 
other nation ^art ttcxa the long blockaded 
Zsrael«^03 
Although* France and aritain had agreed to call a 
conference of twenty four concerned maritiirie powers to de* 
cide the future of Sii^ s Canal* they did not atop their rai* 
litary movements towards the Malta and Cypzus to materia-
lize their plan in the near future* 
From the very £>eginning the prospects for the success 
of the CK»aferenee %fere not bright* Egyptian Governnient re-
fused to attend the London Conference* president i4assQr*s 
stateiaent rejecting the invitati«:it was issued un August 12, 
1956* Zn his statement he rejected the thesis of the three 
102* Robert Stephens, OP* c^t** p*20S, see also w.a. 
Childers pp. cit** pp* 2i2«213* 
203* &»B, Childers* op. cit.* p*19S* 
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poiwers on the **intornational character* of the Sues Canal 
Company ana the argument that It formed part of one system 
with the 188d Convention* Any atten^t to confuse "between 
the '^Uez Canal Omapajiy and tha freedom of aavigation** woa 
only IntetKied to find an "eoccuse for interfcriiig Ux tnu 
internal affairs and sovereiguty of Egypt** • He uescrlw^d 
the propv^ sal for the cro«ition of an "intcrnatiuniil autho* 
rity" as "collective colonialioro**• He objected that the 
I^ ondon Conference had been convened v^ ithout consulting 
Egypt to discuss the future of an l.itugrai part of that 
nation's territory. Instead, President Kas^er propwaed a 
conferonce of the 43 users of thi^  Canal to reconsider the 
Constantinople Convention of 1886 anu to confirm an<^  guaran<-
tee freedom of navigation through the Canai.. The sign, d 
l04 
*Treaty* was bgund to ise submitted to the initod ;iations. 
Mean while uasser established a liaison wit: the Ho^ 
Viet and Indian (iovernments to mount up prctoGuru on /itoeri* 
ca» In this regard a number of meetings w.ro tielu between 
Ijasser and the Ambassador of India and Hus£iia in Cairo. 
Krishna Menon, Indian res resentative to the iiorK^ on Conference 
enroute frcxn l^ ew Delhi to London stopped in Carlo anu partici-
pated in these meetings, it was rumored that his role at the 
Conference wuuld be that of spokesman for the absoutee i^ gypt-
105 ions* prime Miniiiter Nehru on August 8# 1956, stateu in 
104• See Khalil Muliarnnad, o;>. cit.< pp.703-787. 
lOS. Herman Finer, op. cit., pp.l24«»125 & :L35., For further 
details of Ind3[an attitude towv^ rds the Juez canal dis-
pute see The jgconomifgt» (London, ^ept* 29, 13t>6), pp. 
1057-1059. JPor Ijehru*s speeches ana stateiiKJii.a see 
James eayra, op. cit., pp. 
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the Indian Parliament th«t« "tha way JSgypt took control 
of the Suss Canal waa not our iray •«• India rttapoetod tiie 
aovoraiguty of Egypt and tho quo'tion of nationalisation 
waa an internal natter for figypt"* M*M* Rahman^ descri-
bed I3ehrtt*8 attitude in the follwoing vordait 
It iraa more inportant for Hehru and 
India that the Sues Canal waa prqperly 
maintained and waa not eloaed irraapectiimi 
of the a%tthority controlling it*-*^ w' 
tim attitude of US.JR and lndia# th(»igh not unexpected* 
had diaturhed and mortified the US Govemaont, un Jiay 31* 
1956* KhrushcdMav in hie apeech before a lairge crowd at the 
Ijonin Sporta £»tadiuia* c^ penly oiqtported Haa&er'a aeiaxiro of 
the Canal and declared that the action waa completely legal .^^ 
In hia Hq^nion Britain and France ahould not be excitod ov«er 
Sues* He alle^^ that Anglo»7rench Govermienta deliberately 
exaoorbated the Svwa Canal iaaue* He aaid t.hat "tha nationali-
aation of the Sues Canal ie an action which tha i;;gy^s>tlau Go-
verranent* aa a aovereign state* is entitlml to tolce*** and in 
ai^ way it "does not effect the intereota of the people of 
Britain* France* t^ ie U•&•%•* mvl other oountriea".^ 
106, parliamentary Debatea* hott Sabha^ pari: II. volume vili* s y ^ i ? " ^ §?sg!r'(Aiss.m/si?r 
107* H*Hm Rahman* The P o l i t i c a of tioa Aliqiaaeat^ (uew uelhl* 
1969}* p.134. 
108* Herman Finer* op« c i f f p»99« see also Keeain^* (July aswvugtxat 4* 1956}* p*15004. 
^09* KQ»»inq^ (July 26wvuguat 4* 1956}* p*15004. 
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H« also CMdndflHMNi Britain •ml France for tlKsir repeated 
warnings to the figyptlan Government that li Naseer v?oiiid 
not undo his action they would \ase force to achieve ttieir 
objectives• 
The Soviet press warmly appreciated ttm Sgyptian 
llo Govemnents action. ^ on August 9# It was officially 
conflmsd that Russia was going to attend the ensuing 
conference with Its* full solidarity to thei Egyptian Go* 
111 
veriment* 
By new United states had become fully aware of the 
ewoiRMnlist and third %rorld reaction In coso of military 
action against £gypt« It was against the U£> Policy to SMK?^ 
port Britain and Fraxtce In their military CkCtlon which thuy 
were planning against £gypt* Although "irifien the VQA had been 
in trouble in Berlin (during the soviet blctckaoe) in 1943 
and in Korea in 19S1« Britain and Prance h«kd uncondltlonaly 
112 
joined America in resisting the aggreaQor"* Advurso poli-
tical develosMaents coonMilled Dulles to adopt a policy (neu-^  
113 traUsm) %^doh he had strongly opsx^^ '«v months ago* 
^^0. Ibid^ 
ill, See Finer# oo* cit>^ pp»132«133« 
112. p>^t, P.116. 
113. Ibid«« pp.42 & 118. 
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^^ff^R^^^5^^^B^^^^H^^^BJ^H^2^ES^^^^^^^3C2ififfE^^EHt^^EE^^Sl^^^^^fc^^Hft3^^5 
xllitttlJK!^.!3jf:c 
Ttid f i r s t LoocloQ CemiejPOQoe waa opend on August 16« 
i9S6* S3ceept iigypt «nd OceacQ# a i l the tvfenty two inviteoa 
«ttttii«3d4 the eonftNmnee* Zn th<» ccmfexrence m a l e s playact an 
important role* Xa h i s Introduetorar speech on August 16« he 
traced <»it the history QM Sues Canal and Uii@ @v<@nt&« looxi-
114 ing t o tlMi Canal dispute* At the &aa oi iiis speech, 
Dulles presented a proposal for an inter national op«^  rating 
11' board based on certain principles to govern the Canal ayst^a. " 
He did not give much attention to the soveiceign r ights aivl 
in t ere s t s of tktet Egyptian Oovernraent* The Soviet Union and 
Znida opposed the western prv^TOsal denounci-og tiiat i t was 
not acceptable to £gypt« instead* Indian cielogatiuns sub* 
n i t t ed an al ternat ive plan whioh« lK>wever« couXd got only 
the support of US^ K^  ceylon and Indonesia* Bighteen of 
the twenty txio part ic ipating nations* majoxity of whom 
dependent \;^^n the western a ia , supiJurtod t;he propositi 
presentod by millesy with few aciendetaents in i t * At ti^a 
c lose of tiw conference on August 23« tho Eighteen* powers 
i n Peelaration was publiehed* ' 
i i<» ^ Oepfyaeo | 0 | S^ate gHlleUi*^yoX^>3S*> no*e96. (Pid»lication 6383, A«igust 27« 19S6}# pp*33S«-372, 
See a lso Year aook of united xiatioos* 1956* p*l921* 
l i s . See Current Doouiaant i 1956* OP* c i t . * pp*608-614, 
116. Yaar Book of UH* <»>* c i t** p . 19. 
^ '^'» ^ ijeoartBKgnt of s t a t e Bulletin* Volo35.,t3o.897,, (Publication 6385, September 3* 1956)4. p*373. 
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iUX tiMMM) nations who favoured the Dulles PX«ui appoin* 
ted a eoiamittee of five (Aiastrali^ ^ £thiopi«« Zran^ Sweden, 
and the United states)« heeded by Sir »oburt Menzies* the 
Prima Hinistor of ^tstraiia to present aiKl eiqpXalu the pro-
posal to president l3assec« hut it was not siuthorlzeu to no* 
gotiate or discuss alternative proposal* i*he liansies miss-
ion went to Cairo and presented the i^ght@€tn power plan 
to the jegyptian Govemr^nent on .^ pte«ii;>Qr 3« ijSdm After 
intermittant disosssions and eacehange o£ letters with 
Hasser the Goinraittee reported rejection of the Plan 1;^  the 
Govemoent of Egypt on sopt^ E^ilMtr 9« 1956* ^ During the 
discussions liassor repeatedly argued that Ite was ontltled 
to nationalise the Canal and kept on saying that he could 
not accept such a proposal which was noant to remove tlm 
119 
Canal from Egyptian control. Zn a nioniorandum on Sept-
sober 10* Egyptian Govemnent exps&ss&d it£i wilXingnass 
to call a new ^uez Conference to resolve tlie ii3:;ue o£ free-
dom of p«8sage« future developnjent^ and equitable toll8« 
'without prejudice to Egypt*® sovereiguty or dignity". 
thm repeated asourencos given by president liasaer to 
guarantee complete £r<M»dctts of navigation tlurough thu 
118. i>* C i t * j 
t and oi ^ - . r e s iden t i4a8aor*s l e t t e r 
of Sept, 9 reject ing the proposalsi see The Suea Canal 
flR^}?«i'.#'4y.,^^-Sep^e|9^r aS^ 1?S6 t A i>o9«pientary 
gia>lication (Departnent of State Publication 6392^. 
pp» 317«>328« 
119. I b i d . , pp.19-20. 
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Bvmm C«naX« and h i s g»mSii.t»»8 t o aecMpt oiost of the gxaldlng 
pirXnQlpl«« glvittn i n th« Sighttt^n power proposal did not p«-
«uUCy western eountries to whom eny settlement without d i s -
oredeting iissser w«s equal t o the ir defeat . 
fmm 9fftfA yfff'• ^fy^l^u?!** 
Siren before the departure of the Hensies mission to 
Caixo« Xden had foreseen i t s fai lure* I t was jr«wealed by the 
fSiart that on Augiuit 27 £den in a oahle to president Eisenhower 
eaipressed h i s intention to go to the U*N* security Council as 
soon as the f i ve amabers Ccxsraissioo would return* The u«s. 
President i n h i s reply t o s<^n on Si^ptssriaer 2« opposed the 
involveoMmt of the United Nations at t h i s stage* He repeated 
h is warniatfs auaiust the use o£ force oi; t^ tiare^t of force* 
wM€fti# 1« Mff ^«w, **rml'^ «ltl«««t©ly "liiereM^ the area of 
121 Jeopardy"* He eoq^ressed h is fear of Afru-Asian cotusulida-
t ion with JSgypt against the %«ist and above a l l the poss ib i -
l i t y of tlie RvMsian mischief to explo i t the s ituation* He 
a lso discovered that the Aiasriean public opinion f l a t l y 
rejected the idea of using forcM* Ourir;^ the eacchanyo 
of l e t t e r s tomtiu—n Sisenhower and fiden* Dulles d e c i d e to 
ecms up with an alternative proposal* On fieptenri»Br 4« Dul-
l e s suggested that a Sues Canal user 's Association should be 
lao* Janus i^ayrs* &>f c i t ^ . pp* 10 3-104* 
121* See A*A. Eowie« oo* cit*« p*122« 
UJ 
122 tonmAm The SCUA Btitmem provod «ua apg>lG o£ alscord be t -
woen tbe U«S* ai»3l i t a aXlimi^ largely as a rosiLLt of their 
123 
d i v e r ^ n t purposes"* 
Dulltts dlplooAoy t o g ive dlf forent liqpros&ion to dif* 
fersnt p4K^le pttrtalniog SCUA was highly irjurious* He gave 
«n inpression to president Slsenyhower that the Cormiiition o£ 
SCUA was a very n i l d nsasure and sinpXy an extention o£ the 
iSighteen* Poirar proposcO, and i t s attendent formula for a s o t -
tXeaent* I t was only a dsvioe for oo l l eo t ive bargaining with 
president uasser* At the saias time ho triedl to assure the 
Bri t i sh and French Governments that SCUA vam noant to be 
on instnaoent of coercion against iiigypt* 
president Eisenhower had to reply £den*8 l e t t e r of 
Sept«nl>er 6# 1956* After a deta i led discus£iion with Dulles 
about the SCUA plan he coBi>osed a long lett;er to Eden sug» 
ge; t ing that a "slower** and "less dranatie" method should 
J 25 be adopted to defeat Nasser* such as SCUA* ' ihe d e t a i l s 
of SCUA s«di^ M3 reached Eden on S^teober 1()« the day after 
the formal reject ion of IS-powsrs proposal tyy the president 
12fi Nasser* Sdsn and Selwyn lilqyd after coiKiuiting with Hoi-
- l e t and Pioeau (although the l a t t e r powers %rere reluctant 
122* Bowie« 9Dff d t . * p*43* 
124* H«rman Finer^ OP* cit** p*22S* 
12S* Bowie* OD^  cit** p*128* see a l so Finer* OP* cit** p.127. 
126* Finer* 90^ cit** p*219* 
uo 
to acottpt tiMi sohMMi) aec^tad the iXXlA id«i^ * Tho ^CUA pro* 
posaX was debated in tho Uouso of Coataoxm on Aeptanbttr 12 
•ad 13* In hia »p9m&i £den made It clear t}:iat 1£ the £:9ypt-> 
Ian Oovomiaeot refused to cooperate with acVA thon "iier 
Majosty*8 Qovernraant and others conoeroed will be free 
to take such further otepa «•• aa ae^n to be required ••• 
either through the Unitod uationo* or by other oieans* for 
127 the asaertiun of their rights"• 
on September 13« Egyptian anbaasador in vroshingt^n 
infonaad Dulles about tiis government's obj«ictien regarding 
SCUA« Tha sane day Dulles told a press c^nfurencc tiiat 
the US aav«3rniaaDt had no desire to iai;}ose tkm aCUA un £;gypt-
by force* According to him the SUCJI was raeamt to act as an 
agent for the users and to seek the cx>«>opez*atiun of i:>gy^  t 
under the 1868 convention* He made it claax that the Uniteu 
States had no intention "to shoot our way tJirough" the Suez 
Canal* Zf £gypt prevented the passag^« the U^ divert her 
129 
ships around the Cape* 
The news came as % shock and a disi^ppcdntnmnt to the 
governments of Britain and France but to tinaaor it was a 
gratifying surprise* 
127. Jamas £yrs« op* city^ pp*109-113, 
128* Robert Stephens* OP* cit*« p*214* 
129* Uuoted in BcMrie* OP* cit*# p*44. 
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From the laoqixmlag i t was not cl«ar what ro le ttei 
8CUA tfds Qxpmtt9d to pl«y In the auoa Caodl dispute, av^n 
tl30 auothec of the iiCUh had oot a eX«ar cut; idea about i t s 
functioaing* Dulles proposed QCUh soi^tae iciordor to keep 
tiDe eonoerniog partioe husy in the negotiations* The 
actual intention hehina the US delaying pol^icy vas iK>t 
known* Kither he wanted to provide an oppoirtunity to /^iaglo* 
French Governnent for the ir siiXitary pr^;»azration# or 
t o i n c i t e ^aaaer during t h i s prooeaa of nesiotians to v io l en -
ce* Zn the l a t t e r ease llaaaer was to be bl«»ied not the wes«> 
tern countries* 
On S€^pt«ri3er IS the wmtem p i l o t s lel!t tirieir canal 
posts as directed l^ the coa^fuxy This osacture proved to 
be f u t i l e because £gypt surprisingly " k ^ t tfte t r a f i c taov* 
ing without serious delays or disruptions* with p i l o t s re« 
eruited at hone 9jad dbroad** on the s^nct day president 
tiasser in a speech to Egyptian a ir force dctnouncwd HOJA i n 
131 
a very harsh tone* But the t i n s the wesluurn powers were 
busy i n finding out the wo^s and means t o safeguard the ir 
national i n t e r e s t s i n the Middle East* president "i^asser was 
112 i n continuous parley with the Arab nations«" inxring the 
second x«ondon Conference he had a c lose touch with Russia 
130* ^ d . * p*45. 
131* UersMn Finer* ^ ) * c i t . # p*240« 
132* Ibid** 247* 
14^ 
and India* flogarding t«>o Soviet Union the Ciairu corroapoo* 
dant of thtt Tinea raportod t "He (Rusaian iVal>asaadox Kiaaley) 
ia in and out of th& praaiddMQf (iia8sar*a of f ic ia l head quar* 
133 
taxs) thaaa dagra aa of tar aa any prieat with a convert*** 
Naaaar*a attitude had becoraa fEiora dafiant# and @ven coci^ 
tovarda tha waat aa tha £gyptiana qperatad the Canal e f f i . 
ciai^tly after tha with<i*draifal of tha weatairn pilota« 
U9Bmot:*» arrogance^ Ruaaian'a rapaat«cl warninga* lia 
fluctuated diplcniaqjr* and the hoatila attit^tdc of the Afro* 
Aaian nationa^ a l l theae l^ iaetoan eontriimtcid to the growing 
fruatration of Britain and FracMM* l^ hey seiised that the delay 
%fould laalGe their toak harder* At thia 8tag€t« o^tenn and ftollet 
aeeaad to have cc»»» to a eonduaion* 
7ha S«»>xKi Xiondon Conerenee waa held betiiraten s<^toRii:»r 
19 and 22« 1956* At the oonferexMe fifteen of the oigiiteen 
conferring nations adopted ttw £>CUA prc^pos£tla aad projected 
a furthez oeetixig of i ta formal inauguration on October 1# 
1956.^^^ 
On the opening day of the conference itiallea explained 
that t)Mt puEpoaa of tha Aaaociation waa not to enable '*ai^ 
one or more of ua to inpoae our viewa i^^n ai^ ot uur 
133* t^ioted in Finer# OP* cit»# p*246« 
134* See Boifie* op* cit^* pp«45»46*# aae Fltvoz, op. cit«* 
p*269* and alao year Booic of UU» 1956^ 90^ cit** p*20* 
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luaodatos*** Um amOm It cl*ar that scu^ i wa£ not meant "to 
135 
cosreo Egysyt*** Xhi« stAtoiMnt wa« oontretry to tho ori-
ginal form of the SCUA proposal as presenteid to E<Jien and 
Moli«t« I^My ootad that Oulliis ton* during the cunfereno@ 
had iMMin ontirvly i^ Muigad* 3y tbo end of t}::ie first day of 
Confervnoe thoy raollaad titait "SCUA was obcut to fall apart 
to baooaa an obstatiL* rathar than a balp to thulr rightful 
Glaiwj"^^^ 
TlMir fundanental differences regardittg tl^ means and 
ends paralysed the SCUA before It was even foraally established* 
on septenber 23« 1956* Britain and Fr«inoe without oon&ul* 
137 
ting Dulles refered their case to the secuxrlty council* 
Egypt too made a ctMinter coav>lalnt to the £U»eurlty Council 
accusing timm of actions "which constitute a danger to In-
ternational peace and security* and are fiosious violations 
136 
of the Charter of the united tiatlons"* 'Xtm iiecurity Co-
undl decided to discuss the Suez Canal is£)ue on uctober 5, 
19S6* 
139 On Si^ ptMsrioer 25, Sden and liloyd flew tio Praia* Thay 
spent two days with Mollet and plneau discitssing the ir future 
136* Cmrwmt Pocuaients i 19SI>« op^ clt*# p«629* 
136* Finer* pOp clt*# p.261* 
137* Ibid.* p*271«# see also childers* OP. cit** p223* 
138. iP4dt, p .206. 
139. Ibid.* p.386* 
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piMtM» on his return to lAiKlGm £d«n recwi^d « lotter from 
th« pr«alar 8uX9«nln waraiog hla against the course o£ act-
ion vhich the British Oovvmnent had adoptiid since July 26« 
On October 1# SCUA waa formally estajblishea, inilles 
141 
did not attend the looeting* Vho day after the lormation of 
SCUA« the US seeretairy of state at a press conference adbnit-
ted that there t#ere fundarasntal differenoofi .^xjtween tite 
United States and its allies regarding the problem o£ the 
Sues Canal* He went on to say that althuugli> the three Po« 
ymtm had lx>und to be united over matters iiji«e luiSO, the 
United States was free to take a soma idiat independent 
stand on other matter^ relating th» problem of colonialinn 
He made it dear that America could iK>t idemtify itself 
fully either vith col&nial powers or with the poi<rers seel&-
ing independence* He opposed to any Kind of: saontion nili* 
tary or economic against £gn>t« Referring SOJA he said Uiat 
now there was a talk about the ''teeth'* being pulled out of it 
142 
but he was not aware of arqr "teeth" in the SGUA plan. 
Xhalles remarks gave an illusion to i^ acfser and the 
entire Arab wosld regarding the U«S« MiddJ^ i Eastern policy* 
140* Ibid,, p.286* 
141 • Ibid^< p*272** see also JUenozowski* oc>« cit«« p«624 
142. :;<»# York XiM»f^ (October 3« 1956}« p*&. see also Finer« 
0P| cit*« pp*288«>293.^ and Robert Stesihsns* op, cit.. 
I'iti 
on October S« the S«eurlty Council rost; to debata on 
th8 oif^lalnts nade h^ Britain* rrance aad Egypt* After 
public debatea on the Suess canal issue the Council went 
into a aeoret aeasion with the oonflioting parties. As a 
result* a revised Anglo-French resolution txtok shape* 
The £gyptian attitude at Uew York was mild* president 
Hasser vas broim^t unJer strong pressure* "from his friends 
and s«^porters as well as soma ecooonie pr«>ssure from hlQ 
0|^onents# to amkm a ^xqproiBise settlements"* ' «g^ptiai. 
GovernEDont aocpeted the first part of the /oiglo-French re-
solution consisting of liix Principles" to gov^ ern the co* 
qperation of the Canal* 
These werst 
1* There should be free and open transit through the 
Canal without discrimination! 
2* The sovereignty of sgypt should be respectedi 
3* The operation of the Canal should be insulated 
from the polities of ai^ countryt 
4* The manner of fixing tolls and charges should 
be doeided by agreement between £gypt and the 
usersI 
5* A fair proportion of the dues shuuld im ailoted 
to develo^ scienti 
6* In case of disputes* unresolved affairs between 
the Sues Canal Company and the c^ gyptian Govern-
mant should be settled by arbitration«^^^ 
141* acdoert ^ Stephens* op* cit.# p*221* 
144* Year Bo^ k^ of Uli i 1956* op* cit.* p*2a, 
14-; 
Thttse pKLnaLpXma were approvod unanimously on October 13 
%fh«n the soourity CuuneiX iMt in a open oassion again* The 
second part o£ the resolution endorsing int;crn<itional con* 
trol« the London pXan« and iXHiA was not accioptablo to Kgypt* 
It was voted £or by i axistraiia^  Beigiuia* China* Cuba« France* 
Zran* Pern* the United Kingdom^ and the United States. The 
14 S 
Soviet Union ai^ Yugoslavia voted against it* i^ a result 
c£ Soviet veto the Anglo«-Fren<^ resolution was lost* DYJLLIOS 
and ffenun with Haamarskjold* tlie secretary General o£ the 
United nations* again tried to keep the cxisis away from 
anglo^French foroo* The parties wore made t4> agree to r»» 
suae negotiations in Genova on October 29* 1956* But the 
latter events proved that it was the end oi the peaceful 
145* Ibia*. p.23* 
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£v«r s ioee the exeation of Zar«ail« iwr n i la t ions with 
n«ighlx>u]riiig Arab eountxXos jnuaainod tmxmo^ Dcispitet the 
Armistic AgreoABiits of 1949# mmocous Incidents erupted 
•long the dcuKtaroatod l ines* l^ia Arab eountricis iMd never 
reeoosi led thMiselires t o the exi^tenoe of the Jewish state* 
They were humiliated in the Palest ine war of 1948 and did 
not ceeover fron t l i i s shock* Ttm tragic problcmi of Arab r e -
fugees and the stut^Mrn at t i tude of Israel in tens i f i ed thoir 
hatred against the JeM»* AS a result* violati.ons of armistice 
agreements httemm frequent and were being eofimiitted Isy both s i d e s . 
During the {Missa^e of t ine serious differences between Israe l and 
the Arab countries grew whi<^ resulted into ttio majur clashes 
imrolvii^ force* I s r a e l ' s reprisal raids soon took the 
forms of Planned n i l i t a r y «;rtions against the /orab 
1* Henry Cat tan* Palest ine and intemationfltl iiaw t The 
countries, /ijnong such rctJLds* (untlll 1955)# £our had beon 
coxisidered as the major military operations* and wero save* 
rely condensed by tho United Nations, Tn^&o included the 
siads o£ aibya (1953)« liiUiaiin (1954), t/ie Lake Xiioeirlas 
and Gaza (1955) • prior to the Gaaa episode "there had boun 
2 
fewer incidents between Israel ana £gypt than l>etweM»n Israel 
and Syria and Jordan•" The Gaza raid put B^ iypt anu Israel 
on a collision couucse, As a response, Nasuer decided to 
train his consnandos, called fedayeen, for i:he guerrilla-
type repsisals against the Israel. 
Israel's raids on Gaza strip was pro(no1;eu by a ntuiiber 
of factors "which had nothing to do with tlie border citua-
4 
tion**. As a matter of fact Egypt *s policies and attitude 
distiirbed Isr^sl more than the policies of on;^  other /urabs 
states. Following the war of 1948, the i:.gyptian Govorrunent, 
adhcnsing to the general iurab econcMnic boy<x>tt of the jcRirish 
State, barred the Sues; Canal to Israeli shjlpping and cargoes. 
These restrictions, uespitc the arraiatices of 1949, did not 
relsx, forcing Israel to vise the long route around the Cape. 
Hore over, Egyptian Oovornment started visiting and serching 
all ships passing through the Canal suspec1;eu of transporting 
2. Georgiana G. Stevens, (ed.). The United states /md The 
Middle l^ ast, (i4ew Jersey, 1964^, pp«124»1^6«, see also 
Henry Cattan, op«cit«, pp«120»121. 
3. Guy wint £< Peter Calvocoressi, Middle liKiSt crisis, 
(Aylesbury, 1957), p«58.. For details sou Fred j. 
Khouri, T>Ma AraJjwTaraftij Djlarama, ed, Ilnd., (:«ow 
York, 1976), ppr20l,li5-lii4, 106-187, l«o-l89. 
4. Fred J« Khouci, The Ar.Jb»lsraeli DiX&miniis ed, lind., 
(iiew York, 1976), p.200. 
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goods to Israel. On Februar:^' 6, 1950# a royal decree listed 
those Lismas which would be considered cont:raband o£ war and 
thus liable to seizurs ay the Egyptian autiiiorities* when 
found on neutral ships going through the Suez Canal. Israeli 
ships were subject to confiscation if they entered Egypt's 
5 
territorial water* Sgypt Justified her actioa on variotJis 
grounds, it was argued that the armistice agreement was not 
yet a peace treaty* it only suspended the war and therefore 
the state of belligerency still continxied* Thus, as long as 
this situation prevailed* £gypti was entitled to exercise 
the rights of a belligerent* Egyptian Oovernment alleged that 
Israel repeatedly violated the armistice by expelling peace-
ful Arab populations across the Egyptian broder* by raiding 
certain localities in the neutral frontier zone* anu by ille-
gally attacking Egyptian territory. In her self defense 
Egypt gave an analogy of the Allied practices in the First 
7 
and Second World Wars. Egypt claimed that both the UN 
Charter and Article 10 of the 1868 convention provided her 
such a right to prevent Israeli ships from using either the 
Suez Canal or the Gulf of Aqaba which if not checked night 
5. George Lenczowski* The Middle East in World Affairs* 
ttd. Illrd.* (liondon* 1962)* pp. 615-619. See also 
Khouri* OD.cit.* p.205 & 209, 
6. Ibid.* p.618. 
7. sami Hadawi* The Middle Bast Reality t Between war and 
peace* (Dallas* Texas* n*d.}* p.86.*''see Robert R. Bfowie* 
Suez t 1956* (London* 1974)* p.5.* Khouri* op. cit.* p.206, 
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endanger her national security. 
On the other hancU "Israel had repeatedly denounced 
the closing of the S\iez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba as il-* 
legal", it claimed the right to use the Canal uder the 1888 
Convention* and the Oulf xmder general international law« 
and asserted that the armistic ended any rights of belli-
9 
gesency for £gypt". On July, 12, 1951, Israel brought a 
casplaint against Egypt before the United ].v}ations Security 
Council. In response to Israel's petition,, tae Secutity 
Council adopted a resolution on September 1, 1951, direct-
ing Egypt to cease its interference with tlie canal, Dis-
pite this resolution Egypt continued to ia^ pose its restric-
tion on Israeli and neutral shipping. In 1954 this issue 
was again brought to the attention of the United i^ations. 
The Soviet Union which by now had abandone<d ita policy of 
neutrality in the Arab-Israeli conflict, vetoed the iiecu-
rity Council resolution, on September 2a, 1954, isreiQl 
tried to test the blocked by sending her merchant vessel 
•Bat Galim* through the Canal via the Suez Gulf, The Ggyptian 
authorit4.es seised the ship and detained her crew pro rr;p t y 
Israeli Government lodged a strong protest with the .security 
•• See Khouri, op.cit., pp.205-206,, JL.enc30wski, op. cit., 
pp. 617-618. 
9, Robert tt, Bowie, Suez - 1956, (London, 1974), pp.54-55. 
10. U.N. Document S/2298/Rev.l. 
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Council on ;^pteii&>Br 29, 1954, ^\£tor a few nkjnths 
£iirot the crev; fcnd thon the sh ip VA^ rc i c l e - i - e u , -^ut tine 
QCizxjucQ ravooled t h a t iigypt would not reldu,; iicr i -e^vxict ive 
raoasuroa with re spoc t t o oaritlraQ trg»f£ic witii oii eiiOira .^ 
ii^conotnic £>oyeott« blooXacie of the Sue:^ Canal anu the 
S t r a i t s o£ Tiran h i t I s r a e l i s economy oadl.^, /^port from 
econcxnic s t r a i n , there were other cieveloptaonts which h<id 
d uisturtsing e f i l ec t on l a r o u l i p o l i t i c s . A:Eter the ;;^ ues 
Ciinal 3^diQ Agreement i n 1954, I s r a e l f e l t insecure "because 
the tniJdle ii^st was aaprivca of the j?h/sic>aLl presence of a 
\ijQiJtAsrn power round aix>ut i t s borders , expoaing i t t o the 
12 
wrath of thu <\rabs". The formation of Bagdad pac t on 
Fcbruori 24, 19^S, brought iruq c l o s e r t o the w e s t . I s r a e l 
viewed tlm c l o s o n e s s of any Arab country i^ith the wec.t dan-
13 g<2rou:3 t o i t s de;Jting. rhroo days a f t e r tite formation of 
3agdaci p a c t , l£>racli ornied forcea at tackea Egyptian mil itary' 
i n s t a l l a t i o n s i n tbe Gaza s t r i p , k i l l i n g 38 and wounding 31 
14 
^9yptians* Zt was purely a provocat ive <act in order t o 
craatc nuisai;co t o d i v e r t the a t t e n t i o n of b ig powers;. The 
t r a g i d i c i n c i d e n t of Gasa coc^^l lcd Egypt t o obta in fore ign 
1 1 . KesBinq's Contemporary i'yc'chives^ (April 23-30 , 1955) , 
p . I 4 i 5 9 . See a l s o KhottCi^ op . c i t . > pp .207-200 . 
1 2 . iiikshoy C. C h a t t e r j i , Muddle of the iii^idlc East^ V o l . i l . , 
(Wew ivclhi , 1973) , p .139 , 
1 3 . liencsowski, opy c i t . « p . 4 2 3 . , and iihouci, op . c i t . « p . 2 0 1 . 
14 . ^ e e s i o g , (Apri l 23 -30 , 1955) , p»14157. 
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ams to de«l with Israel's wall tralnod ami better equiped 
art^« Egypt preferred to seek arms frcmi tim west. Failing 
in that attoispt it turned to the C^nmuni^t bloc and bo£oro 
the end o£ 1955 concluded a deal with Cseoi^ toslovakia. It 
was 8@on by Israel as upsetting its balancct of power in 
the region. Aftor the Gaza Raid Jaigypt adopluad a poliCj^  of 
reprisal* As a result* the frequency and Intensity of £od-
ayeen raids against the Israeli borders in(:ruasi3a« This mat* 
ter was again and again brought to the attcmtion of the Uni» 
ted Nations* but neither the wacnXngs of tl>e Security Council 
nor the Truce Coarais^ion proved effective to stop Egypt's 
hostile actions against Israel* in octobor 19S5 i^ g^ pt Cun-
eluded defence agreeioonto with ^yria and ;[«<iudi /urauia ana 
in April 19S6 a railitary pact v/as signed ocitween x^ v^^ypt* 
IS 
K>audi Arabia anu the Yemen. These agreements were looked 
upon by isr^K^l as £gipt*s railitary p r e p a r i t i o n s t o rccon^iur 
the Jweish t e r r i t o r i ' . l iouaor's growing popiilaritv uiK>n3 tiie 
Arab ana Afro-Asian counvries a f t e r the Bandung Corifcroace 
in ^ r i l * 1955* c o n s t i t u t e d a p o t e n t i a l ianger t o i . r o c l . 
The attitxKle of the major western poi'^era eii£>eciaii„ :;,rit-^in 
and ti-ie United S t a t e s was not c l e a r c u t . Tliey had ch jied 
Arabs in 1947 and now they ware t ry ing t o balm t h e i r woun ir:.. 
15. The Hjudle ^a^ t £t :iorth Africa i l9<i9'^'1Q» UuruiJu 
Publ ica t ions* bonoon}* p«792. 
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ColXiaoioo of laxtmlm Fr»pce and 
arxtalni 
In this back ground* the out break o£ the Algerian 
16 
rebellion in t'iovmnber 1954« provided an opportunity to 
Israel to exploit Ijasser-phobia o£ the Frenc|i Oovernt. 
Their Soh(»fns workcM^  out# and they succeeded inuatabliohing 
a close liaison with the French Qovernmant. In 1954 a 
Franco^lsraeli arms doal was concluded in contravention 
17 
o£ the Tripartite Declaration of 1950* JE'rance hod viow~ 
ed Israel's help valuable in liquidating li<asser« aa he was 
the aiain cause of her troubles in North Africa, Israel^ on 
the other hand sow France as her permanent ally vtrho would 
provide moral as v/ell as raatfc^srial support in her aoecis. 
After the conclusion of the £gypto<i>Soviet arras deals in 
Ifi Septeodser 1955« Israel had becocne more alarmed than ever 
To counter it# Israel had made as second big arms deal with 
Fr<unoe in Novembor« 1955 • By 1956« France l^ ecame the strong-
est political supporter of Israel in the united nations and 
her major supplier of the mo^ t^ auvanced military weapons* 
including fighter plans and tanks* Nikshoy C, ChatterJi 
had observed I 
officially* France agreed to sell a limitaed 
number of war planes to Israel but these had 
a tendency to nultiply like rabbits when they 
reached Israel*^' 
16* For details see K«C« Chatterji* OP. cit.« px^.207-236. 
See also R,R. Bowie* op. cit.« p«26. 
"^^ ^ 3[bid.^  p*136,* aee also Robert Stephen^}* Nasaer< 
(Aylesbury* 1971}* pp. 157 u 169, 
16, Keesinq, (October 1-8* 1955)* p.l4449. 
19* lj,C. ca^atterji* 90 . cit>« p . 131, 
After llasser n«itionallased the Suez C«un«U. Coo^any on 
July 264^  1956 the major western governments^ Ijegajn to deve* 
lop a strong hostility against hJUn* France ana Israel had 
l^ een collaborating against i;asser from 19S4« Tne year 1956 
had provided th«n a rare opportunity which they did not 
want to mlss« 3oth France and Israel knew thw.t tiie jrltish 
Oovemmsnt was In favour of action against 'Sgypt but she 
was hesitant due tw the US Ofp>po8ltlon« In parllarasnt the 
20 Labor party also op^ x>sod the use of force against ii^ gypt. 
Frcxn tl^ beginning of the Suez Crisis* France was try-
ing to pursuade Britain to act Independently without giving 
much Weight to Dulles* e£forts« Regarding ;SCUA» the French 
Foreign Hlnlster« Christian Pineau« had said that it was 
merely a device of postponement, not a genuine attea|j>t to 
21 find a settlement. But — Britain was not yet rcau^ to 
move without US backing or at least of her aoquluscence* 
After the failure of the ii^ glo«>Fre(K;h rei:>olutlun U. the 
Security Council Brltli^ a attitude had been changed* At 
this moment Britain decided to follow tlM French lead to-
wards Indepont action• The British and French leaders were 
not happy with the out come of the »^ecurity Council procod-
ing8« They concluded that the six prlnclpitls coulu not be 
20* For details See Bowio« op» cit«# pp«24*25. 
21. Hisrman Finer* Dulles over Suez (i.ondon* 1964}* p«262. 
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regarded «is a serious oonaitioent* Thus in the mici octol:}er, 
both Qritein and France were ready to intoirvene railitarily 
for the aaaertion o£ «^at tl>ey though to l>& their rights in 
the S\Mz Canal Coiqpany* 
22 Since August 1956^ the Director Gkm^ral of the Israeli 
Defence Ministery* Shimon Peres, had beon in close contact 
with Fren<^ military and defence officials. While the nego-
tiations for a peace ful solution were going on between the 
contending parties, the Sirench Defense Minister, Maurice 
Bourges Hanoury, visited Israel to seek hur cooperation 
in the military action which his governomtn was planning 
23 
against £gypt* The French national interest was focussed 
on the cfvux throw of iJasser, adCter the eapty hanaed return 
24 
of Pineau frc»n Cairo in March, 1956, ici tlno Icujt v;e@x of 
Septeodber, tine Israeli prime Minister, Ben Gurion, informed 
Fran<» that Israel would participate in a joint <;^ }eration. 
French paid the cost of Israel's cooperation in the form 
of heavy military equipment* In order to materialise their 
plan, a direct radio conr^action was installed between the 
Military of Defense in Paris and Tel Aviv* on ucto£>cr 10 
22* Erskino B* Childers, The Road to auea> (Jbonaon, 1962), 
p*227.. See also Robert Stephens* liasser* (Alosbury, 
1971), pg* 21S»216* 
23. Herman Finer, op* cit** p* 328. 
24. cauiders, op* cit** p*173* See also Finer op. cit*. 
pp* 41-42* 
25. Herman Finer, op. cit., p.329. 
15 
2956« France aod zaz9MX reached a formal agroaineiit to 
make war against i^ gypt in collaboration* 
France wa« leaat concerned about her position among 
the JUrelMi as Algeria had already eroded it. But this was 
not true in case of Britain. Britain needed the friendship 
of Iraq and Jordan to maintain her influ&mx: in the region 
The Conservotive Govormaonts Icnew this fad; very well that 
"Ijasser's enonies condone a direct I3ritish French attack on 
hia« but they could hardly foregive Britain for Joirminy 
forces with Israel".^'^ By this time Britain had become 
aware of the Franco->lsraeli*collaboration« But yet she 
was bound to be hesitant about collusion witii Israel, on 
October 11« Israel had launched a severe reprisal raia on 
Jordan at Ualqilya which was strongly critlciaed by the 
28 British Oovemment, Jordan at once appealed for help 
from £gypt# Iran and Britain %^ iich had «i defensive agree* 
roent with the former, oy this act Israel intei^ ded to divert 
the attention of presioent i^ asser from Israel's plans to 
attack £gypt* It was also presumed that jritish Government 
to avoid an uneasy situation* would cooperate Israel in 
her military action against Egypt. Israel tried to extract 
26« Quoted in Robert Stephens, sasser i A political 
Bioqjraph^ -^  (Alosbury, 1971} # p*216. 
27. a.H. Bowie* op« cit.# p.57. 
28. Forroan Finer* op« cit.. pp«308»327»332. See also Bowie* 
aa* cit.. 
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th« grsatost poeulblo benefits from thiJB nuique situation 
created Iqf Egypt's nationalization o£ the .Suez Canal • 
Xsroel was determined to achicnro a number o£ objectives 
besides destroying fedayeen bases and Egyptian military 
in^itallations* Sho hc^ed to force an end o£ the Ar^Ab eco-
nomic boycott* and opening of both <the Swsz Canal and the 
Oulf of Aqaba to her ahXppLagt <u:^  the mtgotiatioiiS of a 
29 peace settlement with £gypt on Israel's diistatod torir^ s. 
After the failure on the third x«ondon Confere^ico, 
tira French «Bi£»s^ ries« Albert Gassier* Hiniatcr o£ itobour 
and acting Foreign Minister in Pineau's abi$ence at the 
United tMtions* ana ciieneral Maurice Chelle* Deputy Chief 
of Staff* went to London on October 14* and informexi inden 
about the Israeli plan to attacic Kgypt with the co-opera-
tion of France* un October 16* 1956* Lloyod and Lden 
flew to Paris and had a long and secret discussion with 
(toilet and Pinoau* There had boon much susi^ecion and 
specutation about this meeting* It was alleged that at 
this meeting scxne form of collusion was ararongud bringing 
Britain into the MM^ord already existed between Xrance and 
Israel*^ Although both Britain and France denied this 
29* Fred J* Khouri* op. cit** p*214* 
30* Robert Stephens* OP. cit*« p*217* 
31* Wint & Calvocoressi* op. cit*^ p*7&.* i>oe also Fli^r* 
OP* cit.« pp.325-327* 
32* Finer* op* cit** pp*325-326 &i 347* 
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olldgatlon but the latter developments revoAled the facta. 
Soon after his retturn from Paris Eden made certain changes 
in hia Cabinet* "Chief among them was the isiovo of oir wciltor-
Honckton from the Ministry of £>efence to tlie rolativoly obs-
33 
ctire post of pt^roaster General"* The timj.ngs and the stages 
of assault >sre to be fixed in the next meetings* Bon Gurion 
himself« acaoa|;>anicd by Moahe Uayan^ Israeli Chief of staffs 
arrived in France on (October 22« to conaud; the final nego* 
tiation with MoXlet and pii^au* on the nejct day British 
Foreign secretary« Selwyn X<loy4 came from i^ n^ uon to take 
part in the negotiations^ along with a sonJLor Foreigxi 
office official* Patrick Dean* A Secret meietiag between 
the officials of France* Israel and Britain was held in 
Sevres, which continued till October 24*In this muuting 
they agreed on plans and roles in the coming Israeli attack 
on Egypt on October 29* Finally* the agre<unent was signed 
by Ben Gurion* pineau* and patrik Dean on October 25* 1956. 
3S 
on octc^ ser 21* the Jordanian elect:Lon took place* 
which brcMight U ^ pro-Nasoer forces in powtsr* \^s a result 
on October 2S a joint Egyptian* Syrian Jordanian military 
command was announced* v;ith the Egyptian C^xonander in Chief 
33* wint & Calvocora^^si* OP* cit** p*7d*« >^ee Finer oo* cit.« 
p*333* 
34* See Rc^ sert Stephens* opp clt^* pp*222** H.ii* Bowio* op*cit.< 
p*59** Herman Finer* op* cit** p*329. 
35* Finer* OP* cit»* p*34&* 
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to b9 its hood If tiMure were any major tlghtLng with 
Israel, This move v>*o expXoitod by Israel in justifying 
her assault agaim^t £g:^^t« 
I s r ^ l was further encuragea bj^  on imbernationdi situa-
tion favourable to her* The soviet Union got involvoci with 
Hungary and p«lan4« on October 19# tti^ Pol<,s had forced the 
Soviat Marshall General Aokossousky out of the ^^ oli^ ;!^  Com* 
munlst party's Politbaro« had brought back Goimili.a oti* th@ 
head of the party. They ignoreu ^ovoit darning to ^lu^re^s 
their revolt by force, on October -i.<^ the iiunyorians revolt* 
36 
ed against Soviet domination followiny the uxan^le o£ Poland. 
ThiB diversion of Soviet's attention from tlie i-Liddlo i:ast to 
the Eastern Europe providmi a golden p^>on;unity to Britain 
France and Israel. Those events had disturbing effects on 
the United States. And more over at a time wlien ^residential 
election was due with in few days. As the polling date of 
the US presidential election drow nearer^ <i coi»nunic<2tion 
gape betiraen ^^jmerica c^ nd the three coiin^ ri»£i directly in« 
volved in the Suez Crisis had becoma apparont. It wuii alsc 
believed that this situation oi:fered Den-Gurion a hope that 
president £isen hower# a candidate for election* would dare 
to risk antagonizing Jewish voter oy oppos;Lnj Israel *ts invasion. 
36. R.R. Bowie* OP. cit.. p. 59., See also i'iner, oy. Git.» 
pp. 337-338. 
16C 
By tills tJUaa int«XllgeiicMi dep^rtmantci o£ USA and 
USSR wttrnod thttlr KmBprnotly Qoverxinients eOxiut the Tripar* 
37 
t i t s agxwmsnt i#tiicti tooli pXae* iMtween October 22 and 23. 
Zn t h i s Gonnectioo Fv»cidtxit £la«n hower ®«nt s^rveral per« 
•onal asssages t o B«Q Ourion asking him to show reistraint 
and warnir)g to use oC farce irtilc^ would aXtlmately dl&turb 
the peace of tiae whole world* "^ ^ 
I s r a e l i lovaslon of ggypt 
Qn October 29# Israel Invaded Egypt* I s r a e l i para* 
troops of the a ir borne brigade wore dros{>ad at tivi eost&rri 
end of the Mltia Fas3« about f o r ^ miles eas t of the south* 
e m end of the Qiaaz canal* At the aaam tlcie* I s r a e l i ground 
forces cros^^ed the frontier Into southern s lna l at throe 
points* They es^tured the Ooza str ip* ejectted the Egyptians 
from the coast of the auif of Aqaba* occt^ided the ^harrael* 
Sheikh facing the s t r a i t of Tlran« sa^ pec^tr^tod deep Into 
the a inal peninsula* Their actions were swift and %iell plan* 
ned* At some key points* such as Abu Agella* ana n l t l a i>a£S£« 
I s r a e l i forces faced strong resistance fotta Egyptians« but 
xaltlraately they had over come with the backing of Franco 
and Britain* 
37* rirair* oo^ clt** pp«342 & 346* 
38* The Times* (JLiondon* October 29* 19S6} •« ;i>eo also 
Finer oo . c i t . * p . 364* 
39* Hugh Thomas* The auea ^iffair* ed* llmU* (^elcloui iiouks* 
1970)* p* 134** see LencssowsKl* oo . cit** p* i>16,* see 
Khourl* oo* clt«* pp*2l5*2la** Wlnt & CalVs:>cure£^sl, 
OP* Pit** pp» 7S*0O*» and see a lso R.a, Bowie, oo. c i t , * 
p* 60* 
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AS aoon ms the nowa of Zaroel'fi military action against 
£:gypt broke out« world opinion bocome «iavct]:su to i s r d o l . Hav-
ing &Qi^a tlM dov«a(tdtin9 eonsoquoncos of tJio aggression^ 
which might be converted into the worid w«ir III, Uie u;u 
Government had becoiaa alert* Abbd Eta&n, I s r a e l i ^unbassa* 
dor to us, expresaed hie ignorance about tite happenings, 
when he was asked by Willien Rountree* thci /assistant iiee-
retary of the United s tates* ini l les smnmoiyi the Bri t i sh 
and Fren<»} charges d* affaires to h i s office* bacauae there 
was then no Br i t i sh AoiMissador in Washington* (the i ir i t i sh 
Aifll>a88ador i»ir Roger Makins had been replti«€2u by the tiew 
Anbassador* 3lx H4urry Cacoia* who ti&A not yet arrivou) 
and Alphand* the French Aiabassador* was out of town* 
malles told them that an is»nediate appeal t o the United 
Stations was nece&sary* Bat Anglo«French charges d* af fa ires 
were unable ^> say any thing without thoir governnents* con* 
s u l t a t i o n s . Winthrop W. Alorich* the U£» Aatbassador to iiri* 
tain« was a lso instructed to discover in tiOiKion what was 
h«9pening to the t4iddle Last* Aldrich could not get an 
os^pointsient witti liloyd as the l a t er was busy in a Cabinet 
meeting* On the mams day Henry Cabot I«odge, tho u«w, AnO a^s* 
sador to United l^ations* wrote a l e t t e r tc tho p » s i d o » t of 
the £»ecurity Council* Cornut Qontillo* req;uei^ting the conv-
40 
ening of the Security Council as soon as possiblo. 
40* Herajan Finer* Op* c^t** pp.353-358* 
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Mean while the US president @ent urgent tm'MStxg&& to the 
British priBte Minister esklng him for 8up^ >ort« The Uw 
Govemraent hod denied any fore knowleugo of pineau's expec-
ted arrival in Xjondon in fev hours to Join in hanuiny over the 
Anglo-French ultiinatum to both Egypt m d l&rael. They 
alleged that the British Goverrsnent ev<jn ciid not hint 
either about the itltimatum or her intention to op>.jos4ii 
42 tho US resolution in the S€Knirity Council, The v^ry 
evening cabot lodg@ hod a laeeting with Sir Pierson i..ixon« 
the British /Wsbassador to the united i^ ations« to discuss 
the proeeedings of the Security Coiuusil regarding the ex-
plosive situation in the middle East* During discussion 
wlMan lodge mentioned auout the Tripartite pact o£ 19SO* 
Dixon proonjty annoimced that "the Tripartite Doclaration 
43 had lost its value and had no current validity"• Dixon 
requested a delay of the Seciucity Council maoting* which 
was not accppted. Although Uioyd succeeded; to got the U^ 
draft resolution modified which had named Israel as an 
"aggressor**• instead* Israel's action was charged as a 
44 
"violation of the anaistic agreements". 
The Security Council met on October ao« 195(>« to 
41. Ibid.* p. 359. 
42 • £SMt.« PP» 270. 383., see also Am^ ricain foreiyo Policy t 
Current Documents t i956 (iJej^ artment of state publicat-
ion (Washington. D.C.« 1936}« p. 649. 
43. Ibid.* p. 360. 
44. Ibid., p. 367. 
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cpnsider tho US reaolution introduced by Monr^ Caoot 
XtOdge. This resolution (S/3710) CUilled \apon Zsr«iel and 
£gypt imaediateXy to o»««« fire; eaXlod us.*on zsraei iamo* 
diateiy to withdraw its snaid forces l?ohir.id th& ostabXishod 
«unni@tlcd lines f and called upon all tmeta&xs to refrain 
from the use of force or threat of force in the area in 
any manner inconsistant with the purpose of tha United 
^^ ationsy to assist the United Nation in er.suri.ny t)^ in-
tegrity of the armistice agreementsi and to refrain from 
giving any miXitary* economic or financial osistonce to 
Israel so long as it had iK)t con^lied with this resolu-
tion* The us draft resolution was subiaittcd and put to 
vote at the 749th meeting of the Security Council, aeven 
nations ^^ted in favour of the resolution* These includedt 
China« Cuba« lran« peru« the Soviet Union; the United states 
and Yugoslavia, Australia and Belgium abstained from voting* 
45 
France and Britain voted against it* Since the /uigio-Frencit 
votes operated as a veto the resolution was Xo£>t. To Justi-
fy their action they declar»^ d that they could not support 
a resolution that condeioed Israel only* They even tried 
to Justy Israel's action. 
For Soveit Union it was a rare ^portunity to oppose 
Britain and France with the cooper«ition of the United states. 
45 * American Foreign Pft^ icv » Current Documents i 19S6* 
(l>^ »artmsnt of state PuhXic^^tions t Washington* D.C., 
1959). p«647* 
Following ths us lead* thm 3ovelt representative* sobolev* 
on behalf of his govenvMitt presented a siiqple ca«use fire 
reaolution in the security Council iirtiioh w&s alao vetoed 
by aritain and France* 
The French repreeuntative had definit instructions 
from his governraant to veto the resolutions condemning 
Israel* France had soma time before promised Israel th€» 
uae of the veto* if neoessarjr* The British Cvovernment* 
for the saJce of allied solidarity* (which was most requi« 
red after the us opposition) was bound to follow the French 
suit* ^ir Pierson iUixon had given a nurabux of arguments in 
justifing his government action in the Security Council* 
The Egyptian spoksman* C^ nar I.outf i* demanded in the 
Council thmt Israel be bran<^ ted as an ^ aggressor*. He also 
demanded the expulsion of Israel fror:i the ux^ * It wa£ the 
dmaand which Russia too had asleed for* 
Security Council permitted Abba«»i^an to >9ive his .juvern* 
ment*s version regarding Israel*8 military actions against 
£gypt* £ban detailed the wrongs comiitted by i^ gypt a£^<-i even 
47 
exaggerated. 
l^ Mi AnglQ«»Fg»nGh Ultimatum 
Mean %#hile« n o l l e t and pineau arrived in Lon-^ un to 
AQ 
dicuss tim next move (alre^^ay decided) with ciden. 
46* Finer* op* cit»* p*382, 
*^* :p3id.* s^«3&8«359* 
lub 
on October 30# while th« £ittcurity Council meeting to 
consider the Middio East Crisis was going on« the ^ mglo* 
French Ooverninents issued their preparou ultim<ituia to 
XsraeX and Egypt desianding the cassation o£ th@ nostilitie£i« 
the withdrawal of their £oro9S to a aistarcc o£ t&n miles 
from the Sues Canal and to allow British and !t£GnGh forces 
to stay at the Key points in the canal zonte. They declared 
that they would occupy port Said^ Ismail ia« and ;iue2 by 
force if these <»>nditions were not ra^t with in twelve 
hoiurs. As self appointed guardian of peac»« thoy claimed 
to ijo acting to "separate the belligerents** and ensure 
49 
the Safety and availability of tlie iiuez Canal. Kegardiny 
the Anglo-i#rench ultimatum Childers had written that **it 
seerasd to invite Israel to advance west wurd to wards the 
Canal deeper into the Egyptian territory* before Israel 
SO 
must even cease fire*** George iiencsowshi* anotr^r pru«» 
ninent writer of the Middle Eastern affairs was of the views 
There ultiraatunw if successful, would have 
rewarded the aggressor by conceding to him 
the &till unoccupied areas of the Sinai 
Peninsula upto ten miles from the Canal 
while penalising the victim of aggression 
by diemkading total evacuation of ^gyptiag 
troops to the western side of the Canal.^^ 
49* liem;aowski« oi>« cit.# p«S18*« see also wint «aid 
Calvocoressi« op. cit.« p,80# 
50. jsrskinne B. Childers, The Road toques t A ^P*^'^' of 
Western Arab Relations^ (Loncton, 1962)7 p. 2S0« 
51, Lencsowski, op« cit«* p»516« 
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The Sovi«t c®pr<Mieotative« Arkady So^olev« used thia 
new« in JttStl£leation of his all»gatioo that "Israel roust 
hAVQ beea Baaoiaagod to att*ck by thosQ aggre^ /Sive oriel® 
who wore trying to find sons protoxt to move thair foroos 
into tho Middle l^ ast* 
Qn October 31* while spaeking in thct House of Coacfona, 
ieden cleined tiw right for Britain to discharge its "national 
duty" without necesserily waiting for the agreemeint o£ the 
53 United State* Zn the ease mseting& Lloyd had gone furth^ ar 
oy referring the Article 51 of the XjU charter which ,:>rovid&d 
for t^ io right of 5elf«defens«« He argued that self-defenoe 
"undoubt<Klly incli^iNl a situation where the lives of the 
State's nationals abroad are in iamioent danger". nt 
this issue House of Coamons debated and voted on tha Oovorn* 
nent Policy* Majority sv^ pported £den*s stanu* zn^:;ational 
SS 
Asseadaly the result was more encouraging* 
an the sane day presi^nt Eisen howar spoke on tele-
vision and radio on the Middle «:astern situ<;itlon* In his 
addreeshe expressed the gocave concern of the U4> guvernmunt 
over the turn of events* He made it clear that the Ui> Gover-
ment was not consulted in any way about any phase of the 
Angloi^rench action* He disclosed his government policy 
52* riner« 00^ c i t . « p*368* 
53* Ifie ii.oonoroifit# (London* i^ovesiber 10« 1956}« p* 4B2», 
The Tixies of India* (New uelhi« novenber 1« 1956;^  
54* aitoted in Finer* op* cit** p*379* 
5S* The VJorld Today* Vol*12. i4o*2*, (Royal Ins t i tu te of 
Internation Affairs 1 Decentber 1956}* p.481. 
i:^/ 
eg 
in the cmstmat NidaXe ^ast crisis* He &ent «i nuinL>ar 
of massitgoB to Kdctn thrcmgh different choitnoXs warning 
hiJB «bout the possibility of Russian invoiv&niBnt* U::;' 
warnijogs jptsaved loss sffectivs in case uf iiiitoin and 
France* 
ioiiait Bqypt* 
It was a knotm fact (i><3eQ also Knew, it) tiiat uasser 
would not allow stationing of aritish and French troops 
at the Sues Canal* Before tho e.tpiry of dctad litm i^ gypt*s 
reply was conveyed to british ^^ o^ assaltor* 5ir Hui^hr^-
Trevelyian* in Cairo* Egypt had rejected ttm ultiB)atum* 
Israel K^;o@pted it un the conditon that g^y^ t^ accux^ t it 
as well* General Day an iieeorded in his aiari&si 
rhe ultimatuiB does not worry Israel^ we ar«i> 
not with in ten miles of the Canal and we 
have neither interest nor plans to cotac 
closer to it ••• It is clear that the whole 
purpose of the ultimatura is to give tho Bri* 
tish aj3d French govemenints a pretimt to 
ctt^ ture the canal zone by military force^ 
donbtless the l^ gyptians will not wiilinyly 
agree*'® 
British Oovernnent had warned Ckineral Charles f • Keightiey* 
Conmander in Chief of the allied forces in the c^^ration in 
56* For the Text of PresiOent £;i&t>nhoiwer ^ ipeoch see Current 
DocuwsntSi 19S6* oa* cit** pp*648«650*« The Hundustan 
Tinas* Olew *^lhi* J^}oveist»er» I, 1956). 
S7* The World Today « op* cit*t pp* 481-402, 
58* Quoted in Am^»^» Bindra« auea ThrogBJoajs t Causes a»u 
prospects* (i>elhi, 1969)* p*43* 
loS 
59 Egypt* in anticipation. At tho expiration o£ twelve 
hours Anglo-French IXNnbers l>dgan attacking post ^aid and 
other i;;gyptian air £ieldfi on October 31.^ It was preporo* 
tory to the lending of French and British troops in tlvi 
Canal Zone* Their military <^ ;>eration against &g:^ 'pt conti-
nued till tiov^v^,6 in spite of the repeated requests o£ 
the United Nations to cease fire« 
The Egyptians had been tajcen oy surprise. At the time« 
the Israelis invaded Sinai« Egyptian Cocwnander in Chief, 
OexKsral Amer* was awa;;^  on a visit to ^^ yria ana Jordan to 
discuss ahout the joint comsand. AS a matter of tact, 
for many hourse after the initial asaault l^-gj^pt wat; un-
able to con^rehend its true nature onu extent, i^ asscr was 
aware of the Anglo^^Fronch threat, but tm was totally ignor-
ant of their collaboration with Israel. Ha realised th<a 
seriousness of the Israeli invasion only when /^ n^ iu-i roncn 
air operations began against i^ gypt. I^ ow a^ o^rt frotn Israel 
he had to face two major European powers with vastly axxpO" 
rior forces. Knowing the weaknesses of th^ k.yyptian forces 
and disoppointed by the la<:k of the Russian practical adsis< 
tance t^ asser accepted the reality. Aftex the <4nglo-French 
59. Finer, 90. cit., p.304. 
60. The world Today. <»>. cit., p. 482.,see also Vh& aiaaie 
East and Korth Aigrica t 1982-1983 (auropa publications, 
X,ondon, 1983)« p.329. 
61. Robert ^tephenss, QD. cit., p.227. 
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attack he ordered a general with drawal of all Egyptian 
forces frc»B Sinai and Concentrated them over the main 
stratigic centers. He thought that if any territory had 
to be lost It was better it should be the en5)ty Sinai 
Desert, than any of the rest of Egypt, especially the 
Delta iuid the Suez Canal Zone. The forces in the Gaza 
strip and Sharmel-Sheikh were also told to surrender at 
a suitable inon^ nt to avoid further casualties. As a reta-
liatory act, on November 1, Egypt broke off diplomatic relat-
ions with British and Prance, Seized their properties and 
blocked the Suez Canal by sinking the ships and demolish-
63 ing the bridges. 
By November 3 the task of Israeli forces had been 
completed, Israel had got more area than it had planed 
to capture, Israelis were not primarily concerned with 
the Canal. Their main interest lay in con5>leting their 
own war aims^ tht- most in^ortant of which was to gain 
64 
control over Sharmel Sheikh aiid the Straits of Tiran, 
before international pressure forced Israel to accept 
a cease firtS.Now they were in a safe position. Israel 
might accept the cease fire order at any nK?raent. Her 
speedy victory had made Britain and Frfjnce distrubed 
^2« Ibid,, pp.230-231., see also Calvocoressi, op. cit«, 
p.81,, and Hugh Thomas, op, cit., pp,143-144. 
63. I,enczowski, op. cit., p.517., The World Today, op. cit., 
p.483,, The Hindxistan Times, (November 2, 1956). 
64. Moshe Dayan, Story of My Life, (London, 1976), p.152. 
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although t)wy tlMflsmvlvvs %fera responsible for it* After 
achieving her goals Zsrael was no more inte rested to con* 
tinue hostilities* Yaking the note of the con^lex situa-
tion the Anglo-iJ'renf^  Ooverxsients isaude some changc^ a in 
their original plannings« ' At the s£tiae tine they pre-
ssurized Israel not to accept cease fire until the Anglo* 
French landing in S^ orpt* 
on Novenber S# Aiiglo«FMineh paratroops and sea boriic 
forces laiKled in Port Said luaA port Fuad* port Fuaa was 
surrendered on the same 4ay« Eattlc in port :.aia woa con* 
tinued in tfhich the Egyptian amy was supported by a consi-
derable nisober of arraed civilians* However* Franco*British 
forces over come the Egyptian resistanco and on i<oveinber 6 
Port amid was coopletely in their handu* after capturing 
Port Said the allied forces began to advance down the 
Canal towards Ismailia and Suez* Britain ana Froncti 
intended to ospttire the ifhole of the Canal before the 
United l^ ationc and the United ;L>tatos could end ttieir 
lailitary action* They failed to achive this end. uy 
the tixm they reached JB;l«Cap« a village* twenty five 
miles further \tp the Canal* they hau to acoept* the UM 
cease fire* Hollet wanted to proceed* He asked £aen 
65* E*3, Childers* op* cit»* p*2S7* 
66. Robert Stephens* oo. cit.* pp*234*235.* wint u 
Calvocressi* op* cit»* PP*81*82** Finer* op* cit.« 
p*414* 
j.71 
t o be tenacioua for a{x>thsr few hours so t^ ti^ it thair forces 
67 
could reach the Suea* ntey need no laore than twonty four 
hours to aGcm>y the idiole canaX* But £d©n was uivier yre«tt 
strain* he could not go further* In parliament im^ outside 
JLabour leaders continuously attac>ce4 his Govotxutvdnt fur vio* 
la t ing the U«N, Chart«^r# jeopardising th@ Amsrican a l l iance 
and the Ooaaon %fealth« colluding with Zsrael« anu deceiving 
parliananttt Sven h i s own party mmiwcs, who w<£re i n i t i a l l y 
in favour of action* had now become c r i t i c a l to his p o l i -
c i e s* liden*8 two loyal associates* s i r Anthony«-:^utting« 
Minister of s t a t e in Foreign Affairs* anu ^iir Edward iiioi'le* 
£concM»ic ^»ecretary t o the Treasury* had resigned from their 
posts in protest in between l^ oveodaer 3 andi 5 respectively* 
In h is l e t t e r to iSden* Nxttting* %i^ )o was representing Britain 
in U*ii«* j u s t i f i e d his action by saying that i t had become 
liqpossible for hin to defend t)M» CiovernnK»rkt*s posit ion at 
a l l as the I s r a e l i invasion and the #uaglo<»FretK:r) att^tcK 
were parts of the sane "nefarious plan" to oei^tro^ ligypt's 
69 
growing strength and newly won independonco* world ox^ i-
nion condenned U*K* FraiK« and Israel for their agyressive 
70 
act in Egypt* Russian warnii^£» and us pres&ure had become 
67* Finer* oo^ cit*# p*429«* iiR, aowie* ot>. c i t . # p.76. 
&&• Ibid*^ pp*423«i»430** Huge TlKtmas* 
Ximei 
la9t 5* 1956). 
69* 13ie iHinuustan TiBieg* (lioveober 4* 19S6) • 
70* The Hindustan Times* (ilovemoec 2* 1956) • 
3«> oP| cit*< pp«l5^<»lS6.# 
' Ii»i4,a* (Noveiaber 2* 19563) .< The Hindustan 
nber 4* 1956) •* TheTi gs* (bondon* 2ioveni-> 
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Intenso dnci above all the oconomlo strain was uijubearable 
to Britain* In those circunistancoa Edon could not coflvly 
with Mollet*& roquost to prolong the fightings, t%tKi on 
tho ot]Mr hand it was in^possibie for Hollet to gu with-
out British Collaboration. 
Peac« MakiULnQ iifforts 
Britain and France used or misused thoir veto power 
against tt^ two re^^olutions submitted by UUA and U6WK in 
Security Council on ootober 30« calling for an immediate 
ceaso fire between Israel and Kgypt* Unable to act effect-
ively due to the Anglo-French opposition* the Gecurit;^ 
Council approved a Yugoslav's proposal to call on iuraergciicy 
session of the General Assei^ly under the "Uniting for peace" 
71 procedure adopted on June 21, 19S0. £»ir pierson ^ixon 
(Britain) and M. Louis de Guiringuaa (France) challungod 
72 
the legality of this resolution but no Jxisidical answor 
was provided to them by aatnfiiarsHjold* 
As soon as tha General Ascendaly neet on r:uVoiik>or I, 
the US Secretary of ^tate« i>ullos« (the i'resident ^iaonnoimt 
asked him personally to go before the Asceinbly to ro^ jre£ient 
the United states) moved a resolution (v'S^ '^ ^^ ) uryinyi an 
71. Current Uwcuraanta t 1956» opj^jcit-, p«6Sl., i:ot Ixurthor 
details see JPiner op. JcXt.* pp«i84U365»# and Robor Jto-
phens« OP. cit«< p«2i9. 
72* The Hindustan Hia&ti, (£«aveinber« 2« 19S€>) • 
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iflva»didte cease £lre# the withdrawiU. o£ Israeli <ind ii:gypt> 
ian forces behind the ocaiistic iines* a general eiabar^ on 
tho entry o£ military goods into the area of hostilities, 
and iiaiMKliate steps to reopen the Canal after a cease £ire* 
The U,4>, draft resolution was sui»Rittea and put to vote at 
the S62d naeting o£ General Assessbly on N^ioveiBber 2, vjver-
wixelining nMi^ ority (64) voted in favour of thA& resolution, 
Britain, France, Israel, Aufttralia, and uev Zealand voted 
against it« Portugal, South Africa, Belgium, Canada, uto£i, 
and t^ te Netherlands abstained from voting. 
2n nis iiitroductory statement Dulles nirrat&d the 
story of Egypt's violt^tions in regards o£ 1688 Convention 
the U*^, Charter and the security Council ro&olution of 
19S1* He saidf 
We are not blind, that VThat has happona 
in the last 3 or 3 days coniea out of a 
nurky backgrouiKi, These provocations, 
sevimis as they are, can not justify 
the resort to anaed force which has occur-
red with in the last 2 and 3 days, and which 
is going on the night* 
He also sarr'^ ted the story of the nationalisation of the 
3i3mz Canal and the efforts made by tl^ United ;ita«es aiKi the 
United stations to find out a peaceful solution o£ tho problem. 
At this point Dulles told the i^ seinbl;^  that "peocoful process: 
had not been exhausted** and that the violent armed attack by 
three of our Bombers upon a fourth was a "grave error**, con« 
73 trary to the prii^iplos and purposes of the y,n« Charter. 
73. Current uocmimnts i 1956, op. cit>* pp.G51.6So. 
74 
A Chlnestt delvgato had pointed out the: %Mia}u^ ss of tkie 
U*^. roAolution by saying that a cease f i re and withdrawal, 
while essent ial* \msm not a s u f f i c i e n t ros|>on8c* "Wc want 
to stop the Wan at the sama tiiae we must v<rurk haru to re» 
74 
move the cause of War," president Eisenhower in his telo-
viODS adress on cctcdser 31 gave the answer of his objection. 
He Said that the first thing is to stop the fighting as ra-> 
75 
pidly as possible,' His point of view was further elaooratod 
1^ Dulles in his statwnent to the General /^ seinbly on the crren-
ing of November 1* Xn this regard he saidi 
peace is a coin which has two sicies-one 
of which is the avoidance of the use of 
force ami tiim other is the creation of 
coiKLitions of Justice and in the long 
run you can not e9q»ect one without the 
ottMir .•• There needs to be socoe thing 
better than the \ineasy armistios which 
have existed now for these eight years.g 
bet%reen Israel and its Arab iMigtibours. 
Znroediately after the voting* Lester Pearson, Canadicir: 
Minister of external Affairs* put forward an idea o£ a u.i., 
force to l&Bep Arab Israeli borders at peaets while political 
settlntaent could be worked out. Before putting this idea in 
the Asseinbly he took Britain and tho United v>tate£> into con-
fidence. Taking into account of Pearson's tmggustion, £;den 
74. Quoted in Robert R, Bowie* op« cit.< pp*69o70. 
75. Current I?ocunients t 1956, op» cit., p.650. 
76. Ibid., p.656. 
i. l-> 
in the House o£ Consnons* axid Lator Pi@rson Dixun in t ^ 
U,:i. debate repeatedly saidt 
Zf the United Nations were willing to 
take over the physical task of loeiiotain* 
ing PeacM in the areai nu one woitld be 
better pleased than we. But Police act-
ion nuat be there to separate thc! belli-
gerents and to stop the hostilitic£i«77 
Initially the U«l-i. £>eoretary General doubted «iii.K»ut 
the workability of Pearson's Plan* He fearcid that such a 
proposal might be rejected by Arab Afro-Asian, and Ccmvtiu-
nist states* Hammarsjold thought it over sctriously only 
after the realization that the British^ French and Israel 
were not yet ready to accept the Assen^ly*£i rci^olutiun 
997(£^-l}« recOTKnending an immediate cease fire. Anionyut 
the four belligerents only £gypt had agreed to abide it 
on the condition that if "attacking armies ceas© tticir 
78 
aggression". 
Moan whilei X}ulle6 who arrived .>ack to v/ashington 
suffered a S9VQt& afetaoti of abdominal paimt which was d ia-
gnosed as a cancer, Un November 3 he was admitted in waiter 
Reed Hospital to be operated upon* In his ^isjQ&ncQ llorbart 
Hoover* JR*# As an acting Secretary of ;itates enacted tho 
77* tooted in Herman Finer* op* c i t * , p*650* 
78* The VJorld Today* og* c i t * , p*483* 
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IIS policy concerning th* MiddXo Emit crisis^ Hoover had 
e personal, disliking to Iktoe,^^ On Novoc^jr 1, president 
Voroshilov and premier euigenien hed sent letters to Sukarno* 
the Prcisident of Indonesia aiid tjelfiru# the l»ri£ne Hinii.ter of 
India* inconnection of calling an ^ Maergenc^ *' session of the 
second Bandung Conference (first was held in Aprii#1955) 
to demand vithdr<eMal of Britain, France an<:i Israeli forces 
from Egypt. 
7he formal intervention of the Anglo-French forces in 
the Israeli Egyptian battle (s^ :^ >^portin9 th«» aggressor) pro-
ved as fuel to the fire. When on Sutuxday, Kovomber 3, the 
General Aaaea£>lY met again, the AraO, Afro»Asian and the 
Comounist states demanded Imnediate withdrawal m:d aai^ c* 
tions« The ninteen Arab-Aslan nations introduced a draft 
resolution, written in a very strong and coiidesitnatozry Ian* 
guage, in the ASwomiDly* It urged the Genexral ^mcomjl^g to 
take effective measure for tim implementation of the u^ 
resolution adapted hy 64 nations of the Woirld on £4oven£>ar 
2* It was put to vote on Novemher 4« and wets a^optea i^y 
59 to §# with 12 abstentions* 
79» Finer, op« cit.# pp*398-399* 
80* The World Yod^v, c^* cit*, p.482*, so© also gho Econo-
mist* (London, Moverebcir 3, 1956), p. 392. 
Ql» Current Documents t 1956, op* cit». p*(>62., see also 
Finer, op* city* pp*402-403* 
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On mnr^a^smr 3« t3am us ablegate Cabot li(xlge« adopting 
a aotm %rhdt allied posture* sulsraitted two draft resolution, 
one £or a five tmnta&s eoBsalttee to take place of the ola 
Conciliation Comoission* and the other for a three loanber 
ooiaroittc^  rQapoimihXo for the clearance of the t>wtz canal 
and the innplementatione of "Six^Prlnciples**.®^ The ^ ioviet 
Union oppcwed the resolutions on the ground that thev dia 
not solve the main purpose* In the meantinie# a Canadian 
resolution (in the naB» of Canada* QoXotmlQi and i^ orway) 
was submitted to the Gemiral AsuBms^lg requesting Secretary 
General to produce with in forty eight hours a plan for thet 
establishment "with the consent o£ the nationa concerneMi« of 
an emergency international United l^ ations Force to socure 
and supervise the cessation of tK>stilitics in accordance 
with all the tenos" of Resolution 997(ES«>1)« the General 
ASL'Ssibly adopted it on i«oveiiid;>er 4# by 54 0 votes and 19 abs-
tentions* including Britain* France* Israel* Eg^pt and the 
83 Connunisit bloc* 
Before accepting any resolution of General Assembly 
providing for an imn^liate cease fire aatong the belliger-
ents and withdrawal of their forces frcHn Igypt* liritain 
and France wanted to aoiiieve their desidered goal-the des-
truction of Nasser and occupation of tlM» Sues Canal, At ti:Us 
32* Finer* oo^ c i t«* p ,403 , 
S3* Current Docuaients i 19$6j OP* c i t . « p , 6 a i . 
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ttOt they had ttcM«v»d only a partial auecoes&. in oroiar 
to eooplote thoir e;eStructlvo dOJectlvos In i^gig'pt, air pior* 
aon Dixion wanted a delay in voting for a fow laor;- days, aut 
he had failed in his offort. To Justify liis QovQttKmut*& 
Btand £dan sent a telegram to preeident i^ i^aonhowor ix^. which 
he satedi 
Z€ we drew back now chaoe will not be svoi* 
dod« QvQt-^ thinv3 will go lip in £lmm& in 
the Mickile Eaat you will realise^ with ail 
your experience* that we ean not havo a rnili* 
tary vacuum while a united liatione force la bQ» 
lag constituted and is being trans;>urtcd to the 
£»pot» That is why we iau£>t go on to hold th>j po-
sition until we can h€ind over reapomsiblitj^ to 
the United :«ations«@4 
He declared that since it was ontiruly uncertain v/hutiier 
th& UtmF %fOUld be accepted b^ £8r<:^ l and Egypt« but 
England aiKi France had decided to proceed tiwir actioi>. 
On Movenft>er 4# £iecretary General subinittca a re^ o^rt 
to the Oenerai As^ eiribly in coc^liance with the reuulution 
998(££>«>1)« and before any An9lo<^rench paratroops larkled 
in Pert Saici ana Poxt Fuad« the Asc«iibly hou a^ x^ r^ vod Re* 
solution 1000 (£;S->1)> establishing U»I^ i«c:«F, and it£ execu-
tive frame work ano affirming HamAarskJold's decision not 
to include in it any contingents from ponoanent i3»einbers of 
BS the Seciority Council. 
84* Quoted in Finer* OP* cit.. p»413* 
85* See Curjfrent ijocuments t X956* op* ci t#* pp.ii63-667. 
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By this tisMi (httving eroslMd th« Huagaslan r«voIt) 
tho attention of Um Soviet llis«ii« fmd lMN»n eompletely 
(3iir*st«d tovastie tho MitMIe s«8t« On i9o¥«imb«r S« th« 
Soviet Pfins ia.Qist4Mr# mil««oia, sent « o««>JL« to the 
P»Mi<Seiit of tha S«<3ujrity Couocii danAnOii^ g an ismsdiatd 
MMtiog of th« GouQCiX to <li«eii«» "mm aggxeasioa* and the 
dafi«iie« of Xojr««l# Biritaiii# aad Franoi with the oenereX 
AeseetoXy'a reeoiutioi»i« Siiealteneotteiy with thie oehle he 
•eat th<e«teiiia(0 notm to the goveroiaepte of Bcitein, Pranoe 
end xereel* The ienguage uaed i o these le t ters was some whet 
identieeX* He wevned the thiee oouatries that the Russian 
Oovernineot was detesnined to cciash the aggji^ssion and estab-
l i sh pmmom in the Hiddle ^ast with other tmak>&ca of the uni-
ted nations* In ease of tlM^r aon ooaipiianee with the oease 
f ire order any fK>re« the war oULght spread to other eountries 
and wottld heoorae a third world war* consequently the soviet 
press hegain to talli of "volunteers" to help s^pt* On the 
very date# Bulganiot epproec^^ed to president itiisenhower 
with pr^osal to use naval and air foree«« together with 
ottmi£ U»I3* ismisers to stop war in ^gpt and to restrain 
aggression* Sisex^ewer pcooptly reJcK t^ed Bulganin's 
idea* Ztt his n^ly to Bulganin's l e t ter he stated that i t 
was en "eathinki^le*' suggestAa and an effort to divert world 
86. The world godey* OP* c i t .* pp*4dS*4d7*« see mSLl^OSSSLf (London* Soveniher «« 1956} * see also finer OP* cit*# 
pp* 417^22* 
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a t t e n t i o n from ttm Russian ositma eomd,ttod i n Hungary* 
Ha c<xitinued t h a t " t t e world body has ca l l<^ for a c «^e 
£ i re»a withdrawal o£ foiroign t roops and the ostabi ishmcnt 
of a United x^ations force t o st&bllz& the s i tua t ion^ pend* 
ing a sat t lenfent" • In t h i s s i t u a t i o n , "noi thor iJoviet nor 
any o ther m i l i t a r i ' forces" should en te r the niddJLe iiost area 
•xcapt under United iiations raandate,^ ' 
p re s iden t Eisenhower hikCL taken the note of ^oviot 
t h r e a t very seriou£3iy* His fea r of sov ie t involvcraent was 
furt i :^r i n t a n s i f i e d by Churiea &« aohion* the u , - . am.vai.sa-
dor t o itoscow* He sen t a inassago t o the u^ Governnscnt about 
the h o s t i l e a t t i t u d e of a\issian£>« ^ni recofamended tho quicks 
e s t poss ib l e cease f i ce in the Midule ii^ast" t o avoid tl^ic 
Commmist "thareat of a cons iderable i i i l i t a r y a c t i o i s * , ^ 
World pressure had a l so been forzoiuabxe* Espec ia l ly , Krishna 
Henon« Indian de lega te t o U.K., the Soviet Union, the Arabs, 
the Asian nat ions who followed ^'^jehru's load, gave loud tongue 
t o the t r i p a r t i t e aggress ion . ' iTheir sharp r eac t i on t o t'ne 
Anglo«J'renc|i I s r a e l i invasion aga ins t Kgyj/t h^d boo£>ted up 
titu3amx*o ntorale. iilvery Arab goverroKsnt, evaa t h a t of I raq , 
87 . For thsi t e x t of p r e s iden t Elsenhower's rep ly t o prime 
I4lniater aulganin se^s Cmrrent DtKjCumcnta t 1956^ SPASA^A* 
pp.665. 
88 . See f iner* o p . c i t . « p . 4 l a . 
8 5 . Ibidj . , pp»40^-403 k 429-443, 445,447-448, ^ e - Tte l^iindue-
tan TjjmBt (laoveraber 2, 195o} • , !ttie ^tatos-raan^ tiiovem" 
hex 3 , 1956}• 
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had ho^n constroXnod to <l«cXarc its siipport for Egypt .^^ 
The blockage o£ tim Q\m* CmnmX and tho disruption o£ oil 
0hi|Mnent^ h<id cruated a gr«at problem in the w@st £uropcan 
Countrios* Zn thtto« eiareiaaotancos when ail the efforts o£ 
tim Unitod states and the United 4^ation0 had been £aiIod 
to stop the Aaglo»French hostility in £gypt« i^isenhowcr 
ana Dulles dacidod to uBm economic sanction against the^ ie 
countries* Zt proved on effective tneosuro to bring the ag-
gressors on their knees, because ** tim need for u,;». assis* 
91 
tance for the pouiMl and for oil vjas too great to resist". 
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Mean while both Egypt and Israel had agrc^ ed to a c^ sose fire* 
On Noveinbor 6# while <utglo«J'rench forces were fiyhtiny to 
occuijy the whole o£ the Suez Canai« £den a^is eallod on the 
tele0KMMi by Eisenhower* The US president iPressuris&ed iiiden 
to givu the order to cease fire at onee« in tim other case 
the British Oovermnent would be deprived of iWnericon aoli-
darity* aafore this phone call whan iiacmillan the Chancellor 
of the &xehaquer« asJced Washington for substantial eoonooiic 
support* he as told that "a loan would be available* but 
on the Inperative condition that « cease fire bo anr.ounced 
93 by Britain by mid night of x^ ov^ aber 6"« on the mutm day 
90* See Tbo ii;cK>noB^ •st* (boncton* August Il« l»9SI>}* p*497*« 
see also P*J* Vatiiciotis* »aaaer and His Qeneration* 
(JUondon* 1978)« p*231*# Bowie* qp* cit** p*57*> Finer, 
OP* Cit** pp*412*413* 
91* R.H* Bowi6# op^ cit** p*64* 
92* The Werld Today* Op* cit«* pp.403*486,487. 
93* Finer* 90^ cit«* pp* 428-^29. 
ttm u«^, iWabaa»«dojr in P«ri«« A,C« i>oughltts DiXlon« oon* 
v«y*d hi* govrmmnts* iMMage t o prina Minis tor HoXlet. 
Tho giat of the messsage was: 
It you eontimi* in your vrongful aotion# 
do not eount on Vhm United stat»«» Tho 
only pxogms aetion is through thts Unitod 
isatiooe* You miat stop your intenmntlon 
in suost Mid if you do »ot« you <Ban not 
count on our •import*'* 
Sv«ntualiy« undor tho pressuro o£ the United nt^tMa, 
tho Unitod Nations^ the woria public ^inion« and ai^ ovo all 
tho Soviot propaganda to support &gypt by ail har tmims, cofn-> 
pollad Prance and Britain to acwopt oooaae £iro« evo» though 
thoir forces had not yet occupied thewhcie of the canal* Tho 
Anglo-French forces halted about the twenty milos sout o£ 
Port £}aid on the night o£ Moi^ iaber 6# before the dead line 
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given by the u«i>« Qoverncaent* Mean whilis, Hair4aara>;jold 
suJDnitted h is second and f ina l report toth« QoneraX AS eraltl^  
on tlio estabxishtnont of U*ii«s«F, in accordance with ttm lie-
so lut ion 996(£S«»1}* and aesolution 1000(EJS«X} adopted on 
96 i^ovttiiber 4 and 5 respeotXvely* AS a l l the £our beXXi* 
^ r e n t CKmntries had aacoptod cease fir@« a United inations 
Porco was pronptXy brought into existence* ae£or& thu f inal 
9^« P^^*' p*432»« see aXso Huge Thomas* OP* cit^^ p*i39* 
95* R.R, Bowio, OP* cit*# p»76* 
^ « Por Oenerv^ X Asse:i^Xy*8 resoXutions proviuing a United 
»atioi» Sraergency Porce soe Current Pocumeots « X956« 
yp« cit*^ pp«661# 663<»675* 
s«l«ct ioi i of the U*£j« con%iiigent6« of£ored £ruta various 
countries* HMnuurs^jolcl CKMOtfulted u&ti&&x for tila consent* 
The oountrios which had offered the ir troops to the u.;i.i>.F, 
included Indie end p«ki«t«n»'^ The ^gyptien Pre i<ient while 
eeoepted zndien offer had refused to include Fasastan troops 
in the U,£J« fisroe as he 'auvx forgive Pakistan for j o i n -
98 ing the Bagdad pact". India had a l so been a roenber of the 
Seven nations advisory cororaittoe which v^ as establ ished to 
a s s i s t and advise Haimtvarskjold in iji^loiaonting plans for 
9d the Vm^m Force* The £gyptian Govermaent diu lUDt vrant 
t o include Canadian personiMl in Mmli.Z^F, but i t l a ter 
agreed t o a^iept Canadian l o g i s t i c a l and medical sup ;^>ort 
loo 
unit* Haiaroarskjold ami ijurns haa ^ number of niootiny-
with umaaor and Pawsi* the Egyptian Foreign ninister^ in 
Cairo t o seek the ir cocq;>eration and aiscuaaod with thom 
the basic points for the presence and tunctions of the u,L%m 
Force in JSgypt* The f i r s t contingents of U * N . £ . F . arrived 
in Sgypt <m tjovesiber 1S» 1956*^ 
After accepting the un<X)nditional cease f i r e unOor the 
strong pressure frc»s a l l sides* the govornraants of Britain* 
97* The gtateswan* (i^ ovendber 23* 1956)* 
98* Ifim aouad Tfble. vol* xi*VIZ* i4o*186** (A yuartorXy B* 
view of a r i t i s h C<»Kiion wealth Affairs* March, 1937)* 
p*172** The ^tateaan* (iiovendser 16* 19S6)« The TisMS 
of India* (October 6* 19S6}. 
99, Current Pocittaents i 1956* op* cit** pp*674-675* 
BO. A*ll. Bowie* OP* cit** p*isO* 
301* Current PocuraQnts t 19S6* OP. cit** p*60i*. 
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Franco^ and Ifiroel xxtv tried to s«it certain cor.aitioiis for 
the withOrowai o£ their forces £rom £gypt. aince eacii o£ 
the three countrios liod h ^ a scpar«itei motiv«^  for attackin^^ 
£gypt# th@ir conditlona for withdrawal differed too. un i*o-
vcmdoer 7 the Geiieral Aosetnbly pas:.ed two resolutions; oxna of 
which (Hosoiution i001/E&»l} eatauliahed on Advisory Cofaaiit-
tee coqposed of one representative from oach of the foXXoi>;ing 
countries t Znoia , Pakistan Ccylon« Can«^a« i^ razii, Coicmibia, 
and i«o«weQf* The CoRsULttee w«us to function unaer the Chariman* 
102 0hip of the \i»iu ;^ ecretary Gonerai« ^ The other ccGolution 
introdnused l^ Afro-Asian n»nbers« (HeeoXution iao2/E^.l} 
affirmed all previous resolutions of the General '^combXy 
particularly those proviaing for the Emergency Forco« 
Withdrawal of Israeli forces iaCihind the armistic lines 
and total evacuation of Egyptian territory t>y 3rit*iin and 
103 
France. The musXim members of sagdad pa.ct« (lran# Xraq« 
Turkoy« acid Pakistan) and the Arab i^ wdgue lOMunber^  hau also 
exerted pressure for the immediatce and unci:jnditional with-
drawal of Anglo-French troops* in case of Britain the pre-
ssure from soiae of the Comnenwcalth countries was strong. 
The £»oviet Union gave further warnings to aritain« France 
aad Israel and demanded their unconaitional witlKirawciX 
fron the Sgyptian soil without delay* It was also dac-
larcid that in case of non ccM^lianos wit: her doa^ and^  
102, Ihid*^ pp.674-675. 
103. Ibidj^ p. 676. 
X&i 
the Sovlot Russia might 90 to «ny oxtont* 1!he Soviet Pteas, 
Radio* and Talevision were oialcing treraandovts propaganda of 
104 it* There was ao intentional delay in imlocking the Canal 
(although it waa daiaaging econoraieally to Egypt herself) and 
pipe lines* vrtiich BMOO the oil pjroblem in urestern Europe 
acute .British oil S9a&xvea tiere depleting rapidly and her 
industries odght grind to a halt with in a fev; w^ntha. rhoy 
pleaded for oil sii^ plies but yet ''there was no indication 
when or whether the United states intended to ii^leroont 
its «aergei:K:y plans tor increasing the quota of western 
hemisphere potroleixm available to Kurc^^ans*** £cononic 
strain had beccKna unbearable* i^isenhower and Dulles hoped 
that this critical situation might hasten a jritish and 
French decision to evacuate their forces frcm Sgypt* iiasser 
was not twairare of Anglo«French position* He decided to use 
blocicage as a eitief weapon against a x>roXon9ed aritish and 
French occupation* lie teelared that iigypt would not allow 
the salvage operation to begin without the total withdrawal 
of the foreign troops from Egyptian aoil,^^*^ By this tiio^  
Britain and France had completely exhaustea* pressure from 
all side was cK>ntinued. en £iovenber 23 when the Ocneral 
AssfiOBbly met again to its regular session tim question 
104* Finer* OP* Ctt«* p*437** Robert Stephen£>* OK>. cit»< p*23S, 
105« a*k« Bowie* OP* cit>i> p*62* 
106* ««s, mnm and world Reports (January 4* 1967)* p.46^7. 
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of ttm SuMKs and lUcMlo Kant was put to debate* 'She Inolon 
<lol9g€ito Krishna liaaon, olongwith twenty Afro-Aaion repra« 
S€mt»ati.vo8 prcisontod a drAft reaolutiOQ tc> tho Genor<al 
As^ cai^ ly oaliiny Mgon FtemOQt ZscaoX and Bxitalci to coiaply 
"forth with** with resolutloxui 997) (£S~1) aod lOOa {LH^X) o£ 
Uovmxk)&r 2 stnd 7« 1956« 7ho *Vorthtfi.th" resolution was sadop^ 
ted hy s vote of 63 (including U£u%} to 5 with 10 abstentions.^^^ 
Uitiniatoly« unUar the coedoin^ di prosstirta of the various 
factors snci forces the British OovermKant informed the u^ of-
ficials on Kovdiober 23# ld56« that it was reauy to withdraw 
unconditionally from Egypt•^^ AS soon as this aBv& come to 
Washington* Hoover was ordered to provide all sort of help 
to Britain without her formal announceinsnt* Formal aiinoun-
cement of the withdrawal decision was made :t^y tho acting 
priins Minister of isxitain« R.A. sutler as Eciten had yono to 
Jamaica on lioveraber 23* taking a long leave fr<»a his office. 
It was lattor announced that £;den*s physici<^as huu advised 
hiffi to HP on rest (or to «^oid further humiliation) whlci) 
109 
was rauch needed t o him* Thsi French Ooverjienent followed 
t h e l ) r i t i s h sui t* Xho -«;ithdrawal of Anglo»jrrench forces 
l l f l frora £gypt was cof^le tod by l>@ceiid3er 23# 19!»6* ^ I s r a e l 
107. Current PoouaiGnts i 1956* OP* ci t** pp*696-697. 
lOd* RmS<-0 Bowio« Op. c i t** i^ *&3* For d e t a i l s QUQ Current 
DoCUirents t 1956* OPy c i t . * p .700 . 
109. Finer^ S ? A - S 4 | I . * pp«453-455., Robert Stephens, o p . c i t . * 
p«239*« Hugh imexaas, pip* c i t** p . 167* 
110* Ipi.d»^ Pft461.« Bowie, op* c i t** p*84. 
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wittidrvw reluctantly undmr the ^itrong ];»ressur€ exerted a^f 
the United «itat(je« the iimi*m0 n^oi •soviet Jiu^jsia, During the 
raontho of DmcotiAiQLt January# and February, t^ie wenorax Asaem* 
l^y adopted a s e r i e s o£ resoXutione d&mmidltuj on insneuidte 
and uncanOitionol Zsreei i withdrowel* I s r a e l i iorceo withdrew 
frcoQ £;inai paninsula in s tages . Their witherixwal from ^ii^ai 
CKatqpXeted in Jaunary 19&7 and the vacated arsa was occupied 
111 
by the United i^ ations forcM* "But from there the Israelis 
refused to moire until they recieved assurances that neitrier 
Sgyptian nllitory nor civiiian control would ix: restored in 
the Gasta strip ami the U£;i^  would takeover <3nd stay at sharma 
112 
©1 i*halkh*« There two areas were the strcitegic gains to 
Israel* 3y capturing Qasa Israel prevented fedayeen raids, 
and Is^ gaining h^<arma i^l &hai>d) ana straits of Tiran it 
could make xise of Port of Cilat which hecams iiivnowilize 
aftor i^ gypt closod Gulf of ^ qai^ to Israeli or l&rael .xmnu 
113 Shipping* On January 23« 19S7, the Israeli prii»B iiiixiater 
iien G\u:ion, declared ir. the laiesset that ths l:^ raeli forc^ -' 
would not withdraw frcaa cither ^harom el shaiHh ar U^o Gaza 
strip until it had the guarantees it demandi^d. The Zionist loc 
by in USA had esterted a strong pressure on tiiiscoho^ r^ to 
111, aBy middle jiaat and ^ jSrth Africa t 1969»79* (fi^ uropa 
Publications, iiondon)* p*793*« see also John riorton 
Hoore,(ed*). The ^ ab-laraeli conflict, vol*l., (new 
Jersey, 1974), p*12*, see Khouri, f^ g^  cit*, p*217-218* 
112* iEUjibert Stephens, op^ cit*, p*240* 
113* lioshe uayan, ca>* cit., p*195.# 
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aiocept the Zaraeii aeroanOs* Abiaa a^aiXf the Israeli fureign 
mLnliiter, had a nusdaer o£ atetXngs witli i>uile^  (%mo had 
fully recovered by now and JoXod hla office) and, aisseruB-
ed about the \ruarantee* tilii^  was t^^ pre conUitlon of 
Israeli withdrawal fron Sgypt* In the maantime Hantnars* 
l^old trimd to perouade lutasmx to eecept the presence of 
United liations For^» in theee aroae. HumBaxekJold succeed-
ed in his efforts* 
After having satisfied with the assurances given by 
jSisenhower and Dulles in public as well as in private nie-
114 
etings regarding the rights of Israel ix; the Gulf of Aqaba 
and protection against attacl^  from Gaza« Israeli Foreign 
l<iinistor« Golda Mier# announced Israeli withdrawal in 
lis General Asseaably on March, 1957• it. the next two or 
three days* General Dayan and General ourns reached aggree* 
ment on the technical details of the withdrawal• israoli 
foJTces coroipleted their withdrawal from Gaza and shdjcoiu el 
Shaikh by the end of first week of March. The u:^  Forocos 
were stationed in the Gaza strip, along the ^^ inai dcitorca-
tion lir» and in key spots along the Oulf of Aqaba. Israel 
had rejected the proposal that u:i Forceu ;>hould be deployed 
on both sides of dinnarcution lines to prevent incidnots* 
114• Rali^ H* Mgnus, (ed*), Docttaftnts on the fUddle i:.aet# 
(Washington, i^.C 20036, July 1969), pp. 180-182. 
115. Ibid.^ pp.182-184. 
^^^» Ibid.< pp«174«175., see also John Moore, op. cit.> 
prnt, and Khouri, co. cit.^ p.218. 
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7hQ SIMS GmxmX^ %rhieh had iaeao blocked b^ the f^gyptlajos* 
w«8 elQasod lay a U£i salvaga tlmmt n«d ir«K^ peiKl at the end u£ 
Hasch 1957* By May 1957« alX stat«a axcapt iBX&al were again 
using the Casial* 7he Egyptian Oov^nnent in March and finally 
In Ajprll cleolared her policy regardljig the laanageaent and ope-
ration of the SiMa canal« thm end o£ 1956 war weakened every 
prospect of establishing International control ov&^ r HXMZ Canal 
The only guaraotmi for tlie CaniO, users would k» Egypt's proodse 
to their rlfi^ts under the 1MU3 eonstantlnople convention on 
froedc^a of navigation* Thus* whatever the gains Israel had 
ach ieve £rom the tripartite war against Egypt* tivstns i s no 
doubt that Britain and France failed to acKjulre any dlpluiaatic 
or strategic advantages from It* 
i9v 
Egypt has aoen many invaalona* mainly due to lt£? unique 
strategical location In the global syst^n, its geo<-polltloal 
and strategic significance* and ttua convenient trade routes 
have alw^s attracted tho attention of the European powers, 
i4^ ;>olean expressed the same geo<^trateglc concept o£ i^^gypt 
h^i saying that *Kgypt was the cstost lii^ ;>ortant couiitry*. The 
c<rastruotlon of Suez canal had added a new cosisaercial factor 
In the strategic liG|;»ortancu of £gypt« 5oon after lt£ o^ >enlnj 
In 1869# Canal had beconie so vital for the^  flow of exports* 
ijoports and shipping of Great urltaln (wlio originally oi^ pOJi^ ed 
this project}* that 8h& started thlnkln<^ In terms of political 
domination over Egypt, Falling to Invest In the Canal Cod^ j^^ any 
however* Britain did not have any vol^ In Its affalr^^, The 
year 167S had provided a rar«i oi^portunlty to the British 
prime Minister* Disraeli* wiMin debt rlden Ismail pasha solu 
44% of company *• share to him for the four million poijiids. 
It had been considered the first and liqport'^ it dchlevertent 
of Great Britain over the ;»uess Canal, ^ Ince then the i>rltlsh 
Goveminsnt had got an excuse to Intervene In i^^/pt*a domestic 
matter* as a self appointed guardian of the ^^ ues Canal, ^ irltlsn 
defensive policy* regarding the £»uoa Canal continued until 19S6* 
when the United liatlons* and world pressure* forced iter to with-
draw from the Egyptian territory* in the pai;it* arltain had 
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justiflad her milit«jcy interventicHafi in £g^pt on the plea of 
detencNi of tiM Suea C«n«X* But in i956# %«orld vae no more 
ree^ to ee .^t the Anglo>Fceneh justifieetion to their 'police 
eeticm* in figsrpt* Both Britain end Frence ujsed the nationeli* 
sirtJLMi of the Suez Canal by the Egyptian president* Jamal Abdul 
Nasser on July 26« 1956, as a pretext for their aggression* al* 
thous^ it was ixyt the sole reason of their hostility against 
Sgypt* Zt would bo more %>propriate to ast^ that the uatimia* 
lization of the Canal was only an iciportant link in the Otain 
of events leading to the tripartite aggression agaimst Sgy^ t^* 
The crisis had no fundamental ooiOMK^tiMi either with ;^ ue2 or 
Sinai as elaiaed by the aggressors, lam iioiierialist forces 
had been trying to crush Kasser even before the r.aticmali-
sation of the Canal* They also Knew this fact very v/ell that 
after th» end of the Sues Canal Cotapany's eoncesaiun in 1968« 
Sgypt was not bound to renew it* Zt was Egypt's legal right 
to dominate over the auez Canal as it was situated within 
the ja^ fyptian territory* Zn fact# llasser's p<:>licies of naticm«^ 
lisa* pan Arabismf and antiwestemism^ «mich had taKen the 
whole of the Middle Sast into their grip « iiraire more damaging 
to imperialist interosts in the area th«i hla action of nationa* 
lisation o£ the Sues Canal* After the July revolution o£ 1952* 
Kasser had emerged as the central figure in the Middle eastern 
policies* His popularity in £gypt as «NI11 as in the Arab worla 
ocmtinuod to grow* Zn a ehort span of time Kasser succeeded to 
bring the minority of the Arab nations into a crueade against 
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ia|;>«riali8m wad colonialism uncier the bax^ner o£ 'positive 
nautrallBffl* a coM^&pt whleh ha had brought back to Kgypt in 
April 19S5# from tha Dandxu^ Confacaxico* His anti vreatarr. 
attitude was further revealed by his stroovj op^j^iltlon to 
the Baghdad pact* 
Egypt's struggle to eraancipate heie»el£ frcm the western 
domination w«s not a new oonoopt* The spirit of Arab! * a nat-
ionalist revolt against the donination of Britain and France 
in Egypt had never died in Egyptians* although physically it 
was crushed l;>y the British a m y in 1082* since then Britain 
had established her virtual control over Egypt* The devolop* 
lasnts which had occured during and aftor the First world war# 
had further extended the Anglo*French doiaination in the Middle 
Eastern rmgioam Zn order to seek Ar9ib*B halp« which was nuch 
valuable to their war strategy^ Britain and France exploited 
the growing national and anti Turkish sentiinants of the Arab 
subjects of the ottoman Eapire* Arabs were promised full in-
d<q^iidenee in return of their stipport to Allied v/ar aims 
against the policy of their Turkish masters* But at ttw 
end of war« Britain and Fran<» distributed the Arab parts 
of the Ottoman Empire among themselves aoeordicg to ;Skye8-
Pioot aggreemsnt* instead providing th^a full independence 
as they had promised in a series of letters with Hussein 
Sharif of Heoea* The Anglo-French Govemannts established 
their control over the Arab areas under the shaidow of Mandates, 
treaties* and Protectorates* avoiding to make them oat right 
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eoloMies or iraperlAl dap«id«aei«8>Q£ tbm Arab lancia« only 
Ho£a« and Y«ia«a« the most batiofozd oiaongat the Arabians^ 
tiexe left £siee« TiUs was the turning point in the history 
of Middle gast* The Arab nationalism which originally deve» 
loped against the Turkish overlardship vi9a now divorted towards 
the growing Anglo-ii'reiieh dooination in the Middle &,93t&m ru* 
gion« The Arab Xntellid^ntia and nati<»)alist lomiimra began to 
suspeet the iii«»erialist motive behind the Balfour Declaration 
providing a naticmal hoiae to the Jewish people in Palestine. 
AsKwgst the Arab world the nationalist sentiments grew more 
intense in Egypt and Syria* The British protectorate which 
iras established OVQS Hgypt in 191* was questioned by the new 
breed of Egyptian nationalists, 3y 1919 the nationalist move* 
oieat of Sgypt was given a revolutionary fervour b^ a yroutp of 
extremist leaders• At the beginning of 1922 the ariti&h Govern* 
nent realised that it could no Imager be possible tK» maintain 
her interests without giving Egypt s<ffiie owioessions. This re« 
suited into a unilateral declaraticm of Britain* issued on 
February 26« 1922« awaouncing the abolition of the proteo* 
torate and recognizing Sgypt as an independent sovereign 
state under a constitutional monarch* The declaration of 
independence* however* did not ehanijK* the doraix^ ating posi-
ticm of Britain in £gypt* The British Oovernmont had reserved 
her position h^ attaohii^ certain conditions to the iiidepend* 
enoe of Sgypt* British troops and officials v?ere still all 
over Egypt in large nisidaers auid did iK»t cease to intervene 
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in Egypt's doopstio as will as forolgn affairs. This pseudo-
inclApandonoo never satisf i<Hi the Egyptian nationalist leddero -
The wafd party« which had gained much p^^mlarity anongaot the 
Egyptians under the y^naoiio leadership of Zayhlul Pasha« adop* 
ted a tough attitude regarding the status of Sudan and the 
presence of British troops in egypt* These had been tho two 
major issues over which the Anglo«£gyptians relations raroained 
tense* Britain ixnnensily desired to stay in Egypt in order to 
protect her iaperialist interests in the region^ while Egypt-
ians demaxK^ ted the total independence frcm the British Control* 
to preserve the sovereignty of their nation* The conflict 
between the Egyptian nationalism and European imporialism 
continued until the out break of ZtaloWibyssini«n war* The 
growing danger of Hus^ i^ olini in tho surrounaing areas, threat 
end the Anglo»Egyptian Giovernmsnts aliice* Under the Conraon 
fear both Britain and i:^ yypt adopted a ccMfiroiaising attitude 
to resolve their pre^lems* AS a rosult of this change an Anglo-
Egyptian treaty of twenty years duratido was signed on Augtost 
26# 1936* The treaty placed Egypt unctor naiv (^ligations in re-
turn for some concessions. Thus* the nationalist revolution 
which had begun in 1919« was subsided after the conclusion 
of 1936 treaty* 
The t«qporary relief in the iUaglo«»Egyptian relations 
provided by the 1936 treaty soon ended after the 1945. in 
the p o ^ Seooixl world war period a nunber of devolopnoents 
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took placo %mich brought about a radical change in the aid-
dlQ Eastern politics and particularly in £gypt. Xhase deve* 
lopatants imsliided the changing pattern of international po-
litical systna in which Anorica and Russia emsrgod as the 
nmt dooiinating powers of the world* change o£ the govem-
mants o£ the countries directly involved in trie Middle 
Bast crisis* partition o£ Palestine again&t trk& wishes o£ 
the original inhabitants o£ the country* humiliating defeat 
of the Arabs at the hands of newly created state of Israel, 
independence of the tnajority of the Arabs and Afro-Asion 
countries* vmich hit herto \m£o controled either by Britain 
ai^ Frv.iK:e* and growing politicad consciousness and nationa-
lism aflK>ng the new generation* who by now* had become fully 
aware of the Machiavellian charv^ctoristios of the viestern 
powers* creation of Israel had provided a rnajor proof of their 
suspisions against the western intentions regarding the future 
of the Middle Eastern region* The young generation was no more 
ready to con|>rcMBise with evon those old tagitme which had been 
collaborating with the erqperialist powora since the end of the 
First world war. in this charged situation* humiliating de-
feat of the Arabs in the war of 1948* mainly due to the faulty 
decisions of the Arab kings* who were more interested in estab-
lishing their supremacy over each other than to i. ractical uni-
fied action to a»vo ac much as possible of Arab Palestine* pro-
ved to be the last straw. During the Palestine war* the [polic-
ies of Arab KXngs wore largely promoted by their traditional 
a.vc» 
rivalrlas ^mioog the«is«lviM* thesm unhappy events further 
provoked the dntlw^j^toro and «nti raonarchial £iantiJtienta o£ 
the younger got^^rations* 7ha riotd end revoXutlonc which 
oecured in £fn^t# £lyrla« X4id>aaon« Jordan and xraq« in the 
forth oooing years* and resulted into the destructions of 
old smgijatM and in some countrie aasasinations of their 
rulere having pro<^c^tern tendencies* %fere the direct con* 
sequences of the creations of Israel and the sul;>sequent 
Arahs defeat in the war of 1948. Among the Arab %roria more 
radical changes took place in iSgypt# since the goverr^ TMant in 
Cairo had considered itself the leader of the ^ ^^ rab atruygle. 
Throughout the war the Egyptian public was cheated hy their 
leaders providir^ th^a wrong infonrkitions of their quic:-; vic-
tory* Hhen they knew about the realities their humiliation 
and disi^pointnent knew no bound* They also knew this fact 
%iell that it was i^ing Farouk who inspite of rft>i<rashi PK;ha*s 
opposition decided to send Egyptian array to the Palestine war* 
The stories of the involvcoaent of King Farouk in the arms scan-
dal had made the Egyptians totally cutaspirated with the old 
regime* instability of the governments as a reauXt of tusf^ eis 
between King and parliament created a political* social and 
eooncKBic crisis in Egypt* Britain the real founcier to the 
Jewish state in the heart of the Arab lands« still reatained 
in £gypt* and the Sudan's status was yet to be decided. The 
frustration of the lost war blended with eeoiKKtiic and social 
problems of Sgypt* hastend the i^»volutionary process of a group 
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of young amy officers who had boon droaming to ovorthrow 
itqperiallomt aionarchy# «nd fotid«lism from Egypt since very 
long* Thoir dreooia soon eaten true v/hen on July 23« 19S2« a 
revolution under the leadership of I4eguib (tho Chief orchi* 
teeh of coup de*etal renaioed in the background £«r aoniQ tiraa) 
took place in Egypt and up rooted ISO years old Mohanutod Ali 
dynasty* 
3y this time British diplomacy in tho Middle £a3t started 
to be ruined* FrarK:e which had enjoyed the status of second 
dominating power of the Middle East was esqjolled from this 
region in 1941* Before the :^ eoond world war Aiojrican i.>oliti> 
cal interei>ts in the Arab world were extremely nebul:^ >': • rite 
discovery of nevf oil resources and the growings strategic noe<is 
of the military boaos in the Kiddle Boat in the changing in* 
tomational political syst^s had altered the us policy of 
isolution out side the western hemisphere* .Americaxi's in-
direct involvement in the Midale Sastem affairs began through 
her syii|>athetic a«^ £>ort to the Zionist cause in Palestine* 3Sie 
new develO|HaDnts iHiieh occ\ured during mad after tho ;>econu 
World War converted this indirect involvoraont into a direct 
political interest of America in the Middle i^ astern region* 
The United state's openheartcd and fro'^handed support for 
the establishment of Jewish state in Palestine in 1947 was 
the hall mark of her political interest in this area, it 
created a crisis of confidence between the Arabs onu tirie 
United States* This factor had been a dominating force 
ij^i 
behiJid Arab and partleul«xly Egyptian cttutralism and non 
allgniaeQt which ultioataly haXpod to facilitate the entry 
of Soviet influoDce into tho aroa* 
Preaidant Eiaanhowar* who succeedod Harry Truoan (a 
staneh 8iq»portar of Zionist cause in Palestine) in January 
1953* declared hie policy of *impartiality* in dealing with 
the Hiddle Eaat problems* Zn this connection he sent his £»e» 
eretary of State« Jhon Foster l>ulles« to thii Middle £aat in 
Hay# 1953* Eisenhower's prcHoise of impartiality* and Dulles* 
visit# both helped in assuaging the iKNSitile attitude of the 
Arab nations which did sK>t cease to attack ^ yiidrica's consci-
ence regarding the establishment of Israel* Kncouraged by 
this teiqpQrary success* and motivated by her desire to revive 
the old idea of Middle Kast Coomana* the U^ Uovernraent began 
to establish a friendly relations with the revolutionary re« 
giros of £gypt« 
Zn 19S1« after the unilateral abrogation of the 1936 
Treaty* and the 1899 Sudan Condominium Agreement by uahas 
pasha (who himself was the ^>rincipal architect of 1936 treaty)« 
the western powers projected a new scheme of Hiddle i^ ast De-
fence organization to £:gypt« By this joint Mdale luai^t Cfxa* 
mand they wanted to create a permanent security systejn against 
the expected Soviet threat* The proposed scheme was promptly 
rejCKited ts^ the Egyptian Ouvernment on the plea that it* how-
ever* would per^Mttuate western domination into the area. The 
revolutionary regime which came into power in 19S2* gave a 
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oofw hope to the us Qavectamtxtm It felt that it might 'ae eoaior 
to influ«noa tha soldiors thaa thos« o£ exp«»Sf^ onc«d political 
loadara o£ F«rouk*8 regina* The u^ expectations vrero based on 
the wrong colculatione o£ ttie grevety of nationdliom «ind anti<-
vestern feelings of the revolutionary ieedere «wd particularly 
Nasser. Her hopes %#ere largely buried by 19SS« ii^ ien ija&ser 
openly rejected the liH sponsored HSDO plan i^nd pursueded a 
policy of 'positive neutralism'^ a concept laihich he brought 
back from sanding after discussions with !^iru« Tito« ;»uKarno 
and ClK>^u lAi* 
Dulles^ vho had visited £gypt in Hay 1953, believed that 
in the way of the us i^ gyptian friendly relations tho prosense 
of British troops in tb& Suez Canal zone wais an obstacle. Af-
ter this realisation, Eisenhower administration started to 
pressurise Britain to accept the Egyptians demands for the 
evacuation of British forces from the ^uez Canal ^une anu 
unity of the lUle valley. The u^ Government was more atucious 
to secure oil and bases in the Middle East than to support 
the imperial interests of Britain ana France, For Britain 
the departure of her troops from Egypt was meant tho total 
retirement from the Middle Eastern politics* After the ter-
mination of British Mandate over Palestine the governtnent of 
United Kingdom inmensily desired to remain in i:;gypt« Apart 
from Britain's strategic noeds for the suez Canal .JHUQ, the 
Sues Canal itself had become so vital for hot oil ana ccxnmer-
cial requirements that i£ it was mismanaged or capturoa by any 
200 
Other csountJi^  she would suffer fixst and mjat* Jut in the 
chAngiog intornation^ situation Britain could no longer 
•8cap« from the impact of £gypti<ui national:lsia and above 
all from the growing J^ iaarloan pressure* zt was against this 
back ground that agreements over the future of Sudan (1953) 
and evacuation of uritish troops from tho Suez canal ^ i^ one 
(1954) were signed between Britain and Egypt* In Icx^ th tiiese 
events the united states not only offered it»3 good offices 
but also put a strong px»mevLr& on Britain to reach on final 
settliHaents* TUm US Ckyvernraant was then hop<iful that these 
developoMsnts might bring £gypt in the proposed Aiaerican do* 
fence alllenoe for the Middle East* In ordeir to soften the 
attitutde of now revolutionary leaders furtiier* iysierica imd 
offered Sgypt with economic and military aid* But at tim same 
time the US Government attached certain conditions* chief among 
them was the Egypt's acceptance to the .araerican lUddle £ast de-
feiwe scheme* for the delivery of arms* Britain which nad now 
become even hysterical to establish a joint comci^ nd in the iiid* 
die £a8t# in %fhich she was supposed to be oji iBg>urtant ally, 
after her departiuce frcm Palestine in 1947* nationalization 
of .i^ >adan oil refinery by Iran in 1951# and the Anglo i^ gyp* 
tian agreements of 1953 and 1954 ending her traditional hori-
tage in Sudan and £gypt* followed the American suit* i^ Je^ tern 
promises to Egypt were msver fulfilled* par^ tly <i\m to Israeli 
and Zionist opposition* and partly Egypt* .• s^n^acceptunce of 
the condition to this aid* 
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Since Oulleis diplooacy to enlist £gyp1; in a weatcsrn 
defezK^ ellionce had failed* he oevoloped e por^onal h<itred 
ageinat Nasser* %fho by now* had toecc«» the iiuw ha«ui o£ the 
state aiKi president of Council of Aavolution. This factor 
hod always played an ii^ portant role in the ctnsuing Suez 
crisis whi<^* however* created a danger of the third world 
war and brought Anwrica and Russia face to face in the Middle 
Sast* After Egypt's rej€»otion of the r^opos«td mSK, pl«in« Dulles 
invented the idea of a *itorthem Tier* alliance which was soon 
forwarded by Britain* By Qct<^ 3er* 1953* Tur>;ey* Iraq* Britain 
palcistan and Iran %iere linked by treaty* coomonly kxwwn as 
'BagtKiad pact** It is on irony that Acaerica which initiated 
the very idea of *rier* never Joind it* This floctuatcd dip-> 
lomacy of Dulles by introducing a plan and then withdrawing 
frocB it created a number of problems in the near i:uture. 
Svvon aftor the conclusion u£ Baghdau p«ict tlMo western* 
ai^ parti<wlarly the U*S. Egyptian relations)* which haa ii»-
proved considerably with the revolutionary xiegioie began to 
deteriorate* Nasser from the very beginning of til:^ accession 
to power dreamed of Arab unity .l«inking of Iraq with the *iMor-> 
thern Xier alliance ohallen^;^ Nasser's policies and threatend 
his role as a leader of the /irai;> World* He s^ everaly crltici-^ e^d 
this pact and persuaded the other Arab countries to denounce 
it as well* The eo^ pty handed return of the Tonpler mission 
from Jordan and later the fate of ijuri«>£s &aid had revealed 
that how successful i^ at^ ser was in his effort£>. 
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Israel and Russia wero ndturaily banlfitad by this 
situation. Soon after the formation uf Baghdad iract and 
return of Ben aurion to the Oovernm@nt as defence minister 
Zsrael argied forces attackiKi Egyptian nilit'iry instalations 
in the 0«aa strip. Oaza raid was proved to I^ G an *aXarn) bell* 
to tjasser* who« till now had not forgotten tkvQ humiliation 
whi^ the Egyptian army had to face aftor the defeat of the 
Palestine war* Uruler the pressure of the n<;w situation cre-
ated by the Israeli threat he once again ro|>eated tils request 
for the western arms* AS wevtem powers did not pay any att^ i^v-
tion to his reque^t^ he quicKly ttirned towairds Russia which 
•io(Mi long was looking for this opportunity» The Ruosion wo-
oing of Sgypt ttireatend the western intsrosts in the Riddle 
eastern region. But despite the Russian Egyptian arras deal 
the western power did not lose their hope to conciliate 
Nasser. As a result^ Dulles and iu<^n who initially wore 
reluctant to cooperato with the world Bank in finajncing 
the Aswan i^ am project had pron^tly offered their ^overcuauntw* 
help to £gypt* The Sudden change of their hoorts did not ef-
fect on Htmimx^a anti western policies. Aft«u the signing of 
the Baghdad pact he never nissed any opportunity to unuerc^t 
western influence or ititercsts in the region. The developments 
which had occured in the first half of 19S6« mode tite western 
govetiSBents realise that their policy of api>earoment hod fail-
ed with liesser. In retaliation the \JiiA and isritain withdrew 
their offers of financial support fur the CKinstruction of 
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th« Aswan High D«m« Tho World sank offer laj;^ »ad autoiaati-
ealXy as it vas conditional on Anglo«Aniario<»n support. In 
a Counter stroks u^aaar annoiincod the natloinallaation of 
the Sues Canal Coopany declaring that its nsvonuoe would 
be used to pay the IMW Dam* Hujh ThcMpas had rightly sold 
that tm nationalized the ^ues canal Company "Vshlefly to get 
aoney to finance the Dam but partly to snub the west In an 
obvious fashion". 
After the Russian arms cleal« the natlomallzatlon of the 
Canal was Nacsser's boldest action ogalnst tine imperialist £X>-> 
trers* overnight his prestige and pc^mlarlty reached a hgih 
pedestol* Arab mas&>€MS admired his boldness which no other 
Arab leaders had shown in dealing with the ii^ stern countries* 
He was desorlbed by some as the now 5aladin,i who would recon* 
<iuer Palestine" • Apart from the ^^ab worlds ijasser's action 
was Justified by India and fihe USSA* 7hroug]hi out the ^ iuez 
crisis these two ccmntrios played a major role in mobollsing 
the world opinion in favoiu: of £gypt* 
Western reaotlon to the natlonallzatioti of tho ;»uuz 
Canal was not unexpected* Since long thoy wiare trying to get 
rid of Hasser who day by day was b€»cc»aing a dange. t<^  their 
national interests in the i^ ilddle £ast* Britain and Franco, 
which were directly hit by the take over of the Canal« soon 
decided to i2se It as a pretext to justify their aggressive 
actions against i^ a^ ser. The main cause behind the French 
hostility against Hasser was his sup.^ ort to the Algerian 
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r«b«llloD* Srcn before the nation«Iiz«itio» o£ the »^ouz Canal, 
the Ftmn^ Ooveimmaiit began to collaborate with the Xuraell 
defenee uf£ieiai8 to over throv the arrogetft £:gyptlan ieadar 
whoee activities were equally harmful to thia zionii^ t ospira-
tioaa in Palestine* The attitude of the U3 iSovernmant was 
quite different than thoee of ite allies. W3iilu the united 
States shared the British and Trench f eelintis that I4asaer 
was the nain source of all their trouble in the tUddle seat 
and he oust be discredited^ it strongly opposed thd iinglo-
rxmaeh odlitary preparations against £gypt* purhaps* Dulles 
believed that despite of his governnant opp4;>8ition Britain 
and France would attack £gypt then wt^ Aasrica should ioe bran-
ded as an aggressor* OuUcui insoensly desire<l to punish ^ iasser 
for his open defiance with the U£ policies but ha did not like 
to tarnish Aaerica*s inatage in the Arab world* zt was also 
presvuned that Anerica's cocqparation with hax allies in the 
ensuing attack would facilitate Soviet's ph;/sical presence 
in the Middle £ast* From the very beginning of the &\MZ 
Crisis AoMriea had played a very safe game in w hioh Britain 
and France were used as the scapegoats* There is no definet 
proof that ftswrica had a prior knowledge of Israel's involve* 
aent in the Anglo*French planning* But it iM hard to believe 
that without the 133 encourageoent Zsr^tl cotuld dare to take 
such a bold step* Since America knew the we<etkne3Ge8 o£ tho 
aggressive 03untries« she coxild stop theta at any tioie if 
her political strata^ in the area rc^ iuired it* 
d,o 
Xnlti.ally Britain was hesitant to involve Israel in 
tlwir military motion «gain«t £gypt* £^n knew that even 
tia8«er*s strongest enemies would not for gi^ re Britain for 
her oollusion with Israel« l«abour Oi>position and the u^ non 
eo<i*<^ MMration %«ere other factors which had dULscouroging effect 
on Britain* But later £<len*s desire of reviingo had ov^r come 
all his fears and reasonings* Sden was aa#ar«i t^ iat Ic^ ially 
£jasser*s action was justified so he wanted to taJce this 
issue on the broader international grounds* when ;M3 failed 
to acmieve his objective even from the Security Council* he 
soon agreed on his government collusion witlt Israel. 
All the western panic and aopreheimion about the ri^ht 
of free passage and normal functioning of ti-te sues Canal v;era 
artifical* They exaggerated the issixe inordcsr to justify thoir 
hostile actions against Nasser ii^u> had beoonx^  a symbol of i^ab 
aspirations. After weeks of nationalization of the i>uez Canal on 
western «hip was denied free passage throt;tgh the Can^a. In 
fact the tripaartite aggresiuion was the result of a deep rooted 
conspirac:^ of isiperialiflt and Zionist foroect against the grow* 
ing Arab nationalism. 
The out come of the tripartite war worct discouraging 
to both Britain and France* Znslead of dsi^ tx.'oying Nasser# 
their action transformed him into a world figure* a leader 
of international stature* 7tK»y wanted to break up Arab unity* 
Sues brought Sgypt and ottter Arab countries closer tc each 
other (if tef!{>orarily}« rhe war did not weoi^ e^n nationalism 
A.Ai 
and P«nWUtabism tn tho Hl<ldl« S«0t tout intonoifiad it* It 
\mitod Asia and Africa in sharp oppoaitiun to £uruptt <UKi 
brought a 'third tiorid* into axistenee* Britain isrivimsily 
daairad to astabXiah intornational control ovar suaz Canal. 
7ha and of 1956 war lost avary possibility of it* France 
wanted to supress Algorian raballi<»i by destroying its main 
sourea of inspiration* Sha not only failed to do so but has* 
tand tha process of Algerian ii^l^pendance* 3^ ieir aoral and 
political positions ti^ ra further weakened in the v/orld and 
particularly in the Arab countries* Arabs wsro not only bet* 
ter of Anglo*S*reneh asoault on £^pt# but they wero hostile 
because there two countries brovight Israel as a partnor tA 
their collusion* Their lania excuses that by intervening 
toftween Israel and 2gypt they wanted to protect the Suess 
Canal had lost its validaty when t h ^ Jointly vetod the Secu-> 
rity Council reaolution (S/3710) calling for an ieamodiato cease 
fire between Israel and ggypt* Apart from this fact* the deve-
Icpoents which had oecured in the nionth of (Dctober, 19&6« re-
veal that the tripartite action against £^ i:>t i/as pre-planned* 
although Britain and France denied this alligation* 
The /liiglooFrench decision to attacic £y:/pt suefaca to have 
dominateu, largely b;^  their aootiomi* 2'hey i}nra>^ ed -.gy^ t raainl;^ 
to satisfy their wounded ego* ;^ a8&er*e policies of i^rab unity 
and independence under Egyptian loadyership was a cliallonye to 
Great Britain (and a les.^ er degree to Franco) which iiau dumi* 
nated Egypt from 1862 and the Arab world sirioe thu eriu of the 
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first World war* svoeuatlon of the British foreos from tha 
Su«s Can«l Zona* tollLwnA lay £9ypt'8 rsJolclogA with ^uvlot 
Forslgn Mlalstar# shopllov« had a hiuaillatlng af fact on Edan. 
It siMaa that la hla frustration ha undar estimated the gra-
vity of tha British eolluslon vlth Zaraal an, anaa^ o£ the 
Arabs* Tha affacts of tha AaglOi^ranch Invasion vera sc 
diyaaglng that even thalr frlands and public opinion had 
bac<»m» 9(vtm9 to tham« Zn Britain* anoroaous crowds* Incltad 
by tha labour opposition* took a hostlla tturn chanting that 
"fidan Mist go" and "Xiaw not War** ifowevar* tho Sutaz «i£falrs 
had caused tha political daath of British prliae Minister, 
Edan* «rt)o nsvar uttarad U9»tmK*» name without amotion. 
Zt Is Irony that thalr elosc«t ally Araarlca joind hand:;. 
with \»x greatest aaaaqr SUissla In suprasslng thalr action kxi 
£gypt* Through out tha Suez Crisis the u*^. attitude arxi ^kct" 
Ions* VK^xo»^&&. throt^h tha U.ii* and outside* wers mainly gui-
ded by her desire to strengthen her position in the oil rich 
Middle Bast* Zt was obvious that the shattoring Inmoge of Bri-
tain and Franca In the Arab world would be i>enif icoil tor AoKi-
rlcA*s strategic goals* Soon aftor tha natl^nallsi^tion of the 
Sues Canal* imlles assured Eden* that what i^ assar had atteinp-
ted to swallow was to be disgorged* But it was imlles* iiAio* 
Instead of Hasser* forced Britain* France* and zsrael to dis-
gorge what th4^ had swallowed In J^ gypt* Zn the iiuez crisis 
Dulles flactuatlxMI deploraacy Is an liic>ortant factor to con-
fus the A>^lo«Frencd> CovemniQnts* By pressurising the aggre-
ssors to cease fire and withdrawal frc»a ttie occu^ ied araas* 
2oa 
AMurioa inlMi»iKl9di to oatcbJLlsh bar laadorship in the region* 
TlMi U8 pollci*0 vttro motX'9tmd by har aalf i&h Intarssts but 
fostunataly th«y aavod the world froai the dsxag&c of a third 
great war. 
la CKMBe»ari«ion to Pranee and Britain^ xarctel's action 
vaa well calculated* and ita aina were clearly defined. ;^ he 
had extracted every poaaible benifit of the Anglo-French «>-
operation in her war efforts* The reault of the war proved 
that Zarael succeeded to achieve all her inrnedidto objectives, 
if iK>t her long term goals. Although under 1U^ strung ^ .jr&asure 
of the USA« the UN and the U.^H« Israel had to surrender her 
territorial gains* but once again her railitary superiority 
over Sgypt was recognised. Unlike Britain and France neither 
Israel's esH> nor her prestige were Involved with r«assdr« By 
attacking Egyptian territory* Israeli prims Minister lien* 
Gurion wanted to destroy hor ciilitary strentith because a st* 
roog sgypt was a constant danger to his ziotiist aspirations. 
Since Israel is a product of iraniorality and bad faith* sh@ 
never cared about the legality and norality uf her actions. 
The growing interest of Aoerica in the Middle ^a&tarn 
region eareated a grave situation for Soviet Russia. ii;yypt 
opposition to the %festem sponsored MKDO plan and later to 
Baghdad pact* brought au^ s^ia closer to the Egyptian loaoers 
The Russian ams deal with £g^pt was the first indicatiun 
that in the changing international situation the Hiddlo £ast 
ocniXd no longer remdin «« « j;mr«iy western spheres of influ-
ence. This fact wes further reoognlzea by tt%a active ^ orti-
elpetion of the soviet Aussie in the sues affair• In the ;sue2 
crisis Russia's role was prisaarily pro^^andistic* olthuugh 
it helped enorrauusly ia drivii^ Britain* France and 
Israel out of Egypt* ay her taotful diplomacy Russia won 
o w r the hearts of the Axabs* xn the aontha following the 
war* world had witnessed the growing Soviet and Comnunist 
influence in the Middle Sast« Zt is more oppropriate to s«y 
that the Suez affair paved the way for the ontry u£ the ;>ov<-
iet Union in the Arab world* which* since long the western 
Showers %#ere trying to ovoid* After Sues* Ariihs began to rea-
lize that iB|>eriali8m axid i^ ioniam were even ciore dangerous 
to their national interests than that of conBounisn* Dtiring 
the ;»uez crisis Russia and America seetasd t<;> he ooqperdtii^ 
in resolving the dispute* But the later develOi;>aients proved 
that their cooperation was 8)rK»rt lived* 
Araite bitterly denouxM::ed the Anglo*French action against 
SSQTPt because these tw? governiaents haO. sc^ i^ ht the support of 
Zionists to re-establish their control in tim Middle East* aofoe 
of the Arab countries expressed their sympathy to £gypt by bre-
•Jcing off dj^lofnatic relations with Britain and France* ;^ ryia 
reacted by blowing up the Iraq petruleum Coa^anyls pipline 
erosing their territory and .iiaudi Arabia stopped the flow 
of oil to Bahrain refinery* But no Arab coucttry made any 
nove to attack or even tiireaten Israel* 
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Anong the Aaian countries the role of XndXa had boen 
epprociablG* Zt did unite the third world to roioe tho 
voice agoinat the iotierieftifltJi and zioniets atrocities cc4»-
laitted in Egypt* Indie's eioral 8t;q;>port with oth&r isian and 
African cc»uitries provided the i^gyptiens thoir psycliologioal 
need vhich was imMh required in this grave siituation, 
Egypt had suffered a considerable lose from the tri{>artito 
attack* Apart from the military personiMils A mitaoer wf £g;^ ptian 
civilian lost their life* Israel's amy coptiupeoL a largo aiaount 
of ailitary equipment transport^sd fron Stussla and other CC4Q»U-> 
nist ccmntries* It was once again proved that ctecpitu Russian 
arnSf Egyptian araor could not defeat lsraeli£J* Egyptian <ioo«» 
nomy was hadly effected by this war and caused a hardship to 
Cairo Ooveroaent* But inopite of all these damages £gypt*s 
political gains wure enorraous* whatevur the cost Nasser had 
to pmy in the 1956 war# )KI succeeded in tarnishing tho western 
and particularly British influence in the region* By establish-
ing international control over Sues Canal* which was regarded 
as a synble of dignity and pride by the Sgyptianst these po-
wers oaq^ octed tho political death of uasser in Egypt as well 
as in the Arab world* liasser not only saved the iiuQz Canal 
(to %rt)ich he had sacrifised the desserted Sinai penuensula 
and aharm el Sheik areas) but used it as a diplonatic v.e^ o^n 
against the Anglo-French Govomtnants* After the Sues episode 
Arab had beo;»» even more responsive to his pan A r ^ policies 
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than bofore. in Syria and Boxdan strong pro^Haeaer groups 
cans into powar# establlahing cloaer relations with ^ g^ypt. 
ZQ Fobruacy 1956# figypt and Syria procXainad thair union 
(though short iiyed) in a Unitad Arab Republic. In fact« 
Nasser lost the battle but won the war. 
In general* the Suez war generated a nuisber of the 
new probl«cas in the Middle ii;ast* It paved tlie way for the 
entry of Soviet Russia in the region which intensified the 
cold war between the two super powers, with the £ast west 
confrontation there was further worsening of the iurab Israeli 
relations. The A r ^ hopes for the American xrapproachement 
with theaw raised by her strong opposition to Anglo-French 
Israeli invasion against £gypt« proved to be illusory. Fi« 
nally« we nay sm^ that the crisis %rtiich erupted in 1956 was 
patched t^ by the efforts of the UN« the USA* the ussa and 
the third world countries* but att«ai|>ts to have a durable 
solution continue to remain elusive. 
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